"My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"

“His [Jesus’] capacity for suffering was commensurate with the ideal character of his humanity, with his ethical perfection, and with his sense of righteousness and holiness and veracity. No one could feel the poignancy of pain and grief and moral evil as Jesus could. But besides these more common sufferings there were also the sufferings caused by the fact that God caused our iniquities to come upon him like a flood.” —Louis Berkhof

“It is with the holiest fear that we should approach the terrible fact of the sufferings of our Lord. Let no one think that those were less because he was more. The more delicate the nature, the more alive to all that is lovely and true, lawful and right, the more does it feel the antagonism of pain, the inroad of death upon life; the more dreadful is that breach of the harmony of things whose sound is torture. He felt more than man could feel, because he had a larger feeling. He was even therefore worn out sooner than another man would have been. These sufferings were awful indeed when they began to invade the region about the will; when the struggle to keep consciously trusting in God began to sink in darkness; when the will of the Man put forth its last determined effort in that cry after the vanishing vision of the Father: My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? Never had it been so with him before. Never before had he been unable to see God beside him. Yet never was God nearer him than now. For never was Jesus more divine. He could not see, could not feel him near; and yet it is ‘My God’ that he cries. 

Thus the will of Jesus, in the very moment when his faith seems about to yield, is finally triumphant. It has no feeling now to support it, no beatific vision to absorb it. It stands naked in his soul and tortured, as he stood naked and scourged before Pilate. Pure and simple and surrounded by fire, it declares for God. The sacrifice ascends in the cry, My God. The cry comes not out of happiness, out of peace, out of hope. Not even out of suffering comes that cry. It was a cry in desolation, but it came out of faith. It is the last voice of Truth, speaking when it can but cry. The divine horror of that moment is unfathomable by human soul. It was blackness of darkness. And yet he would believe. Yet he would hold fast. God was his God yet. My God—and in the cry came forth the victory, and all was over soon. Of the peace that followed that cry, the peace of a perfect soul, large as the universe, pure as light, ardent as life, victorious for God and his brethren, he himself alone can ever know the breadth and length, and depth and height.” —George MacDonald

The ends and nature of true obedience according to William Ames

Reformed minister and theologian William Ames (1576–1633) instructs the reader about the goals and nature of true obedience to God. What follows is in full agreement with Canons of Dort, I.8, I.13, and V.13 (unsurprisingly, since Ames was secretary of Johannes Bogerman [1576–1637], the president of the Synod of Dort, during that synod).

 

27. The chief end [of obedience] is God’s glory; for we attend to God by obedience, upon whom we lean by Faith; otherwise obedience would not flow from Faith. Seeing also that Faith is our life, as it joins us to God in Christ, it is necessary that the actions of that same Faith, which are contained in obedience, should also be carried to God; that is, to his glory. 

28. The lesser principal end is our own salvation and blessedness. Romans 6:22, Being made servants to God, you have your fruit in holiness, and the end, eternal life; Hebrews 12:2, For the joy that was set before him, he endured the Cross. 

29. For although obedience performed only for fear of punishment or expectation of reward is rightly called mercenary, yet if any [believer] were secondarily stirred up to do his duty by looking at the reward, or for fear of punishment; this is not alien to the sons of God, nor does it in any part weaken their solid obedience. 

30. But our obedience is not the principal or meritorious cause of eternal life. For we both receive the privilege of this life and also life itself, by grace, and as the gift of God for Christ’s sake, apprehended by Faith. Romans 6:23, The gift of God is eternal Life in Jesus Christ our Lord. But our obedience is in a certain manner the ministering, helping, and furthering cause toward the possession of this life, the right of which we had before; in this respect, it is called the way in which we walk to heaven (Eph 2:10).

31. But obedience furthers our life both in its own nature—because it is some degree of the life which itself is always tending toward perfection—and also by virtue of the promise of God, who has promised eternal life to those who walk in his precepts. Galatians 6:8, He that sows to the spirit, from the spirit shall reap eternal life. 

32. For although all our obedience while we live here is imperfect and defiled with some mixture of sin (Galatians 5:17, the flesh lusts against the Spirit), yet in Christ it is so acceptable to God, that it is crowned with the greatest reward. 

33. Therefore the promises made according to the obedience of the faithful are not legal [as of debt], but evangelical [as of grace]; although some call them mixed (Mat 6:3).

William Ames, The Marrow of Sacred Divinity 
(London, Edward Griffin, 1639),
book 2, chapter 1, articles 27–33

"Christianity is the truth both of optimism and pessimism." — Hans L. Martensen

An optimist and a pessimist, by Vladimir Makovsky  (1846–1920)

 

Hans Lassen Martensen (1808–1884) was a Danish Lutheran bishop, theologian, and thinker. He was a contemporary of Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), with whom he had a very complicated relationship (not merely because of Kierkegaard, from what I can understand). 

Like Kierkegaard, Martensen was a complicated figure (both theologically and personally), though for different reasons. Martensen was fascinated by the philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831). Though Martensen read Hegel critically, Martensen speculated about progress and historical development along Hegelian lines (one of the reasons that attracted Kierkegaard's fierce criticism). 

However, I found Martensen's discussion on (philosophical) optimism and pessimism both insightful and balanced, a good way between the cosmic pessimism of Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) and Hegel's Christ-less optimism.

These are passages that I selected from Martensen's Christian Ethics: Vol. 1, General Part, trans. C. Spence (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1873), 164–191. I believe they contain helpful philosophical, theological, and psychological considerations.

