In Defence of (Good) Labels in Philosophical and Theological Discussion (and, Precision ≠ Pedantry)

I found this on the Internet. I do not know
where it is from exactly. Apologies.

A while ago, I posted on Facebook the following quotation by Herman Bavinck.

"The difference between Augustine and Pelagius, Calvin and Castellio, Gomarus and Arminius is not that the latter were that much more gentle, loving, and tenderhearted than the former. On the contrary, it arises from the fact that the former accepted Scripture in its entirety, also including this doctrine [election and reprobation; they were and always wanted to be theistic and recognize the will and hand of the Lord also in these disturbing facts of life; they were not afraid to look reality in the eyes even when it was appaling. Pelagianism scatters flowers over graves, turns death into an angel, regards sin as mere weakness, lectures on the uses of adversity, and consider this the best possible world. Calvinism has no use for such drivel. It refuses to be hoodwinked. It tolerates no such delusion, takes full account of the seriousness of life, champions the rights of the Lord of lords, and humbly bows in adoration before the inexplicable sovereign will of God Almighty. As a result, it proves to be fundamentally more merciful than Pelagianism. How deeply Calvin felt the gravity of what he said is evident from his use of the expression 'dreadfull decree' [Institutes, 3.23.7]. Totally withouth warrant, this expression has been held against him. In fact, it is to his credit, not to his discredit. The decree, as Calvin's teaching, is not dreadful, but dreadful indeed is the reality that is the revelation of that decree of God, a reality that comes through both in Scripture and in history. To all thinking humans, whether they are followers of Pelagius or Augustine, that reality [of God's decree] remains completely the same. It is not something that can in any way be undone by illusory notions of it." ~ Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics: God and Creation: Vol. 2, 394-395.

Soon, a scholar (who will remain unnamed) commented that "I" (even though I quoted Bavinck's own words) was misinterpreting Arminianism and Pelagianism (a plausible claim when directed to me, quite a grandiose claim when directed to Bavinck). This is because, the person continued, they are theologically and historically not exactly the same (although neither Bavinck nor I ever claimed that they are exactly the same, and that is not even the point of the quotation). Therefore, the person claimed, Arminianism and Pelagianism should not be linked together as Bavinck does. With a fine final touch, the person implicitly but unmistakenly suggested that I should go studying these issues since I did not know enough about them (I was not sure how that is relevant, but it was quite right nonetheless!).

I will set aside the first and the last two curious remarks since this blog post is not at all meant to be a personal matter but an occasion for some considerations. Talking about the real issue here, Bavinck's point is not the theological and philosophical differences between Pelagianism and Arminianism, a point that nobody denied and that is irrelevant here. The real claim is that these two theological positions (Arminianism and Pelagianism) have the same core problem, that is, making salvation ultimately depend on man, and not God (as the reading of the Bavinck's entire chapter, "The Divine Counsel," clearly shows). It is on the basis of those shared common cores that the connections and the labelling are made (between Arminianism and Pelagianism in this case, and in other cases if done correctly), and not on the basis of a supposed full theological equality which nobody has claimed and that is admittedly not there. 

This is nothing new. Augustine of Hippo saw that what we today call Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism have basically the same essential problems. In Letter 217, Augustine described Semi- Pelagianism “as necessarily implying the basal idea of Pelagianism” (B. B. Warfield, Augustine and the Pelagian Controversy; emphasis added). In fact, Augustine writes to Vitalis as follows.

"Here you [Vitalis] are again perhaps going to say that the Lord does this when we read or hear his teaching, if a person assents with his will to the truth that he reads or hears. You say, 'For, if God's teaching were concealed from him, God would not direct his steps in order that, once they had been directed, a man would choose God's way.' And for this reason you think that the Lord directs the steps of a man to choose God's way only in the sense that without God's teaching he could not come to know the truth to which he assents by his will. You say, 'If a man assents to it (something that lies within his free choice), the Lord is correctly said to direct his steps in order that he may choose the way of him whose teaching he follows because he was first persuaded and then assented, which he does by his natural freedom if he wills to, but does not do if he does not will to. And he will receive a reward or punishment in accord with what he has done.' This is the teaching of the Pelagians that is wrongly spread about and rightly condemned, and Pelagius himself, fearing that he would be condemned in the courtroom of the Eastern bishops, condemned the view by which they say that the grace of God is not given for individual actions but lies in free choice or in the law and teaching. Will we be hardhearted to such a point, my brother, that we hold that Pelagian view on the grace of God, or rather against the grace of God, that Pelagius himself condemned with a false heart, but still in fear of Catholic judges?" ~ Augustine, Letter 217, 2.4 (emphasis added).

Augustine was certainly aware of the differences between Pelagius and Vitalis (and of the differences between the Pelagians and the Semi-Pelagians), and Augustine wisely does not expressly call Vitalis a Pelagian (Augustine's intent is corrective and pastoral). Nevertheless, Augustine is clearly making a strong connection between Vitalis and Pelagianism because they have a core doctrine in common (of course, not any core doctrine in common, but one relevant to the debate they were facing).

