What I would like to do here is to offer some very introductory considerations about the debate in relation to a rhetorical device I have seen in the controversy in question. I am referring to what I have called the metaphysical disdain for metaphysics that I have seen among many critics of Christian classical theism. With that, I am referring to the self-contradictory and demonizing lament of some adversaries of classical theism who never seem to miss the occasion to cry: "That's metaphysics, not exegesis!" I think that is an unnecessary and false dichotomy. I believe one thing on the background of the criticism of classical theism is the unnecessary and not-long-ago-produced dualism between biblical exegesis and systematic theology. In addition to this, In order to show why I think such claim is self-contradictory and demonizing, I will offer an imaginary dialogue to my reader. The following is not meant to represent any anti-classical theist in any accurate way. It is just a fictional dialogue, so no particular individual should feel offended. Nevertheless, it contains specific objections and attitudes that I have met on different occasions.
Anti Classical Theist: "Unlike you, I don't think we should interpret the Bible verses where God says to change His mind. I read them for what they 'simply' mean."
Classical Theist: "What about the verses that say that God or His mind do not change?"
ACT: "Well, you should interpret them."
CT: "...No way!"
ACT: "We ACTs interpret the Bible faithfully. Malachi 3:6 talks about the unchangeable plan of God, not about his nature. It's merely covenantal."
CT: "Actually, the verse crystal clearly says that God's plan for his people doesn't change because He doesn't change. And what about James 1:13-18? Or Job 23:13? Are those "merely covenantal," too? Moreover, you have to prove that a passage which is covenantal logically excludes the fact that it is teaching us something about the nature of God. You can't just assume that acritically."
ACT: "We ACTs interpret the Bible for what it really says."
CT: "You kinda said that already. What about the passage?"
ACT: "We ACTs don't ground exegesis on Greek philosophy."
CT: "That sounds like a strawman. Neither do we CTs. But if something is true, it's true, no matter who said it. So, Malachi..."
ACT: "We ACTs do not use metaphysics."
CT: " Oh, really? I wonder where terms and concepts such as essence, being, person, hypostasis, nature, and so on, come from. They are not literally in the Bible. Do you want to get rid of those, too? I guess you won't reject those, because they are found in the writings of the Fathers of the ancient church, thus being inconsistent with your own approach. God has to be explained somehow as much as it's possible, and words and definitions are useful for that. Of course you use metaphysics, just not the general framework that Christians has used for centuries."
ACT: "Nothing I have suggested disparages the use of extra-biblical terminology. Nobody does theology without using extra-biblical terminology."
CT: "No, sorry, but it isn't just a matter of mere 'terminology.' I fully agree with sola Scriptura and all its principles, and I also agree that exegesis is foundational. But your 'extra-biblical terminology' isn't just a gaseous set of merely neutral terms floating inactively in the air with no philosophical or ontological meaning, but they constitute a system that claims to understand better something. So, if you claim that the I need to make my case for using categories, exactly the same applies to you and to what you simplistically call 'extra-biblical terminology.' You cannot selectively and conveniently decide where to make that request to justify the method, but it applies to all cases, your 'extra-biblical terminology' not excluded. You should do that in a sufficiently clear way (and even then, I wonder how many terms and concepts you will still borrow from Scholasticism generally intended)."
ACT: "Wow! It looks like everybody's an expert metaphysician, now."
CT: "That's beside the point. Moreover, contrary to the implicit claim behind your sardonic remark, using metaphysical categories is not the same thing as being a professional metaphysician. If I teach theology to 9th graders, that doesn't necessarily mean I am a professional theologian, nor I necessarily need to be one in order to do that."
ACT: "You mentioned Scholasticism, but Aquinas hasn't solved everything."
CT: "Are you even listening to me? I never even mentioned Aquinas. But he has many good things to s..."
ACT: "Frame, Wright, and Bauckham agree with me."
CT: "You just implicitly accused me to merely rely on an authority I never mention, and now you mention three of your authorities just like that?"
ACT: "There is no detailed exegetical treatment of the doctrine of divine simplicity."
CT: "That is actually not true. First of all, you can find several exegetical nuggets not only in some Patristic and Medieval theologians, but also among the Reformed Scholastics. That they are not gathered in one single place or volume, that does not make your statement true. Then, I can think of one, or two, or three contemporary examples that directly contradict your claim. Plus numerous articles and book chapters."
ACT: "Sounds like docetism."
CT: "..."
I repeat what I have already said through CT in the imaginary dialogue. I think exegesis is foundational. But I wonder where categories such as essence, being, person, hypostasis, nature, and so on, come from. Certainly, we do not find them literally in the Bible. Shall we get rid of them, too? I guess today's Protestant theological revisionists will not reject these categories because they are found in the writings of the Fathers of the ancient church, thus being inconsistent with their own assumed approach. In fact, these terms and concepts are not just mere neutral terms that fly in the air like inactive ectoplasms with no ontological meaning whatsoever, but each of them does convey a specific meaning. God has to be explained somehow as much as it is possible, and words and definitions are useful for that. Protestant theological revisionists do use a metaphysics, they just do not use the general framework that Christianity has productively used for centuries.
Such unjustified shock for the teachings of Christian classical theism, and especially for the traditional categories used to express those teachings, reminds me of the following words of Jonathan Edwards. He wrote them in the context of his debate with Arminians and libertarians, but I think they are applicable also in our specific case.
It has often been objected ... [that we] run into nice scholastic distinctions, and abstruse metaphysical subtleties ... that it is very abstracted and metaphysical. If that be made an objection against the foregoing reasoning, that it is metaphysical, or may properly be reduced to the science of metaphysics, it is a very impertinent objection; whether it be so or no, is not worthy of any dispute or controversy. If the reasoning be good, 'tis as frivolous to inquire what science it is properly reduced to, as what language it is delivered in: and for a man to go about to confute the arguments of his opponent, by telling him, his arguments are "metaphysical," would be as weak as to tell him, his arguments could not be substantial, because they were written in French or Latin. The question is not, whether what is said be metaphysics, physics, logic, or mathematics, Latin, French, English, or Mohawk? but, whether the reasoning be good, and the arguments truly conclusive? The foregoing arguments are no more metaphysical, than those which we use against the Papists, to disprove their doctrine of transubstantiation; alleging, it is inconsistent with the notion of corporeal identity, that it should be in ten thousand places at the same time. 'Tis by metaphysical arguments only we are able to prove, that the rational soul is not corporeal; that lead or sand can't think; that thoughts are not square or round, or don't weigh a pound. The arguments by which we prove the being of God, if handled closely and distinctly, so as to show their clear and demonstrative evidence, must be metaphysically treated. 'Tis by metaphysics only, that we can demonstrate, that God is not limited to a place, or is not mutable; that he is not ignorant, or forgetful; that it is impossible for him to lie, or be unjust; and that there is one God only, and not hundreds or thousands. And indeed we have no strict demonstration of anything, excepting mathematical truths, but by metaphysics. We can have no proof, that is properly demonstrative, of any one proposition, relating to the being and nature of God, his creation of the world, the dependence of all things on him, the nature of bodies or spirits, the nature of our own souls, or any of the great truths of morality and natural religion, but what is metaphysical. I am willing, my arguments should be brought to the test of the strictest and justest reason, and that a clear, distinct and determinate meaning of the terms I use, should be insisted on; but let not the whole be rejected, as if all were confuted, by fixing on it the epithet "metaphysical." ~ Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, Part 4, Section 13.
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