Non-Christian optimism and pessimism defined

Naturalistic optimism, apart from Christianity, ignores sin and redemption, and is ignorant that the world, by the Fall, lias become this world; it assumes that this world still maintains its original condition, when "God saw all that He had made, and, behold, it was very good." [Genesis 1:31] The supreme Good has never been lost, the world's harmony has never been disturbed; the world preserves a normal position, a normal development; and everything viewed from the standpoint of totality is good. The supreme Good is the free self-development of humanity in a world affording all the required conditions. The optimist view of life takes in only the creative and sustaining powers of existence, and shuts out the contemplation of death and disorder. Evil is considered as only a defect, a limitation, nay, as the condition for life movement and progress; the supreme Evil is only lack of wisdom, ignorance and barbarism, which are to be overcome by advancing culture.

The view of life diametrically opposed to this, which we shall call pessimism, assumes, on the other hand, either that the world originally, and from the beginning until now, has been and remains a vale of sorrow, that man was formed for suffering and for a disturbed development of life; or it admits a golden age in the beginning of history, which has disappeared and given place to a depravity ever on the increase. But its constant complaint is that the supreme Good cannot be found by man in this world, that the supreme Good is but a mere ideal, a thought, an image of the fancy, generated by human desire, and which unhappily man must ever pursue with eagerness; whilst the reality presents to him only the supreme Evil, namely life, and even existence, as an unsolved and unsolvable problem of dissonance—a painful contrast to the pretensions of the ideal. [166]

The Christian view on optimism and pessimism

Christianity is the truth both of optimism and pessimism. It is pessimist, in that it teaches that the whole world lieth in wickedness, that man has a lost paradise behind him, that the supreme Good has disappeared, that human life with all its excellences only shows us the ruins of an empire which has been overthrown, since man by the abuse of his free-will has lost his royal dignity on earth. But it is optimist, in that it teaches that it is possible for man to be redeemed and to be reinstated in his sovereignty, that the supreme Good is restored in Christ, who has opened again the gates of paradise. [167]

The advantage of non-Christian optimism over non-Christian pessimism

If we compare optimism and pessimism as they appear in the natural life of man, the last of the two may be designated as the more elevated view, since it unveils the incongruity of the reality with the ideal, which optimism conceals. Pessimism, in the midst of its errors, has yet a deeper perception than optimism of the jar in existence; and just because of this more correct apprehension of the actual condition of the disturbed harmony, it is the constant corrector of the other, troubling the calm of its contemplation. Yet optimism and pessimism are near akin, bearing the relation of immediate perception and reflection. They are both found at all times in the human race. For man has an impulse to life, and finds satisfaction and enjoyment in existence, whilst, on the other hand, he bears sin and sorrow secretly in his heart.

It is indeed characteristic of pagan pessimism, that the ethical is more or less dominated by the fatalistic, that the blame of the whole is cast on a mysterious destiny. But yet it approaches more closely to Christianity than does this self-satisfied optimism; for "they that are whole have no need of a physician, but they that are sick" [Luke 5:31-32; Mark 2:17; Matt. 9:12].

The contemplation of the condition of paganism at the time of Christ's birth is specially instructive, because it shows us the result to which this belief at last conducted through the long course of its history, the total absence of result, the pure nihilismus in which the whole terminates. Through sorrow the way is opened to the acknowledgment of sin, and the pessimism of Christian ethics paves the way for true Optimism...The Optimism of unrenewed human nature never permits itself to be carried through to a conclusion. [167–168]

What non-Christian optimism gets right

There is no one who does not require to listen to it, who does not require to open his eyes to the beauties of creation and of human life; no one who does not require this appeal to contemplate the grandeur of life, not merely in what is most elevated, but also in the minute and lowly, not merely in the far removed, but also in that which lies nearest to us, and which just on that account is so unnoticed, whether it be the sunbeam which shines in on us in our chamber, or the men who appear to us so commonplace, but in whom there is yet something original, some ray of eternity, if we have but eyes to perceive it; or it may be the circumstances or the occupation which we look upon as so trivial and unimportant, but of which we might make something useful and important, if we had but energy and love. The question is only, if pessimism is really excluded by such life-teaching, without the intervention of Christianity. We maintain that all optimism which is not Christian contains a pessimism, hidden and repressed it may be, but not annihilated. [169]

The fixation of non-Christian pessimism

The want of result in which optimism terminates, and which it most commonly seeks to conceal from itself, is, from the first, prominently brought forward by pessimism as the great, all-embracing, fundamental discovery. Pessimism fixes its glance on the disturbing and destroying powers, and beholds these as the conquering. In nature, it discerns everywhere death in life  in human affairs, the evil overpowering the good; in history, the incessant rolling of a Sisyphus stone; and thence arrives at the conclusion that the life of man is without aim, the last object and intention of existence—nothing. Not the less does it continue to demand an ideal of a world which must be real; and however otherwise it may be regulated, this work must always be such that the individual can find in it absolute satisfaction. This contradiction, at the same time denying the ideal and demanding it, often appears like scepticism, as doubt of the reality of life ; but in the very demand for this reality there lurks a secret belief that it is to be found. Sceptic pessimism must therefore clear gradually into belief or sink into fatalism. [174]

