My Initial Two Cents Inspired by Dolezal-Frame: Metaphysical Disdain for Metaphysics

At the moment, in Protestant circles, there is a rather lively debate going on about the doctrine of God's nature. It seems it has been triggered by John Frame's review (followed by a 2nd and 3rd part) of J. E. Dolezal's book. In my opinion, the understanding of the God of Scripture is the real issue. The focus is especially on some of the divine incommunicable attributes, such as simplicity, immutability, and impassibility. I think this is the hinge of the entire dispute, and not merely the adoption or rejection of "Thomism" or of some tenets of that or of some other tradition (which would be a rather simplistic and reductionist view of the controversy).

What I would like to do here is to offer some very introductory considerations about the debate in relation to a rhetorical device I have seen in the controversy in question. I am referring to what I have called the metaphysical disdain for metaphysics that I have seen among many critics of Christian classical theism. With that, I am referring to the self-contradictory and demonizing lament of some adversaries of classical theism who never seem to miss the occasion to cry: "That's metaphysics, not exegesis!" I think that is an unnecessary and false dichotomy. I believe one thing on the background of the criticism of classical theism is the unnecessary and not-long-ago-produced dualism between biblical exegesis and systematic theology. In addition to this, In order to show why I think such claim is self-contradictory and demonizing, I will offer an imaginary dialogue to my reader. The following is not meant to represent any anti-classical theist in any accurate way. It is just a fictional dialogue, so no particular individual should feel offended. Nevertheless, it contains specific objections and attitudes that I have met on different occasions.

Anti Classical Theist: "Unlike you, I don't think we should interpret the Bible verses where God says to change His mind. I read them for what they 'simply' mean."

Classical Theist: "What about the verses that say that God or His mind do not change?"

ACT: "Well, you should interpret them."

CT: "...No way!"

ACT: "We ACTs interpret the Bible faithfully. Malachi 3:6 talks about the unchangeable plan of God, not about his nature. It's merely covenantal." 

CT: "Actually, the verse crystal clearly says that God's plan for his people doesn't change because He doesn't change. And what about James 1:13-18? Or Job 23:13? Are those "merely covenantal," too? Moreover, you have to prove that a passage which is covenantal logically excludes the fact that it is teaching us something about the nature of God. You can't just assume that acritically." 

ACT: "We ACTs interpret the Bible for what it really says."

CT: "You kinda said that already. What about the passage?"

ACT: "We ACTs don't ground exegesis on Greek philosophy."

CT: "That sounds like a strawman. Neither do we CTs. But if something is true, it's true, no matter who said it. So, Malachi..."

ACT: "We ACTs do not use metaphysics."

CT: " Oh, really? I wonder where terms and concepts such as essence, being, person, hypostasis, nature, and so on, come from. They are not literally in the Bible. Do you want to get rid of those, too? I guess you won't reject those, because they are found in the writings of the Fathers of the ancient church, thus being inconsistent with your own approach. God has to be explained somehow as much as it's possible, and words and definitions are useful for that. Of course you use metaphysics, just not the general framework that Christians has used for centuries."

ACT: "Nothing I have suggested disparages the use of extra-biblical terminology. Nobody does theology without using extra-biblical terminology."

CT: "No, sorry, but it isn't just a matter of mere 'terminology.' I fully agree with sola Scriptura and all its principles, and I also agree that exegesis is foundational. But your 'extra-biblical terminology' isn't just a gaseous set of merely neutral terms floating inactively in the air with no philosophical or ontological meaning, but they constitute a system that claims to understand better something. So, if you claim that the I need to make my case for using categories, exactly the same applies to you and to what you simplistically call 'extra-biblical terminology.' You cannot selectively and conveniently decide where to make that request to justify the method, but it applies to all cases, your 'extra-biblical terminology' not excluded. You should do that in a sufficiently clear way (and even then, I wonder how many terms and concepts you will still borrow from Scholasticism generally intended)."

ACT: "Wow! It looks like everybody's an expert metaphysician, now."

CT: "That's beside the point. Moreover, contrary to the implicit claim behind your sardonic remark, using metaphysical categories is not the same thing as being a professional metaphysician. If I teach theology to 9th graders, that doesn't necessarily mean I am a professional theologian, nor I necessarily need to be one in order to do that."

ACT: "You mentioned Scholasticism, but Aquinas hasn't solved everything."

CT: "Are you even listening to me? I never even mentioned Aquinas. But he has many good things to s..."

ACT: "Frame, Wright, and Bauckham agree with me."

CT: "You just implicitly accused me to merely rely on an authority I never mention, and now you mention three of your authorities just like that?"

ACT: "There is no detailed exegetical treatment of the doctrine of divine simplicity."

CT: "That is actually not true. First of all, you can find several exegetical nuggets not only in some Patristic and Medieval theologians, but also among the Reformed Scholastics. That they are not gathered in one single place or volume, that does not make your statement true. Then, I can think of one, or two, or three contemporary examples that directly contradict your claim. Plus numerous articles and book chapters."