Robert L. Dabney makes a very similar point while discussing the similarities between Pelagianism and the position of one of his theological adversaries, Albert Taylor Bledsoe (1809-1877).

One more of Dr. Bledsoe's complaints of unfairness remains to be noticed. This is, that we assert his philosophy to be virtually Pelagian. This charge we did undoubtedly make, and intend to repeat. Now, Pelagius and Celestius taught sundry dogmas, such as baptismal redemption, monkery, the existence of unredeemed infants dying in infancy in a happy eternal state which yet is not the Christian's heaven, which Dr. Bledsoe does not hold; nor does the veriest Socinian on whose modern shoulders Pelagius's own mantle has fallen, hold them. They are as antiquated as the Ptolemaic astronomy. These ancient heretics, again, carried out their erroneous first principles with a symmetrical consistency in some results which we never dreamed of ascribing to Dr. Bledsoe; we do him no such injustice. In these senses he is, if he will prefer it so, no Pelagian. But in church history Pelagianism is a given, definite code of doctrines in philosophy and theology, clustering around certain hingepropositions. These hinge-propositions granted, the essential body of the system follows for all consistent minds. What wo mean by calling Dr. Bledsoe a virtual Pelagian is, then, this: that he asserts these hinge-propositions, and the more obvious and important of their consequences." ~ Robert L. Dabney, "The Philosophy of Volition," 222.

The Canons of Dort also make the same kind of connections, several times, between Arminianism and Pelagianism. Some people might be offended by some of the words used by the Canons, which would be missing the point they are getting at. The Canons have been carefully written by some of the best Protestant theologians of the 17th century, they are a very important document and, therefore, they should be considered seriously. The writers of the Canons were not trying to be inflammatory, but they were making an important theological claim regarding the substantial similarities that they saw between Arminianism and Pelagianism. See Canons of Dort, Head 2, Error 3, Error 6; Head 3 and 4, Article 2, Error 7, 9; Head 5, Error 2.

Again, it is on the basis of those shared common cores that the connections and the labelling are made (between Arminianism and Pelagianism in this case, and in other cases if done correctly), and not on the basis of a supposed full theological equality which nobody has claimed and that it is admittedly not there. Bavinck's, Dabney's, and the Canons' claims are refuted by proving that there are no core shared doctrines between Arminianism and Pelagianism (good luck with that!), and not simply by pointing to the obvious fact that those two positions do not teach exactly the same things and that they raised in the midst of two different historical contexts. Moreover, if this kind of connections and labelling should be made only when two positions are theologically and philosophically fully the same, then the necessity of such connections and labels will disappear altogether because then we will have, not two teachings with similar core doctrines, but one and the same teaching, thus making the useful practice in question virtually impossible. It is an unreasonable criterion. 

But does all this simply have to do with Arminianism and Pelagianism? Not really. Then why have I bathed in all this cybernetic ink? The reason is that the Facebook event described above gives me the occasion to discuss the usefulness (and possible dangers) of using labels. I think the reason that explains the response I received is not related to an ordered desire to be theologically and historically precise but rather has more to do with a desire of making unnecessary qualifications, ignoring substantial common issues, and not realising the necessity of labels and designations in order not to get lost in an endless web of tangential qualifications and distinctions. Already in the 18th century, Jonathan Edwards faced this kind of protests. I believe his words are quite to the point.

"Many find much fault with the calling professing Christians, that differ one from another in some matters of opinion, by distinct names; especially calling them by the names of particular men, who have distinguished themselves as maintainers and promoters of those opinions: as the calling some professing Christians 'Arminians,' from Arminius; others 'Arians,' from Arius; others 'Socinians,' from Socinus, and the like. They think it unjust in itself; as it seems to suppose and suggest, that the persons marked out by these names, received those doctrines which they entertain, out of regard to, and reliance on those men after whom they are named; as though they made them their rule: in the same manner, as the followers of Christ are called 'Christians'; after his name, whom they regard and depend upon, as their great Head and Rule. Whereas, this is an unjust and groundless imputation on those that go under the forementioned denominations. Thus (say they) there is not the least ground to suppose, that the chief divines, who embrace the scheme of doctrine which is by many called Arminianism, believe it the more because Arminius believed it: and that there is no reason to think any other, than that they sincerely and impartially study the Holy Scriptures, and inquire after the mind of Christ, with as much judgment and sincerity, as any of those that call them by these names; that they seek after truth, and are not careful whether they think exactly as Arminius did; yea, that in some things they actually differ from him. This practice is also esteemed actually injurious on this account, that it is supposed naturally to lead the multitude to imagine the difference between persons thus named and others, to be greater than it is; yea, as though it were so great, that they must be as it were another species of beings. And they object against it as arising from an uncharitable, narrow, contracted spirit; which, they say, commonly inclines persons to confine all that is good to themselves and their own party, and to make a wide distinction between themselves and others, and stigmatize those that differ from them with odious names. They say moreover, that the keeping up such a distinction of names has a direct tendency to uphold distance and disaffection, and keep alive mutual hatred among Christians, who ought all to be united in friendship and charity, however they can't in all things think alike." ~ Jonathan Edwards, The Freedom of the Will, Preface.