The tragic in the world

It is only through true pessimism that we can arrive at true optimism. We add still further, that as Christian pessimism finds its corroboration in the actual experience of life, so also its truth is powerfully confirmed by the great phenomena of the tragic and the comic. We speak not here of the poetic art, but of the tragic and the comic, as cosmological appointments, as essential conditions of the present world over which we are moved both to laughter and to tears. They both preach the old text: "All is vanity!" [Ecclesiastes]

Let us then take first the tragic, and inquire what sort of world, what general condition of the world, does it exhibit to us? Does it not show us a world of liberty, which is at once a world of crime and a world of cruel destiny—a world which just on the principal points of the moral life exhibits a painful contrast between the ideal and the reality? Does it not show us ideal men, who succumb to the complications of the life of free-will? Does it not show us the overthrow of the magnanimous, the beautiful, the noble, the good—a contradiction which can only find its solution in the contrast which Christianity institutes between this world, the course of this world, this present world, and the world that is to come, which last contains the possibility of solution? 

The tragic, as the painful contrast between ideal and reality, lias in its lower forms a fatalistic impress; but in the highest fornis the fatalistic is changed into the ethical, fate into guilt. The contrast between ideal and reality appears already in nature, and in the relation of nature to man. It oppresses our feelings as a painful contradiction that creation in all its beauty must submit to decay, that the animal world is subjected to such great sufferings, that the powers of nature so often encroach upon human life, that blooming manhood, just at the point where it should most gloriously unfold itself, is blighted by a gnawing worm; that an unfortunate accident—and the number of unhappy accidents is legion—suddenly annihilates the anticipations of a great future. This feeling still more oppresses us when we see the ideal life of free-will so often struggling, perishing under sickness and bodily suffering, in poverty and want.

Yet not merely external fate oppresses us with the feeling above named, but also when we obtain a glimpse of the inner being of men, human individualities; when we see many noble and beautiful characters perish, not by external fate, but from an internal mental agony, which is deeply seated in their individuality, their will, their affection, since they are devoured by an inward contradiction, and cannot attain equilibrium as regards their surroundings, so that towards these they are like plants indigenous to a milder region, when transported to a bleak and ungenial climate. [I wonder if Martensen is thinking about Kierkegaard here.]

Actual life shows us in many ways that there are such minds [the ones described in the previous paragraph], for whom in this world there is no preparation (except that of redemption); whilst we cannot avoid the assertion that these mental sufferings are on account of sin, not merely personal sin, but also that of the race, the effects of which, like that of a benumbing prose, are death-bringing to those finer natures which are devoted to an ideal passion. The tragic, in the present course of the world, shows itself more clearly in its ethical significance, in the fact that those who stand high in the moral world, who, armed with mighty power of action, aspire to realize a great ideal, again and again perish through their own crime. [181–183]

Aesthetic tragic
It is this form of the tragic which dramatic poetry specially makes its subject (historic tragedy); and the history of the world shows us constantly the same phenomenon, shows us the destruction of heroes, because these either pursue a merely subjective ideal, or because they wish to carry a real ideal beyond its limits. It is essential to the representations of dramatic art, and enforced by Aristotle and Hegel, that the tragic hero must have a crime, and that in a tragedy no perfectly good and upright being should be represented as suffering entirely without blame, because this would be too distressing;, too woundings to the moral feelings. [183]

The tragedy of the world at the tragedy of the cross

We will not contest the merely aesthetic validity of this theory. But actual life does not restrain itself within these limits. It shows us in this world the good in itself, the absolutely just, perishing; shows us that there is a suffering on account of sin, which is not a suffering for personal guilt, but exclusively a suffering for the guilt of others for the sin of the nation, for that of the race; shows us the rejection and crucifixion of Christ by men; shows us under different forms the verification of the Saviour's words  "Jerusalem, Jerusalem, that killest the prophets, and stonest them that are sent unto thee; how often would I have gathered thy children together, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, but ye would not!" [Matt. 23:37] Under the cross of Christ, on the height of Golgotha, the real nature of the world displays itself. Here the optimism of the natural man fades, though it is just here that a higher optimism originates. But the utmost which here appears is this: So stands it in this world; this is the earthly fate of sacred truth and uprightness! [183–184]

The comic in the world

But the same world which shows us the tracrlc shows us also the comic. The comic is an indirect testimony to the validity of the pessimist theory. The comic contemplation of the world views it not as a world of sin, of guilt, of destiny, but as one of folly and fortuitous occurrences. Here is no painful contrast, but one entirely painless, which calls forth in the mind a feeling of pleasure of quite a peculiar kind. But in its inmost essence the world of folly is the world of sinfulness; only where there is sin, where freedom has declined from its ideal, can there be folly. Folly, or the intellectual contrast, the intellectual opposition to the ideal, has its presupposition and origin in the ethical contrast, in the contrast of the will to the ideal.

As now, in the comic contemplation of the world, the ethical consideration is withheld, and as it were suspended, as the comic contrast to the ideal is without suffering—a contrast which dissolves itself in laughter—it may certainly be affirmed that the comic view of the world may, above all, be designated optimist. Tragedy brings Pessimism into view; comedy, on the other hand, exhibits optimism: for in all dilemmas, difficulties, and dangers, it is apparent that these are only imaginary and to be overcome, that the perils of this life "have no necessity," and that all will come right in the end. But comic optimism is only apparent—is only, in the strict significance of the term, a mere phenomenal superficial optimism, under which tlie real character of existence is concealed; while, on the contrary, this is unveiled by the pessimism of tragedy. Comic optimism has moral earnestness, and thereby pessimism, in the veiled background, as folly has sin in the background, as fortune and the easy play of chance have stern fate in the background; and it is a shrewd observation, that the comic writer acts wisely in letting the curtain fall at the exact instant when the game is at its height: for if he should carry on his narrative, and show us how it fared with these fortunate beings at a later period of their history, he would infallibly arrive at a time of misery, in which there opens a wide field for pessimism.