ACT: "Sounds like docetism."

CT: "..."

I repeat what I have already said through CT in the imaginary dialogue. I think exegesis is foundational. But I wonder where categories such as essence, being, person, hypostasis, nature, and so on, come from. Certainly, we do not find them literally in the Bible. Shall we get rid of them, too? I guess today's Protestant theological revisionists will not reject these categories because they are found in the writings of the Fathers of the ancient church, thus being inconsistent with their own assumed approach. In fact, these terms and concepts are not just mere neutral terms that fly in the air like inactive ectoplasms with no ontological meaning whatsoever, but each of them does convey a specific meaning. God has to be explained somehow as much as it is possible, and words and definitions are useful for that. Protestant theological revisionists do use a metaphysics, they just do not use the general framework that Christianity has productively used for centuries.

Such unjustified shock for the teachings of Christian classical theism, and especially for the traditional categories used to express those teachings, reminds me of the following words of Jonathan Edwards. He wrote them in the context of his debate with Arminians and libertarians, but I think they are applicable also in our specific case.

It has often been objected ... [that we] run into nice scholastic distinctions, and abstruse metaphysical subtleties ... that it is very abstracted and metaphysical. If that be made an objection against the foregoing reasoning, that it is metaphysical, or may properly be reduced to the science of metaphysics, it is a very impertinent objection; whether it be so or no, is not worthy of any dispute or controversy. If the reasoning be good, 'tis as frivolous to inquire what science it is properly reduced to, as what language it is delivered in: and for a man to go about to confute the arguments of his opponent, by telling him, his arguments are "metaphysical," would be as weak as to tell him, his arguments could not be substantial, because they were written in French or Latin. The question is not, whether what is said be metaphysics, physics, logic, or mathematics, Latin, French, English, or Mohawk? but, whether the reasoning be good, and the arguments truly conclusive? The foregoing arguments are no more metaphysical, than those which we use against the Papists, to disprove their doctrine of transubstantiation; alleging, it is inconsistent with the notion of corporeal identity, that it should be in ten thousand places at the same time. 'Tis by metaphysical arguments only we are able to prove, that the rational soul is not corporeal; that lead or sand can't think; that thoughts are not square or round, or don't weigh a pound. The arguments by which we prove the being of God, if handled closely and distinctly, so as to show their clear and demonstrative evidence, must be metaphysically treated. 'Tis by metaphysics only, that we can demonstrate, that God is not limited to a place, or is not mutable; that he is not ignorant, or forgetful; that it is impossible for him to lie, or be unjust; and that there is one God only, and not hundreds or thousands. And indeed we have no strict demonstration of anything, excepting mathematical truths, but by metaphysics. We can have no proof, that is properly demonstrative, of any one proposition, relating to the being and nature of God, his creation of the world, the dependence of all things on him, the nature of bodies or spirits, the nature of our own souls, or any of the great truths of morality and natural religion, but what is metaphysical. I am willing, my arguments should be brought to the test of the strictest and justest reason, and that a clear, distinct and determinate meaning of the terms I use, should be insisted on; but let not the whole be rejected, as if all were confuted, by fixing on it the epithet "metaphysical." ~ Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, Part 4, Section 13.

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Young Thomas Aquinas Goes to Sunday School

"Come on, Tommy boy! Sing with us! 🎶 I have decided to follow Jesus! No turn... 🎶"

Thomas: "On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that 'predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits.' But foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who predestines, and not in the predestined. I answer that, predestination is not anything in the predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider, as was proved above (I:22:1). But the execution of providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active way in the governor. Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The execution of predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle (Romans 8:30): "Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He also magnified [Vulg. 'justified']." For more on this, see my forthcoming Summa Theologiae, 1st part, Q 23, A 2. See also Summa Theologiae, 1st part, A 23, Q 5."

"😐 ......Alrighty, then! I am sure you will like this new song. C' mon, Tom, join us! ♬ If you happy and you know it, clap your hands (clap👏 clap👏)! And if you are happ... ♫"

T.: "On the contrary, happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation. I answer that a thing may belong to happiness in three ways: 1) essentially, 2) antecedently, 3) consequently. Now the operation of sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man's happiness consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated Good, Which is his last end, as shown above (Article 1): to Which man cannot be united by an operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because, as shown above (I-II:2:5), man's happiness does not consist in goods of the body, which goods alone, however, we attain through the operation of the senses. Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the operation of the intellect demands a previous operation of the sense; consequently, in that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the resurrection, 'from the very happiness of the soul,' as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) "the body and the bodily senses will receive a certain overflow, so as to be perfected in their operations"; a point which will be explained further on when we treat of the resurrection (II-II:82-85). But then the operation whereby man's mind is united to God will not depend on the senses. You can read more on this in my forthcoming Summa Theologiae, 1st part of 2nd part, Q 3, A 3."

"😑 ......Thomas, sometimes, you really are no fun."