Does that mean that one can use labels and make connections indiscriminately? For instance, can we put Calvinism and fatalism on the same category? The answer is no. The similarities between Calvinism and fatalism are very far from being substantial (therefore, we lack what is needed to make the connection and use the label), but they are either only in appearance or straightforwardly fabricated (Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 277-311, 365-371, 375-412; John Gill, The Cause of God and Truth, 183-198;  C. Hodge, Systematic Theology: Vol. 2, 278-309; R. L. Dabney, The Practical Philosophy, 153-155; G. H. Clark, “Religion, Reason, and Revelation,” in Christian Philosophy, 238-270; T. J. Williams, Love, Freedom, and Evil, 43-58, 103-116, 119-185; S. Christensen, What About Free Will?, 224-237; J. N. Anderson, “Calvinism and the First Sin,” in D. E. Alexander and D. M. Johnson, Calvinism and the Problem of Evil, 200-229; G. Bignon, Excusing Sinners and Blaming God, 167-232). Edwards admits that too often labels are given and connections are made where there is no real or enough warrant and simply in order to uncharitably censure others.

"I confess, these things are very plausible. And I will not deny, that there are some unhappy consequences of this distinction of names, and that men's infirmities and evil dispositions often make an ill improvement of it. But yet I humbly conceive, these objections are carried far beyond reason. The generality of mankind are disposed enough, and a great deal too much, to uncharitableness, and to be censorious and bitter towards those that differ from them in religious opinions: which evil temper of mind will take occasion to exert itself, from many things in themselves innocent, useful and necessary." ~ Ivi.

"Calling a spade a spade" should not degenerate in "calling a spoon a spade." However, to dismiss a good practice because it is often abused is not a reasonable response.

"But yet there is no necessity to suppose, that the thus distinguishing persons of different opinions by different names, arises mainly from an uncharitable spirit. It may arise from the disposition there is in mankind (whom God has distinguished with an ability and inclination for speech) to improve the benefit of language, in the proper use and design of names, given to things which they have often occasion to speak of, or signify their minds about; which is to enable them to express their ideas with ease and expedition, without being incumbered with an obscure and difficult circumlocution. And the thus distinguishing persons of different opinions in religious matters, may not imply, nor infer any more than that there is a difference, and that the difference is such as we find we have often occasion to take notice of, and make mention of. That which we have frequent occasion to speak of (whatever it be, that gives the occasion) this wants a name: and 'tis always a defect in language, in such cases, to be obliged to make use of a description, instead of a name." ~ Ivi.

This is a very common habit that humanity practices in several different circumstances.

"Thus we have often occasion to speak of those who are the descendants of the ancient inhabitants of France, who were subjects or heads of the government of that land, and spake the language peculiar to it; in distinction from the descendants of the inhabitants of Spain, who belonged to that community, and spake the language of that country. And therefore we find the great need of distinct names to signify these different sorts of people, and the great convenience of those distinguishing words, 'French,' and 'Spaniards'; by which the signification of our minds is quick and easy, and our speech is delivered from the burden of a continual reiteration of diffuse descriptions, with which it must otherwise be embarrassed. That the difference of the opinions of those, who in their general scheme of divinity agree with these two noted men, Calvin, and Arminius, is a thing there is often occasion to speak of, is what the practice of the latter, itself confesses; who are often, in their discourses and writings, taking notice of the supposed absurd and pernicious opinions of the former sort. And therefore the making use of different names in this case can't reasonably be objected against, or condemned, as a thing which must come from so bad a cause as they assign. It is easy to be accounted for, without supposing it to arise from any other source, than the exigence and natural tendency of the state of things; considering the faculty and disposition God has given mankind, to express things which they have frequent occasion to mention, by certain distinguishing names. It is an effect that is similar to what we see arise, in innumerable cases which are parallel, where the cause is not at all blameworthy." ~ Ivi.

The presence of substantial similarities in the pillar teachings of position a and position b is a sufficient reason to make the connections and to use the kind of labels we have been discussing so far. That said, labels should only be used when such substantial similarities are actually there, and should not be used as mere attempts to negatively characterize or demonize. Finally, both labels and warranted theoretical connections are made necessary by the very nature of language, by the need of communicative effectiveness and concision, and by the need to avoid "obscure and difficult circumlocution[s]." As long as integrity is maintained, the meanings of the words and the doctrines involved are accurate, and the connections are grounded, the academic and the minister, as well as the non-academic and the layperson, should not fear to adopt the practices here discussed when necessary simply because he or she does not have a graduate degree in Late Antiquity Christian theology, Early Modern Protestant thought, or similar. Once the criteria just mentioned are satisfied (although I realise they are only introductory and general), the practices at issue are legit and those who adopt them should not worry if, for example, someone does not like the fact of being theologically and philosophically close to Pelagianism, Semi-Pelagianism, Arminianism, or some other doctrine. Accuracy is essential, courtesy is always welcome, and charity is required. Pedantry and evasiveness are not.

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