In humour, the mind does not soar merely above this or that individual matter, but above the whole world of relativities, above the contrast between the great and the small, the high and the trivial, nay, even over tragic pathos, in so far as human earnestness, even when it embraces the great and the high, is encumbered with a limitation of naiveté, a narrowness of perception which causes it to confound the humanly great with the absolutely great—a limitation by which the heroes of tragedy often show themselves to be encumbered. Thus they maintain the relatively great aim which they pursue, and for which they suffer shipwreck, to be the unconditionally great and important. Humour makes the diversity between great and small fluctuating; for it possesses a sharp eye for the fact that great and small, the high and the trivial, the deep and the superficial, the touching and the ridiculous, approach each other nearly, and often pass over into each other: wherefore it is also the union of weeping and laughter, of smiles and tears. Undoubtedly this humoristic contemplation, which soars above this whole world of relativities, must have its ultimate hold, its last refuge, in something which is not relative, in the absolutely great—namely, in God. And there is therefore a twofold kind of humour. There is a humour which rests in religion, in faith, and which in religious reconciliation has overcome Pessimism. In a partial manner this humour often sparkles forth in Luther's letters, and in his Tischreden (Table-talk). But there is also a humour in which consciousness in this world of tragedy and comedy has not found its refuge in religion, but seeks a final refuge without finding one—an unhappy, shattered consciousness, which vainly craves repose and satisfaction in this world of contrasts, and which now, by making everything fluctuating, seeks deliverance from the pressure which rests on the mind. An example of this melancholy humour is that of Hamlet, who endeavours to escape from the heavy burden of his soul by indulging in a philosophic humour—a philosophy which, in spite of its brilliant and deep thought, is without result, and ends in unsubdued dissonance. [184–188]

The tragic's and the comic's common witness

Thus both the tragic and the comic—the former directly, the latter indirectly—bear testimony to the sin and misery of the world, a world needing redemption. Though it has not seldom been asserted that writers or actors of comedy pay homage to an optimist view of the world, yet experience most frequently shows the very opposite. [188]

The failure of non-Christian optimism and pessimism

It appears from all that has been remarked in the foregoing pages concerning the condition of the world, from the ancient complaint on its vanity, from the tragic and the comic as its essential qualities, that the Optimism of the natural life of man cannot be carried through to the end, because that its Pessimism always hursts forth. But, on the other side, neither can the Pessimism of the natural life of man be carried through, just because the character of the world is a mixture of good and evil, and not exclusively the one or the other. Pessimism carried out to the end would be absolute despair. But while this may indeed affect certain individuals and particular periods, it is not true of maidvind as a whole. Not merely do the creating and sustaining powers continue to react against those of destruction; not merely do life and the impulse to life and its enjoyments, merely for life's sake and without any wherefore...there is, moreover, in tlie heart of man an ineffaceable feeling of certainty that suffering and death cannot be the ultimate object of life—an imperturbable hope, which after each mortification arises anew, that in spite of all obstacles and restrictions, a highest Good must yet at last be possible as the portion of humanity, and that there must be possibility for a happy result as regards the whole. [189–190]

Christianity's optimism and pessimism (190–191)

Christian pessimism and optimism are both merely relative ideas, which will not stand the test of practice and experience, for which reason also most men alternately follow both views entirely according to circumstances; which may also be expressed thus, that most men live in an unsolved contradiction, which is exactly the fundamental character of this world. 

Pessimists are to be found who live according to optimist maxims, who, whilst lamenting over this world as a vale of tears, contrive not the less in daily life to make themselves as comfortable as possible, which is notably the case with Schopenhauer, who has written a so-called lower eudaimonistic system of morality and prudence, to which he adheres in practice, in direct opposition to his ascetic "doctrine of unhappiness" (Uugluckseligheitslelire) which he developed in theory. 

Optimists are to be found who live in a pessimist frame of mind; for whilst, as regards the human race as a whole, they maintain that all is well, that everything in this world goes on exactly as it ought, yet in their own concerns, and in their daily circumstances and relations, they are vexed and irritated, complain incessantly over much which is wrong, and which must and ought to be entirely otherwise. 

Systems of philosophy endeavour to escape this contradiction, but life constantly exhibits it afresh under forms innumerable.

Doubtless, also, in the Christian life many inconsistencies appear; yet it is Christianity alone which makes it possible for man to attain, in the deepest sense, unity in his view of life and in his frame of mind—to combine without self-contradiction optimism and pessimism. As Christianity, by awakening consciousness of sin and of guilt, awakens the true fundamental pain of existence in regard to which all other sorrows and calamities are subordinate, so it awakens also the true exaltation over all misery which hallows every pure and innocent joy. In showing us existence in the light of redemption, it shows us the new creation as the completion of the first, gathering up the fragments of this world into a whole whenever the eve is fixed on that structure which is to be erected in the fulness of time, so that all things may be assembled under Christ as their head. And although Christian consciousness only sees the perfecting of the world and of individuals in hope—and there will thus always be in the Christian mind a tinge of pain at the contrast between the ideal and the reality, a craving for the overthrow of the fragmentary and the substitution of the complete—yet there is agreement in the inmost being, in faith and in love, which work for the coming of God's kingdom. 