T.: "On the contrary, I answ..."

"Drop it."

T.: "Ok."

©

Words in grey are my own and not Aquinas'.

R. L. Dabney on Natural and Revealed Theology

R. L. Dabney (1820–1898).

R. L. Dabney's The Practical Philosophy: Being the Philosophy of the Feelings, of the Will, and of the Conscience, With the Ascertainment of Practicular Rights and Duties (1897) is a very interesting book (there is also an open-access online version). I have read and consulted its third book, "The Will," because it seems to have some significant similarities with Jonathan Edwards' approach to the matter. I hope to have the time to write something about it in the future, also consulting other relevant places from Dabney's works.

While I was browsing the book, I came across the last chapter of the volume where Dabney discusses moral duties in relation to God. He then concludes with some remarks on natural and revealed theology. I find his words quite interesting, and I thought to report them here.

By the prevalent native disposition of men, duty to God for its own sake alone is not preferred, but disliked. The light of Natural Theology can do no more than present to the mind objects which, were the mind fundamentally moral, would attract it; but which naturally and in fact do not attract the immoral mind. What effective resource has Natural Theology, then, to work this moral revolution in which alone true reform and moral blessedness can originate?
Whence, then, are the effectual remedies for guilt and immorality to come? Philosophy is silent; it has no answer. To ascertain the solution we must pass into the domain of Revelation, the inculcation of which is the function of the Christian Church. Here, then, our study must end. And this is the impressive proof of its inferiority to its elder and divine sister, Christianity, that Philosophy, after leading us up to the greatest and most urgent of all problems, and redisclosing to us our guilt and moral disease, is compelled to turn over the great question of the remedy to the recorded Word of God, and retire confessing her own weakness to heal and save. Has this long course of her training been therefore useless? No; it has trained our power of thought. It has shown us many truths which are valuable, though they may not claim the primal worth and infallible certainty of God's messages. And its best gift to us will be derived if we learn its closing lesson of humility and of reverence for the "more sure word of Prophecy."

 ~ R. L. Dabney, The Practical Philosophy (Harrisonburg, VA: Sprinkle Publications, 1984), 521.

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REFORMATION POST: Two Books on Justification, and Thoughts on the Office of Believers

Happy Reformation Day!

Contrary to Bergoglio's wishful thinking (according to which the Reformation is over) and in opposition to Peter Leithart's claim according to which the Reformation failed (that is, paraphrased, it failed because it did not promote and/or it failed to actualize Leithart's own contemporary ecumenical ideology that the 16th century Reformation never ever intended to achieve), today is a day that testifies to the fact that the Triune God and his gospel will always win, even when things look as dark as they can be. Today is the 500th anniversary of the Protestant Reformation. Today, 31 October 1517, 500 years ago, Martin Luther nailed his 95 Theses to the door of the church in Wittenberg. 

To commemorate this vital event, in addition to having worked for the publication of my book, I would also like to suggest two books from which I have greatly benefited. The first is an old but gold, the second is a book published just this year. 

A picture of the unabridged version of Luther's

Commentary on Galatians that I own.

The first book I am referring to is Luther's monumental Commentary On Galatians. It is a repetitive book, but that is not an accident nor a negative thing. In fact, Luther himself says several times that the gospel of salvation by grace alone through faith alone is too important, and natural man is so prone to forget it, that it needs to be repeated and expounded continually. More importantly, this volume shows Luther at the best of his exegetical, theological, and pastoral genius.  Regarding exegesis, Luther demolishes the erroneous interpretations of the epistle to the Galatians, such as the most peculiar claim according to which Paul, in saying that we are not justified by the law, is referring only to the civil and ceremonial law. Theologically (and, I would personally add, philosophically), the commentary presents Luther as a man of unshakable commitment to the Biblical gospel of justification by faith alone, as well as of the atoning death of Christ and of penal substitution and imputation, all points that he was totally adamant to maintain and not to compromise with anyone. Pastorally, it is a sweet spiritual medicine for the soul, where Luther continually comforts the reader with the gospel of pure grace, exhorting him to look away from himself or herself and to fix the eyes only on Christ for salvation and any spiritual good, also in the light of Luther's encouraging accounts of his own intense temptations and dreadful depressions (other than myself, also John Bunyan witnesses [see 129-130] of the great usefulness of the book in this regard). There is an abridged version of this commentary online for free, and also a very nice abridged paperback. For the real nerds, there are the Luther's Works series, Volume 1 and 2. To the reader who has enough time but not enough money for the LW series, I warmly suggest taking the time to read the unabridged version, available in one or two published versions, and one free online.

Available both in America and Europe.

