Thomas: "On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that 'predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits.' But foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who predestines, and not in the predestined. I answer that, predestination is not anything in the predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider, as was proved above (I:22:1). But the execution of providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active way in the governor. Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The execution of predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle (Romans 8:30): "Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He also magnified [Vulg. 'justified']." For more on this, see my forthcoming Summa Theologiae, 1st part, Q 23, A 2. See also Summa Theologiae, 1st part, A 23, Q 5."
"π ......Alrighty, then! I am sure you will like this new song. C' mon, Tom, join us! ♬ If you happy and you know it, clap your hands (clapπ clapπ)! And if you are happ... ♫"
T.: "On the contrary, happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation. I answer that a thing may belong to happiness in three ways: 1) essentially, 2) antecedently, 3) consequently. Now the operation of sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man's happiness consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated Good, Which is his last end, as shown above (Article 1): to Which man cannot be united by an operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because, as shown above (I-II:2:5), man's happiness does not consist in goods of the body, which goods alone, however, we attain through the operation of the senses. Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the operation of the intellect demands a previous operation of the sense; consequently, in that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the resurrection, 'from the very happiness of the soul,' as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) "the body and the bodily senses will receive a certain overflow, so as to be perfected in their operations"; a point which will be explained further on when we treat of the resurrection (II-II:82-85). But then the operation whereby man's mind is united to God will not depend on the senses. You can read more on this in my forthcoming Summa Theologiae, 1st part of 2nd part, Q 3, A 3."
"π ......Thomas, sometimes, you really are no fun."
T.: "On the contrary, I answ..."
"Drop it."
"Drop it."
T.: "Ok."
©
Words in grey are my own and not Aquinas'.