Aristotle has said that great and noble minds have a disposition to melancholy; and the truth of this saying is confirmed by history, both in the pre-Christian and the Christian world, because such minds have a perception of the great dissonance, of which the multitude are unconscious. It may be added that it is not by any means to great minds alone that this is applicable, but to every real Christian. But this pain is constantly changed into joy, as it is thus expressed in an old Danish song:

Never am I without grief, 
Never still without relief.

“Watchman! What of the Night?” — A poem

A poem of despair and hope.

“Watchman! What of the Night?" is the title of one of my poems. It appeared in the May/June 2023 issue of Modern Reformation. The poem is available online on the magazine's website. You can read it by clicking on the picture below.

©

Herman Witsius on the utility of holiness for the believer

The following excerpt is from chapter 16 of Conciliatory or Irenical Animadversions,
by Herman Witsius (1636–1708).

That is it not inconsistent we live to Christ, and consult our own advantage

V. It is certain indeed that the true Christian lives to Christ, that is, to his glory; but it does not follow from thence that he does nothing for his own advantage. It is not contrary to the duty of a holy man, to desire life, long days, and enjoy good (Ps. 34:13). Nor did Eliphaz the Temanite advise Job amiss: "pray, acquaint thyself with him, and be at peace: whereby good shall come unto thee" (Job 22:21). Nor is it unlawful to anticipate how good it shall be for me if I live to Christ." It is good for me, to draw near to God" (Ps. 73:28).

That we must do good because we live, and that we may live

VI. In fine, it is not inconsistent to do something from this principle, because we live, and to the end, that we may live. No man eats indeed but he lives, but he also eats that he may live. We both can and ought to act in a holy manner, because we are quickened by the Spirit of God. But we must also act in the same manner, that that life may be preserved in us, may increase, and at last terminate in an uninterrupted and eternal life. Moses said excellently of old, Deut. 30:19-20, "I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set life and death before you: therefore choose life, that thou mayest live, in loving the Lord thy God, obeying his voice, and cleaving unto him, for he is thy life." Deut. 7:1, "Observe to do, that ye may live." And [Deut.] 30:6, "The Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart to love the Lord thy God, that thou mayest live." Truly these speeches are not legal, but evangelical.

That it is good and holy that in the study of good works we have a regard also to our own salvation
VII. Secondly, a mercenary baseness is certainly unworthy of the high born sons God; but their heavenly Father does not forbid them to have any regard to their own advantage in the exercise of holiness. He not only permits, but also willeth "that by a patient continuance in well-doing, we seek for glory, and honour, and immortality;" and to them who do so, he will render eternal life (Rom. 2:6-7). And though he requires us to love him above all, yet he does not command that all love to ourselves be entirely banished. For we are not bound to love our neighbour, and not to love ourselves. It is also just that the study of holiness be excited in us by this love to ourselves. For, pray, what is the end of all these promises, whereby God hath commended his precepts to us, but that stimulated with a desire after them, we might the more cheerfully obey him? Not to love the benefits promised, is to contemn the goodness of God who promiseth. Not to be animated to piety through a desire after them, is to abuse them to a purpose quite opposite to that for which they were designed of God. David himself confessed that the precepts of God were far more desirable than gold, yea, than fine gold; and sweeter than honey, and the honey-comb, even on that account, because in keeping them there is great reward" (Ps. 19:10-11). And the faith of Moses is commended "because he had respect to the recompence of the reward" (Heb. 11:26). Yea, that faith is required of all who "come unto God, whereby they must believe that he is the rewarder of them who diligently seek him" (v. 6).

Provided that love to ourselves be properluy subordinate to the love of God
VIII. But at the same time this love to ourselves ought to flow from the love of God, be subordinate, and referred to it. It is not lawful to love God for our own sake, so as to consider ourselves as the end, and him as the means, by the enjoyment of whom we are rendered happy. But since we are the property of God, whom we ought to love above all. things, therefore we are also bound to love ourselves in relation to him. Our good is therefore to be sought, that in it we may taste the sweetness of the Lord, and that his peculiar treasure may be so much the more increased. Thus love to ourselves shall at last be absorbed in the ocean of love Divine. The subject itself obliges me to repeat here what I observed elsewhere.

That godliness is profitable to all things
IX. Thirdly, neither is it agreeable to the perpetual tenor of the Scriptures, that we reap no real advantage from duties rightly performed; that no evil is averted by prayers, fastings, and penitence; and that neither peace of conscience, nor joy of heart, are promoted by the exercise of virtue. Certainly this is contrary to the Mosaic doctrine, Deut. 6:18, "Do that which is right, that it may be well with thee." Add verse 3: "He who followeth after righteousness and mercy, shall find life;" "righteousness, and honour,” saith the writer of the Proverbs, chap. 21:21. Paul tells us that "godliness is great gain, and that it is profitable unto all things, having the promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come" (1 Tim 4:8), and that "good works are good and profitable unto men" (Titus 3:8). [Witsius also references 1 Tim. 6:6, "But godliness with contentment is great gain."]