The second book I would like to recommend is, as I said, a recent publication: Gospel Truth of Justification: Proclaimed, Defended, Developed, by Prof emeritus David J. Engelsma. I do not intend to compare Engelsma to Luther (Engelsma himself would reject the comparison), but I find some similarities between Luther's Commentary on Galatians and Engelsma's book. Firstly, the book is exegetical: Engelsma not only offer coherent and sound exegesis of the relevant Scriptural passages, but he also inflicts deadly blows not only to the Roman Catholic interpretations of those Biblical places, but also the more nominally Protestant versions of justification by faith and works, such as the unbiblical teaching of the Federal Vision and the New Perspective on Paul (regarding the latter, Engelsma efficaciously shows that these "New" Perspectives are not new at all, but are the old "gospel" of faith and works with a different and perhaps more academic appearance). Secondly, the book is outstandingly theological in that it interacts not only with the Protestant confessions and creeds but also with a wide range of orthodox (and unorthodox) sources. Thirdly, the book is pastoral. Engelsma rightly recognizes the vital role of justification by grace alone through faith alone both for the preservation of the instituted church of Christ and for the spiritual health and comfort of the believers. I do not hesitate to say that the love for the church and for the individual believer is the main reason that led Engelsma to write this book, a book born "out of love for the truth and the desire to bring it to light," to use Luther's words. In this latest regard, the book is also repetitive, and this is meant in a good way, namely, in the same sense that Luther's commentary is repetitive: the author regularly reminds the needy believer of the gospel of grace alone through faith alone. Engelsma's book also treats other important theological doctrines (such as God's unconditional covenant of grace with his elect people) and, with its polemics against modern distortions of justification, it makes a great couple with Luther's commentary.

I would also like to make some considerations about the doctrine of the office of believers in connection with the current controversies within Protestantism. This is because more and more frequently I read from some leaders and non-leaders (especially some of those who identify themselves with the New Perspectives on Paul and the Federal Vision) patronizing and condescending words and tones towards those who hold to justification by grace alone through faith alone, excluding works as a cause or condition of salvation. When you criticize a Federal Visionist or a FV inclined guy (or New Perspective guy, or any other modern justification by faith and works guy), some of the answers I have often come across are:

1) you misunderstood him (greatest hit)
2) you do not have enough theological degrees or peer-reviewed published papers to have something serious to say
3) you are disqualified because have not read enough some forgotten fantastically decisive and greatly relevant personal notes in Latin by some past Protestant theologian
4) you are "uncharitable"
5) a combination of the previous 4, or all of them together.

The following is only one of many examples that can be found in books or on social media.

"The controversy about Shepherd has become so heated that some of his critics, including official statements of two denominations, have accused him of denying the gospel or of preaching 'another gospel.' In the light of Shepherd’s writing here, quite consistent with his writings elsewhere, it should be plain that such criticisms are stupid, irresponsible, and divisive. Theological professors who make such comments, in my judgment, do not have the intellectual, theological, or spiritual maturity to prepare students for gospel ministry." - John Frame, in P. Andrew Sandlin, Backbone of the Bible (Covenant Media Foundation, 2004), xii. Emphasis added.

So, according to Frame, if a theological professor accuses Shepherd to promote an unbiblical message, this person does not possess "intellectual" (my point 1), "theological" (point 2 and 3), "or spiritual maturity" (point 4): a good example of point 5. And if this is the sentence upon theological professor, one wonders what kind of judgment Frame has towards non-academic or laypeople who reject Shepherd's teaching. I am not aware of any apology issued by Frame for this grossly grandiose assertion. Apology or not, the point is that this attitude and tone is clearly present among many FV and NPOP supporters. 

One never wins with them, one seems to be always wrong by definition, by the very fact of disagreeing with them, either because "unlearned," or unable not to "misunderstand" any given point, or because of any other similar irrelevant claim. According to some of these individuals, if one dares to criticize those theologians who make good works either a cause or a condition of salvation, then these critiques need to get some seminary training and to publish in peer-reviewed journals before they can be taken seriously. It seems to me that this is a sort of modified mild Gnosticism. Although, it has to be said that (some of the ancient) gnostics had at least some explicit (although erroneous) philosophical reasons upon which they grounded their intellectual snobbery. In the cases I am referring to, the attitude most often does not seem to be anything but a mere "Well, you disagree because you are stupid and/or ignorant." As a consequence of that, in the contexts at issue, justification is sometimes depicted a mere "academic question." Whether Paul wrote or not Hebrews is a mere academic question, not justification. Luther and Calvin were not willing to go to the steak for a mere "academic question" (Luther and Calvin whom, of course, according to some FV people also supposedly agree with them, according to the theological monopoly that some of the FVists want to impose basically over most of the Christian theological production).

Of course, these sorts of attitudes are an implicit but clear denial of the Biblical teaching of the office of believers, beautifully expounded in Luther's Freedom of the Christian. However, I am not entirely surprised by these attitudes, and the reason is strictly connected to the doctrine of justification: when one loses the Biblical doctrine of justification by grace alone through faith alone, also the right view of the law is inevitably distorted (the "law of love," as Luther calls it in his commentary to Galatians). In this cases, academic learning, at least in a sense, takes the place of what once was the supposed spiritual superiority of monks and nuns in the monasteries. It is also in opposition against these unchristian behaviors that I desired to recommend here the two books described above, two books that encourage, equip, and tell us that every Christian, scholar or not, has not only the right but also the spiritual ability to promote, in Christian love and truth, the true Biblical doctrine of salvation by grace alone through faith alone, and to condemn any teaching that opposes it. 

"This doctrine [of justification by grace alone through faith alone] can never be taught, urged, and repeated enough. If this doctrine be lost, then is also the whole knowledge of truth, life, and salvation lost and gone. If this doctrine flourishes, then all good things flourish, religion, the true service of God, the glory of God, the right knowledge of all things and states of life." ~ Martin Luther, Commentary on Galatians (London: James Clarke, 1961), 21.

Sola Fide.
Sola Scriptura.
Solus Christus.
Sola Gratia.
Soli Deo Gloria.

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Subordinationism (3): Aquinas

What follows is merely a collection of quotations from Thomas Aquinas dedicated to the topic of the equality of the three persons of the Trinity. Aquinas is one of my subsidiary interests. He is a systematic and (needless to say) deep writer. This is to say that I need more time and reading in order to expound further without sounding repetitive. However, one thing seems clear to me: one of Aquinas' intentions is to avoid and/or reject the ancient error of subordinationism.

Compendium of Theology, Chapter 43 (The Divine Word not Distinct from the Father in Time, Species, or Nature): "Among things that are not distinct in essence, there can be no distinction according to species, time, or nature. Therefore, since the Word is consubstantial with the Father, He cannot differ from the Father in any of these respects. There can be no difference according to time. The divine Word is present in God for the reason that God understands Himself, thereby conceiving His intelligible Word. Hence, if at any time there were no Word of God, during that period God would not understand Himself. But God always understood Himself during His whole existence, for His understanding is His existence. Therefore His Word, also, existed always. And so in the rule of Catholic faith we say that the Son of God 'is born of the Father before all ages.'"

Summa Theologiae, Part 1, Q. 42 (Equality and Likeness Among the Divine Persons), A. 1 (Whether there is equality in God)): "We must needs admit equality among the divine persons. For, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x, text 15,16, 17), equality signifies the negation of greater or less. Now we cannot admit anything greater or less in the divine persons; for as Boethius says (De Trin. i): "They must needs admit a difference [namely, of Godhead] who speak of either increase or decrease, as the Arians do, who sunder the Trinity by distinguishing degrees as of numbers, thus involving a plurality." Now the reason of this is that unequal things cannot have the same quantity. But quantity, in God, is nothing else than His essence. Wherefore it follows, that if there were any inequality in the divine persons, they would not have the same essence; and thus the three persons would not be one God; which is impossible. We must therefore admit equality among the divine persons."

Part 1, Q. 42, A. 2 (Whether the person proceeding is co-eternal with His principle, as the Son with the Father): "We must say that the Son is co-eternal with the Father. In proof of which we must consider that for a thing which proceeds from a principle to be posterior to its principle may be due to two reasons: one on the part of the agent, and the other on the part of the action. On the part of the agent this happens differently as regards free agents and natural agents. In free agents, on account of the choice of time; for as a free agent can choose the form it gives to the effect, as stated above (I:41:2), so it can choose the time in which to produce its effect. In natural agents, however, the same happens from the agent not having its perfection of natural power from the very first, but obtaining it after a certain time; as, for instance, a man is not able to generate from the very first. Considered on the part of action, anything derived from a principle cannot exist simultaneously with its principle when the action is successive. So, given that an agent, as soon as it exists, begins to act thus, the effect would not exist in the same instant, but in the instant of the action's termination. Now it is manifest, according to what has been said (I:41:2), that the Father does not beget the Son by will, but by nature; and also that the Father's nature was perfect from eternity; and again that the action whereby the Father produces the Son is not successive, because thus the Son would be successively generated, and this generation would be material, and accompanied with movement; which is quite impossible. Therefore we conclude that the Son existed whensoever the Father existed and thus the Son is co-eternal with the Father, and likewise the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with both."

Part 2, Q. 42, A. 4 (Whether the Son is equal to the Father in greatness): "The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in greatness. For the greatness of God is nothing but the perfection of His nature. Now it belongs to the very nature of paternity and filiation that the Son by generation should attain to the possession of the perfection of the nature which is in the Father, in the same way as it is in the Father Himself. But since in men generation is a certain kind of transmutation of one proceeding from potentiality to act, it follows that a man is not equal at first to the father who begets him, but attains to equality by due growth, unless owing to a defect in the principle of generation it should happen otherwise. From what precedes (I:27:2; I:33:3), it is evident that in God there exist real true paternity and filiation. Nor can we say that the power of generation in the Father was defective, nor that the Son of God arrived at perfection in a successive manner and by change. Therefore we must say that the Son was eternally equal to the Father in greatness. Hence, Hilary says (De Synod. Can. 27): 'Remove bodily weakness, remove the beginning of conception, remove pain and all human shortcomings, then every son, by reason of his natural nativity, is the father's equal, because he has a like nature.'"