That by it impending calamities are avoided, and peace of conscience and joy promoted

X. That impending calamities are averted by penitence, is taught of God, Jer. 18:7-8 ["At what instant I shall speak concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdom, to pluck up, and to pull down, and to destroy it; if that nation, against whom I have pronounced, turn from their evil, I will repent of the evil that I thought to do unto them."]. And remarkable is Zephaniah's speech, chap. 2:3, "Seek the Jehovah, all the meek of the earth, who work his judgment, seek righteousness, seek meekness, it may be ye shall be hid in the day of Jehovah's anger.” Further, it is written in Isaiah, chap. 32:17, "That the work of righteousness shall be peace, and the effect of righteousness, quietness and assurance for ever." In the same prophet we are also taught, that if any "cease to do evil, and learn to do well, it shall come to pass that their sins, though as scarlet, shall be white as snow; and though red like crimson, they shall be as wool," chap. 1:16-18. He also teaches "that if any man rightly observed the Sabbaths of the Lord, he should delight himself in the Lord," chap. 58:13-14. 

When we believe the Scripture asserting all these things, we do not believe that the exercises of virtue or religion merit any such thing, or that the efficacy of these duties is so great, that of themselves, setting aside the divine blessing, they can procure benefits, or avert calamities: but we believe, so great is the goodness of our heavenly Father, that for Christ's sake, he liberally rewards the sincere endeavours of his children, who rejoice to please him. "For God is not unrighteous to forget your work and labour of love, which ye have shewed toward his name" (Heb. 6:10).

20 questions to Joshua R. Farris, author of "The Creation of Self"

1. Joshua, tell us a bit about yourself and your research interests.
   I grew up in the broader St. Louis area. I was a military brat as they say. I went to school at Missouri Baptist University. From there I went on to study at the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, then to the University of Bristol to study under Oliver D. Crisp (one of the forerunners of the Analytic Theology movement). During my doctoral work I focused on the relationship between human constitution and the origin of souls. This has probably been the area that has motivated the most interest across the disciplines of theology, philosophy, and science and religion. However, I have also done some work that motivates the new renaissance in idealism for philosophers and theologians. Additionally, I have research interests in science-engaged theology, theological anthropology, the beatific vision, Reformed theology, and atonement theology. My first book is a constructive theological exploration of Cartesianism in constitution and the origin of the soul studies. My second book is An Introduction to Theological Anthropology: Humans, Both Creaturely and Divine. My third book is The Creation of Self: A Case for the Soul, which makes an argument for the soul and that God is required as an explanation, even causal explanation.

2. What have you worked on that feeds into The Creation of Self? 
   Aah, yes, well I’ve been thinking about the philosophy of mind, the mind body relation, and the nature of consciousness since my dissertation. I had an intuition about a particular view of the soul that yields not only theism, but yields creationism of souls where God is the direct and immediate cause of souls. Of course, this text draws more heavily from my philosophical works, but it is also theological in nature. It is a piece of natural theology, which provides an important contribution in the context of Consciousness arguments for God. At its heart, however, this is a deeply theological work. It is theological in the sense that it points the reader to God as the explanation for souls.

3. What is the big picture in The Creation of Self?
   The big picture has been suggested, but really it is all about the self as soul, which is ultimately theological in nature. It is not only controversial to talk about the soul and to defend it, but to argue for God. In fact, the argument that I make here raises additional questions about God’s relation to the world as well as how we understand the scientific method. Biological evolution, whatever you think of it or your commitments are, is insufficient to bring about individualized or personalized soul that is you. This is of course a ripe time to think about this as there is a lot going on in terms of consciousness studies, AI, soul studies, and so on. There is something about you that makes you you that is more than the generalities that you have. And, this is precisely why recent proposals of the self as a social construction, personality traits, animal body, the brain make a proposal like this controversial but also important. There is something about persons that is deeply theological.

4. What is a soul?
   A soul is a substance of a certain kind. Substances are property bearers, they have some independence from other particulars or objects. They are the bearers of mental events and are characterized as the type of things that make choices, has thoughts, experiences, and is characterized more by qualities than quantities.
   

5. What are the main reasons you believe in the soul?
   There is a question about the marks of the mental. I think these features require not only linguistic dualism (as different descriptions of the material), but property dualism and almost certainly logically presuppose a distinct type of substance of those features. These features include intentionality, privacy of the mental, introspection. These are features that seem, if they are true, to logically require a new substance—a thing that owns them, binds them, and is unlike that of the brain. Of course there are some who take the mental seriously who reject what you might call reductive physicalism, identity physicalism or eliminativism, and presume that the subject/individual remains material but the mind as a set of properties/capacities is totally new in nature. I think this is questionable and doesn’t work for a variety of reasons. One of the reasons is that the very modal intuitions we have about the possibility of survival, the distinctions between the substances, zombie and ghost intuitions require or, at a minimum, are best explained by a soul along the lines that I have described already.

6. What brand of the soul do you affirm in The Creation of Self?
   I affirm a brand often called Neo-Cartesian substance dualism in contrast to what some call hylemorphic dualism, Thomistic dualism or Kantian dualism.

7. What is substance dualism?
   Substance dualism, generally speaking, is the view that there exist two types of substances that are the bearers of distinct types of properties, the carriers of specific capacities and powers. These two include body and soul, but there are a variety of ways to make sense of them. My brand says that I am my soul or the core of me is my soul that has a body and interacts in deep and intimate ways with the body.
   