Part 1, Q. 42, A. 6 (Whether the Son is equal to the Father in power): "The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in power. Power of action is a consequence of perfection in nature. In creatures, for instance, we see that the more perfect the nature, the greater power is there for action. Now it was shown above (Article 4) that the very notion of the divine paternity and filiation requires that the Son should be the Father's equal in greatness--that is, in perfection of nature. Hence it follows that the Son is equal to the Father in power; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost in relation to both."

The Compendium, though incomplete, is still a very helpful summary of Aquinas' theology, and I personally find it a great introduction to his thought (after perhaps his On Being and Essence). Summa Theologiae does not need any introduction. I will only say that, although I have reported here only a selection of quotations from 1:42, the entire section is very worth meditating. 

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Is Tolkien an ethical dualist/Manichaean/Gnostic? No, but Martin is most probably a hard monist

"I admire Tolkien greatly. His books had enormous influence on me. And the trope that he sort of established—the idea of the Dark Lord and his Evil Minions—in the hands of lesser writers over the years and decades has not served the genre well. It has been beaten to death. The battle of good and evil is a great subject for any book and certainly for a fantasy book, but I think ultimately the battle between good and evil is weighed within the individual human heart and not necessarily between an army of people dressed in white and an army of people dressed in black. When I look at the world, I see that most real living breathing human beings are grey." ~ George R. R. Martin (for Martin's more extended assertions, see here and here).

So, one of the things that Martin's words imply is that J.R.R. Tolkien is too dualistic: evil all on one side, and good all on the other side. Tolkien would be a sort of ethical dualist, or a Manichean or a Gnostic or some kind.

But then you think about Tolkien's saga, and you see that things are not as Martin puts them. 

Six nations of men join Sauron
in the War of the Ring.
And let's not forget Gríma Wormtongue.
[Picture from
Wikipedia, War of the Ring]

• The seven kings of men give up and join Sauron quite soon, after receiving the rings
• The virtuous king Isildur refuses to destroy the Ring once on Mount Doom.
• The totally normal Hobbit Smeagle kills his best friend for the Ring.
• Saruman, sent on the earth to fight Sauron, joins Sauron. 
• The hero of Minas Thirit, Boromir, almost steals the Ring from Frodo. 
• Galadriel, the most powerful and good elf in the middle earth, is powerfully tempted by the ring. 
• Countless men from the south and east join Sauron. 
• Pirates (men) join Sauron. 
• Gondor's ruling steward, Denethor, a person from a glorious family, willfully gives up to hopelessness and madness. 
• The Battle of the Pelennor Fields is won ultimately because Aragorn cunningly enlists The Army of the Dead, a stinky group of once traitors and now undead and undying soldiers and scoundrels who mercenarily accept to fight for him merely because Aragorn, as Isildur's heir, promises to free them from their curse. 
• At the end of his journey, the hero of the entire LOTR book, Frodo, gives up to the power of the Ring. 
• Gandalf is sometimes quite rude. 

The Men (as well as the elves, the Dwarves and the Hobbits) of Tolkien's world, including its heroes, are complicated beings who fight against inner temptations and against the evil of a dangerous and violent world. But maybe Martin has read a different Tolkien. 😊

Then, I do not think Martin's books (Games of Thrones, of which I have read the first two before giving up to boredom) see "humans as grey." I think his books reflect the fact that the author sees men as black as they can get. The best characters in his saga are despicable individuals. Sure, mankind is spiritually depraved in my view. I agree that "ultimately the battle between good and evil is weighed within the individual human heart," but I do not see any of this in Martin's GoT. Both in real history and in Tolkien's world there is also redemption and virtue. There is not a hint of such things in GoT. All is, not grey, but pitch black. In the universe of Martin's soap opera of murders, betrayals, and wars (with several sprinkles of sex and dragons to attract more people) there is no goal nor purpose but one: to repeat ad nauseam that human beings are dark creatures that live only for power (alternatively, pleasure) and survival, and that is the end of the story and the bottom truth of reality. Therefore, if Tolkien is a dualist (and he is not), Martin is certainly a hard monist. Martin seems to have a specific worldview at the bases of his GoT stories, and, even though I do not know what this worldview exactly is, it generally looks like a sort of hard monism with a monolithic view of man, history, and things in general. In this sense, I think Tolkien's writings are way more "realistic" (and exceedingly more edifying) than Martin's.

Malebranche VS Werewolves

Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715).

Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) really tried to make his The
Search for Truth as comprehensive as possible by covering all the topics that needed to be discussed. And I think is rather uncontroversial that among these main philosophical problems, werewolves have a quite preeminent place!

While I was quickly skipping through this volume, selecting the passages I was interested in from this rigorous summa of Malebranche's philosophy and epistemology, I was surprised to find a chapter titled "People Who Imagine Themselves to be Sorcerers and Werewolves." Although I read it with interest and I found it rather entertaining, my first thought was: "Why in the world he, a rationalist philosopher, needed to give a lengthy refutation of these folkloristic stories?" 

Then, after further and less superficial consideration, I realised that, firstly, I was surprised because, nowaday, it is (almost?) universally believed that werewolves are only fictional creatures, but apparently that was not the case during Malebranche's days. Secondly, I was entertained because, even if the French philosopher discusses here things that today we intuitively connect with novels and movies, he was still able to communicate through his treatment some of the main traits of his philosophy. Malebranche describes these beliefs as mere superstitions produced by man's imagination (or, at most, clinical cases in need of medical treatment), as opposed to the enquiry of reason which focuses primarily not on sensations and emotions but rather on the intelligible ideas that the universal reason (the Logos, for Malebranche, incarnated in Jesus Christ) communicates to men in general through rational enquiries and to some men in particular through special revelation. So, after reading the passage and reflecting upon it, maybe it is fair to say that Malebranche's chapter witnesses not against the seriousness of his long book, but, on the contrary, in favour of its comprehensiveness and attention to the issues that surrounded him at his times (although, I am sure he won't mind if I still consider his words quite entertaining). Finally, and needles to say, I do not endorse many of the ideas present in the book in question.

The quote below is the section I am talking about. It is from an old English translation published in 1700. There is also a new English translation of this work, which I hyperlinked above, and that I was too lazy to transcribe here, preferring a quicker copy and past from the old translation. But the English is exquisitely refined, so hope you enjoy it! 

The strangest effect of the force of imagination, is the immoderate fear of the apparition of spirits, witchcraft, spells, and charms, lycanthropes or wolf-men, and generally of whatever is supposed to depend on the power of the devil. There is nothing more terrible, or that frightens the mind more, and makes deeper impressions in the brain, than the idea of an invisible power, intent upon doing us mischief, and to which we can make no resistance. Whatever discourses raise that Idea, are attended to with dread and curiosity. Now men affecting all that's extraordinary, take a whimsical delight in relating witches surprising and prodigious stories, of the power and malice of witches, both to the fearing others and themfelves... 

Men in speaking engrave in our brain such impressions as they have themselves. When they are deep they speak in a way that makes a deep impression upon others: for they never speak, but they make them like themselves in some thing or other. Children in their mother's womb, have only the perceptions of their mothers; and when brought into the world, imagine little more than what their parents are the cause of; even the wisest men take their measures, rather from the Imagination of others, that is, from opinion and custom, than from the rules of reason... 

The apprehension of wolf-men, or of men who imagine themselves transformed into wolves-men, is a fancy no less ridiculous. A man by an extraordinary sally of imagination, falls into a form of madness, that makes him fancy he grows a wolf every night. This disorder of his mind disposes him to the doing all the actions that wolves either do, or he has heard of them. He leaps then out of his house at midnight, roams along the streets, falls upon some child he meets with, bites, tears, and miserably misuses it. The stupid and superstitious people imagine this fanatic is really turned wolf; because the wretch believes it himself, and has whispered it to some persons, who cannot conceal the secret. 

Were it an easy thing to form in the brain such impressions, as persuade men they are transformed into wolves; and could they run along the Streets and make all the havoc those wretched wolf-men do, without an entire subversion of their brain (as 'tis an easy matter for a man to go to the witches-sabbath, in his bed, and without waking ) these notable stories of men metamorphosed into wolves, would have no less effed than those that are told of the rendezvous of witches; and we should have as many wolfmen as we have wizards. But the persuasion of being changed into a wolf, supposes a subversion of brain much harder to be effected than that disorder of one, who only thought he went to the midnight-sabbath, that is, of one, who fancied he saw in the night what was not and who, when he waked, could not distinguish his dreams from the thoughts he had in the day-time. 

The main reason why we cannot take our dreams for realities is, the Incoherence we find in our dreams, with the things we have done, when awake: for hereby we discover they are only dreams... 

But the imagination must be highly distempered before a man can fancy himself a cock, a cat, a wolf, or an ox; which is the reason the thing is no commoner; though these disorders of mind sometimes happen either through God's punitive justice, as in the cafe of Nebuchodonosor, related in Scripture, or by a natural overflowing of melancholy in the brain, whereof many instances are to be met with in the books of physicians. 

 ~ Nicolas Malebranche, Treatise Concerning the Search After Truth, Book 2, Part 3, Chapter 6.

🐺 🐕 🐺

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Few Thoughts in Occasion of my NEW BOOK

One of the main sources of anxiety for a scholar is the necessity to publish! You have to publish! Publish! Publish! Publish! 

While working on material to publish in academic journals, I decided to publish the thesis that I produced for my Master of Research. I decided to do that with a publisher that is very good at keeping the prices as low as possible and, more importantly, very efficient in making the publication easily accessible in as many parts of the world as possible (namely, Resource Publication, an imprint of Wipf and Stock). I published it with the title Luther's Augustinian Theology of the Cross, and with the subtitle The Augustinianism of Martin Luther's Heidelberg Disputation and the Origins of Modern Philosophy of Religion.