8. What version of the mind-body are you affirming and how might this impact how we see God and how we do theology?
   Neo-Cartesianism is a position not only on the soul but on the mind-body relation. I am strongly sympathetic to it, but that is not the main focus of the argument in the book. The argument of the book is more focused on the nature of the soul as an individualized thing, a substance of consciousness.. That being said, it seems to have implications for the mind-body relation (by mind I am largely taking as synonymous with the soul, but you might think of it more as a power of the soul). One of the implications is that the soul is so radically distinct from the body that it lends itself to not the sort of view called hylomorphism, at least not as it is normally construed along form-matter ontology, powers ontology or something of the sort. Rather the two substances are so different that they do not overlap, even if they are functionally integrated and fit for the other. But as John Foster noted: at one level there do seem to be reasons to affirm the functional integrity of the body and soul, yet there is not the scientific precision that can be given to it in say the way that you might give to brain mapping and explaining what is taking place when neurons fire and where they fire spatially. There is, in other words a reality there that we experience, but not one that should be construed along empirical lines. And, at one level the relation will point us back to God as fitting the two for the other. There is, then, a seeming of arbitrariness for some.

9. What do you see as the relation between philosophy and theology and how does this map onto history?
   I see them as complimentary and respecting certain domains of knowledge. In a representative way as we see in the older distinctions of natural knowledge and supernatural knowledge, although I prefer the latter to be called ‘particular’ knowledge but still have some place for supernatural with reference to the beatific vision. There is some overlap between the domains and while I am open to the possibility of a demonstrative natural theological argument for the Trinity I think that it is unlikely to be a strong argument and should be reserved for particular revelation. We can be sure that the Trinity is true based on particular revelation. That being said I would include other categories and topics as properly a part of particular revelation (e.g., sin, aspects of human nature, salvation, ecclesiology). While these subjects should be rigorously thought through with the categories of reason, good metaphysics, they are properly located as arising out of particular revelation. We can use outside tools to illuminate our understanding of particular revelation or even interrogate it, but natural revelation does not override or replace particular revelation. We need both. A part of what is so distinctive about particular revelation is the ‘particular’ truths it gives to us about God, namely the truths that we find in the concrete historical person Jesus Christ. It is here that we find a particular revelation that is, arguably, Sui generis and not properly a piece of natural revelation (although some have considered history a part of natural revelation in a way that seems to prioritize the one over the other, someone like Wolfhart Pannenberg).
   

10. Do you discuss the modern question of subjectivity in your book?
    Yes, in a round about way. The notion of subjectivity permeates the book and considers the unique contribution that you and I as individualized substances or subjects of consciousness make to the world. We are not just objects to be studied or harnessed empirically. We are more than that! And, these facts are not beholden to empirical methods. And yet these are the most important and interesting facts in the world. But if we give ourselves over to naturalism, we stand to lose not only clarity but insight that is given through persons, wisdom, traditions, and so on.
    

11. How does this relate today, to modernity, and to the past?
    It relates to modernity insofar as the question of subjectivity, the particular, personhood took up more interest by the philosophers. This is clearly seen in existentialism and the various problems of particularity that it raises. The question of whether or not machines could become like us is alive and well in modernity leading to today. Just think of the classic story of Frankenstein, which has become a more interesting and in the minds of many a live possibility due to artificial intelligence.
    

12. How does this relate to the history of philosophy?
    In part, I think it forces us to consider the nature of personhood, subjectivity more carefully.
    

13. How does this relate to the history of Christian theology?
    Related to my previous answer, theology must wrestle with the particularity of persons and the implications that has in terms of who we are and how we relate to God and the rest of creation. These are not objectified facts or commodities that can be handled or should be handled simply as scientific truths ready to be empirically verified or studied in a lab.
    

14. Did anyone in Church history affirm the sort of view you are advancing?
    Well, yes of course. I consider this view to be largely consistent with the Plato-Augustine-Calvin tradition and later taken up by Descartes in distinctive ways. After Descartes, of course there is a wide and varied reception of Descartes in what is known as the Cartesian tradition. There is of course a minority report of Cartesians in the Reformed tradition (i.e., they didn’t all follow Thomas on the question of human constitution).
    

15. What are the main views you have as targets for criticism?
    The main views that I aim at include all bottom up theories of how it is that humans, particularly, souls come into existence. Specifically, I have might eye to all naturalistic theories of subjects including the variant physicalisms, emergentisms, and more recently panpsychism.
    

16. Do they map on to the history of philosophy and theology?
    Yes, all of them (except maybe for emergentism as it is sometimes construed) finds support or traction in history.
    

17. Are there similar insights into the history of Christian theology that impact how you think about these fringe views of the mind-body?
    Yes, well, nearly everyone in the history of theology affirmed some aspect of Divine creationism because they saw the soul as ontologically unique and needing a distinct explanation. Building on that insight, its important to point out the truth of Divine causal explanations in our contemporary setting when the soul is regarded by many philosophers as passé.
    

18. What about evolution? You mention it often in your book. Though I can’t speak for all Christians, I ask you this question knowing I speak for many Christians who would think about buying your book. I found the evolutionary hypothesis untenable. Scientifically, ministries such as Creation Ministries International and Answers in Genesis have gathered enormous empirical evidence against it, whether one likes it or not; exegetically and theologically, I think of Douglas F. Kelly’s impressive Creation And Change: Genesis 1:1–2:4 in the Light of Changing Scientific Paradigms, just to mention one example. What would you say to these readers? 
    Just to be clear, the aim of the argument isn’t to affirm Young Earth Creationism, Old Earth Creationism, or Evolutionary Creationism. My aim is more refined and could be compatible with any of the views listed. I specifically go after views of the mind that consider evolutionary mechanisms and the material worked with as sufficient for the arising of persons in biological history. To get more into the nitty gritty of biological development across history is a different issue and while there are connections, I don’t think the argument should exclude any of the parties from reading and engaging with the books argument. If anything, I show that evolutionary creationism requires a bit more explanatory resources and Divine action must be brought into the fore a bit more than their paradigm may allow.

19. So, you are saying that, even assuming a picture where evolution happens (which is assumed by the views you are opposing), those views still would not be able to account for the existence of the soul and its workings?
    Yes, precisely. That’s the point. Even if it were true, then it would not follow that souls could emerge in that climate. Their mechanisms, laws, and so on, are not sufficient explanations for the origination of souls or persons as immaterial substances of consciousness. They just are insufficient quite apart from what you think about the history of biological evolution.
    

20. In conclusion: what do non-Christians and Christians gain from reading The Creation of Self?
    Non-Christians are forced to take seriously the mind, the sufficiency of science, and the implications this has toward theism. There are important facts that are simply not present or foregrounded by empirical sciences. They are insufficient for arriving at knowledge of the world. We need the Creator God who is a designer of the world and we find a paradigm in the soul-body and it’s creation for thinking more robustly about persons. This latter point is important for Christians especially for those who are consumed with naturalism or have been influenced by its limiting space on our perceptions. This will of course help us to interact with Scripture as it relates to and sheds light on the created order.

You can read a sample of Joshua's book here.

The Jonathan Edwards Encyclopedia — A Review

It is safe to say that Jonathan Edwards can be placed next to giants of the caliber of Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, and many others. This is why the depth and length of Edwards’s thought has produced a large amount of secondary literature. In spite of this, a reliable and extended reference work was still needed. Harry S. Stout (general editor), Kenneth P. Minkema, and Adriaan C. Neele (associate editors) have finally provided it. The Jonathan Edwards Encyclopedia is the combined effort of three of the main heirs to the revival of Jonathan Edwards studies started by Perry Miller. These three scholars have collected the contributions of 169 scholars (according to my calculation of the long list of contributors) in order to offer brief essays (each accompanied by a short but helpful bibliography) about all of the main historical, biographical, theological, and philosophical topics pertaining to the life and thought of Jonathan Edwards.

Historian George Marsden, author of the masterful biography of Jonathan Edwards, Jonathan Edwards: A Life (Yale University Press, 2004), introduces the volume. The foreword is followed by the editors’ introductions in which they give a brief overview of the pre-existent reference tools for the studies of Edwards. After the list of contributors, the list of Edwards’s works, and the list of entries (whose usefulness should not be underestimated), the book contains three small but useful maps aimed at situating facts and events in Edwards’s life. After these initial sections and tools, the reader can begin his study of Edwards’s life, work, and thought thanks to the almost four hundred short essays in the Encyclopedia. 

The entries of the Encyclopedia have been written by a large number of scholars. Therefore, it is rather unsurprising if the reader, especially the reader knowledgeable of Edwardsean secondary bibliography, will notice in the Encyclopedia a variety of voices and interpretations. However, this is not necessarily a flaw. From a theoretical point of view, it is an almost unavoidable symptom of the genius of Jonathan Edwards and of the richness of the interpretative keys that his brilliant works have produced. From a more practical point of view, the entries are generally well balanced, thus offering the reader the basic tools for further studying Edwards by himself on each debatable or less debatable issue. 

The “Further Reading” section at the end of every entry contains a brief and useful list of some of the main works in Edwardsean secondary bibliography. However, in several instances I would have expected to see additional works in the lists (though here, different focuses and interpretative approaches might influence the individual judgment). Furthermore, the “Further Reading” sections contain references to Edwardsean primary sources only on very few occasions. This might be an editorial decision—which I am sure is based on good reasons. Moreover, the Edwardsean texts relevant to each entry are typically quoted, referenced, and expounded upon in the main text of the entry itself. Nevertheless, I wonder whether the inclusion of the main primary sources in the “Further Reading” sections would have made the entries more comprehensive, especially for the beginner student of Jonathan Edwards.

On a similar note, the reader already familiar with Edwards’s works and world will perhaps wonder why one or more entries are absent. For instance, it seems that the topic of the divine image in mankind plays a significant role in Jonathan Edwards’s psychology and theological anthropology, both in the more speculative works (e.g., Freedom of the Will) and in the more practical ones (e.g., Religious Affections). To be fair, God's image in man is explored in the entry “Psychological Thought” and elsewhere, but perhaps it deserved a separate entry. Nevertheless, the editors themselves say that the volume “is not, and cannot be, comprehensive” (x). Additionally, the editors state that they “welcome hearing from readers about entries that are lacking” (x) as they are planning to produce an online edition of the Encyclopedia, a tool that will greatly benefit every student of Edwards. Edwardsean scholars should perhaps keep this project in mind.

In spite of these few considerations, the Encyclopedia is a remarkable volume. The great number of contributors and the variety of interpretations do not damage the final result, but rather they create a scholarly banquet where the reader can feast on theology, philosophy, and history. The Encyclopedia is an ambitious and successful enterprise, a very helpful resource not only for academics and non-academics specifically interested in Edwards, but for those who are interested in American religious history as well.

Originally published by Reading Religion, October 4, 2018

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