It was a rather strange feeling when I finally got the printed book in my hands. On the one hand, when I looked at the cover and I skipped quickly through the pages, the booked appeared to me like a dear son (forgive the exaggeration) for whose growth I laboured. On the other hand, after innumerable hours of work to finalise the manuscript, the content of the book was so familiar to me that I stopped reading only after a couple of lines. I could not read it anymore!

Jokes apart, I am glad and thankful for the final result, and I hope that my little contribution may benefit the readers.

Regarding the book, for the UK it is available on Amazon. 

For the USA, it can be purchased on the publisher website or on Amazon (if you want to use Amazon, check the Amazon website for your specific European [for example, Italy] non-European country),

Also available on E-Book Kindle format.

The book is also available on Wordery and BookDepository with free worldwide delivery.

For many reasons, I have not posted in a while. This is my first post since February. But I plan to start again posting theological and philosophical stuff. The fact is that the life of a PhD student is so filled! I wonder how those other scholars do it... just joking. 😇 

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Subordinationism (2): Anselm

I know, he is looking in the wrong direction...

I'm late in this series! One can never fully know how life can get busy: reading, writing, tutoring, marking, travelling (to meet a special friend ) etc.

Anyway, the next theologian I am going to briefly mention in this series (which is taking me way too much time) is Anselm of Canterbury. In Italy (where I am from), he is usually called Anselm of Aosta, where he was from. I used to be quite pedantic about specifying this, but after years abroad I do not really mind anymore. This said, let us turn our attention to something that we can learn about the equality of the three persons of the Trinity from Anselm of Aosta...... did I say Aosta?

We will focus on De Processione Spiritu Sancti (The Procession of the Holy Spirit), a beautiful treatise based on a lecture Anselm gave during the council of Bari in 1098. Pope Urban II called the council in order to convince the bishops from Puglia and Sicilia who followed the eastern though on the procession of the Holy Spirit. Urban well thought to call his best trinitarian champion for this.

We will see here what Anselm has to say about the equality on the three persons of the Trinity. While reading him, please bear in mind the claim of today's subordinationists according to which "differences in roles and authority between the members of the Trinity are thus completely consistent with equal importance, personhood, and deity" (Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine, Zondervan, 1994, 459. Emphasis added). The main (extremely serious) problems are the two emphasised concepts, i.e., difference in "authority" and it supposed harmony with equality of "importance." I think the above claim is a logically absurd escaping device, as I have tried to briefly show in my previous post. But let us turn to Anselm, now. 

"The Father is not earlier or later than the Son, or greater or lesser; and the one is God neither more nor less than is the other ... the Son so exists from the Father that He is in every respect the same thing as the Father and is one and the same God as the Father. Thus, just as the sole and simple God cannot be greater or lesser than Himself, nor earlier or later than Himself, and just as He has no diversity within Himself, so the Son is neither earlier nor later, neither greater nor lesser, than is the Father. Nor does the Son have in Himself anything different from the Father; rather, just as the Son has it from the Father to exist perfectly, so He has it from the Father to be equal and similar to the Father in every respect—indeed, to be the very same thing [as is the Father]. Hence, just as although the Son exists from the Father, the Son is no less God than is the Father, so although the Son has from the Father the fact that the Holy Spirit exists from Him, the Holy Spirit exists no less from the Son than from the Father. For insofar as the Son is one and the same God as the Father—i.e., insofar as the Son is God—He is not distinct from the Father and does not have any dissimilarity. For the Father is not one God and the Son another God, nor are they dissimilarly that which they are; rather, the one is distinct from the other insofar as the one is the Father and the other is the Son. And just as the Son is not a God other than the Father, so with respect to the fact that the Son is God He does not have anything from any other than from Himself. Now, when we say that God exists from God and that the Son exists from the Father, we construe this to mean not that one God exists from another God but that the same God exists from the same God—even though we say 'The one exists from the other,' i.e., that the Son exists from the Father. For (as was said earlier) just as in accordance with the name signifying oneness God receives no diversity, so in accordance with the names signifying that God exists from God, necessarily He admits of plurality ... Just as God is not greater or lesser than Himself: so in the case of the three (viz., the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit) there is not anything greater or lesser; and no one of them is what He is any more or less than is another of them, even though it is true that God exists from God by proceeding and by being begotten." - Anselm of Canterbury, The Procession of the Holy Spirit, 14. Emphasis added.

Of course, Anselm does not believe that the three persons are absolutely and under every respect the same. In fact, he seems to distinguish them according to classical orthodoxy (see, among many places, paragraphs 14 to 16 of The Procession). I let the reader read the rest of Anselm's work which, although not perfect and rather brief, is a very interesting part of the centennial debate about God's triunity. 

Next blog post: Thomas Aquinas! And I hope to make it longer than this one.

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