Herman Bavinck on General and Special Revelation

Herman Bavinck (1854-1921)

Nowadays, the truth of the sufficiency of Scripture is often used as a catchphrase that is supposed to sound biblical and devout. Scripture is sufficient, but sufficient for what? For absolutely every single thing, activity, and work in life? If we don't qualify what does it mean that Scripture is sufficient, if we don't qualify for what Scripture is sufficient and that Scripture is sufficient for what is meant to be sufficient (see 2 Tim. 3:16-17), we may sound pious and spiritual but we are being illogical; we may sound like honoring Scripture as the Word of God, but we are actually misunderstanding its purpose and abasing it to the level of an instruction manual. Herman Bavinck seems to have known this quite well. 

"Does special revelation swallow everything that lies before us in nature and history, such that, in order to know everything about it (nature and history), we need to do nothing other than to investigate the Scriptures? There are indeed those who theoretically reason this way, but at the same time they contradict the practice in their own life. After all, they go to school, receive instruction in the subjects that they need for life, and permit themselves to receive training for that trade or calling which they wish someday to practice in society. Agriculture, animal husbandry, business, industry, etc.—they are all learned from nature in school and in life. This instruction, too, comes to them from God, but they do not receive this instruction from Scripture, but from nature. God instructs them in the way they must act through the nature of things; and this also comes from the Lord of hosts who is wonderful in counsel, and excellent in working (Isa. 28:23–29)." ~ Herman Bavinck, Biblical and Religious Psychology (Jenison, MI: Reformed Free Publishing Association, 2024), 8.

That said, although Scripture does not say everything that can be said about everything, Scripture still says something about all things, in one way or another. Therefore, Scripture plays a vital role in all disciplines and activities practiced by mankind.

"But on the other side, are the Scriptures so detached from nature that they never in any way concern themselves with, never speak of, and shed absolutely no light on it? Is Scripture alone a light on the path to heaven, and is it in no respect a lamp for our feet as we walk in the paths of this earth [Ps. 119:105]? This is equally contrary to reality, because Scripture by no means limits itself only to purely religiousethical and heavenly things; but each moment it also deals with those matters that concern earthly life. As you know, it tells of the creation of heaven and earth, the origin of man, of man’s sin and misery in this life. In its first chapters, Scripture takes the whole of humanity into consideration; it lets special revelation flow forth through the prophets and in Christ to the whole of humanity, and it ends with the prediction that one day there will come a new heaven, but also a new earth in which righteousness dwells [2 Pet. 3:13]. And in the unfolding of this rich and broad history, it descends again and again to all kinds of particulars, to phenomena in nature, to events in general history, to chronologies and genealogies, to definite expressions about the nature of man, about his soul [ziel], his spirit [geest], and his heart [hart]. On all sides, special revelation penetrates deep into the natural life of humanity." ~ Bavinck, Biblical and Religious Psychology, 8-9.

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Updated: March 5, 2024

Luther's "Shocking" Realization of the Need for a Reformation

Dawn: Luther at Erfurt,
by Joseph Noel Paton.
From Wikimedia Commons.

The following passages are taken from Martin Luther's Sermons on John (2:23-24), in Luther's Works, Volume 22, Sermons on Gospel of St John Chapters 1-4. Luther mentions the deep pains and intense struggles that he experienced when he gradually started to realize that some of the teachings of the Church Fathers, some of which were developed and officially accepted by the Roman Catholic Church, were in contradiction with the Scriptures. Luther briefly describes the slow and painful realization of the desperate need for a Reformation of the church, a Reformation to which Luther was called to contribute, as an appointed preacher and lecturer in the church. Of course, these words do not tell the entire story. Nevertheless, they offer a personal picture, depicted by Luther himself, of Luther's own theological and existential struggles, and it is a picture that is in contradiction to some anti-Protestant propaganda that sees Luther as a careless revolutionary and deconstructionist.

No one will believe how great an ordeal it is and how severe a shock when a person first realizes that he must believe and teach contrary to the fathers, especially when he sees that so many excellent, intelligent, and learned men, yes, the best of them taught thus, and that the majority of the people in the world shared their views; among these were so many holy men, like Saints Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine. I, too, have often experienced this shock. But in spite of all this, that one man, my Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, must have greater weight with me than all the holiest people on earth put together. Yea, He must also outweigh all the angels in heaven (Gal. 1:8) if they teach anything at variance with the Gospel, or if they add to or detract from the doctrine of the divine Word. And then when I read the books of St Augustine and discover that he, too, did this and that, it thoroughly appals me. And when, over and above this, the hue and the cry is raised: ‘The church! The church!’, this dismays one most of all. It is truly difficult to subdue one’s own heart in these matters, to deviate from people who are so highly respected and who bear such a holy name—indeed, from the church herself—and no longer to have any confidence and faith in the church’s teaching. I mean, of course, that church of which they say: ‘Lo, the church has decreed that the precepts of Saints Francis and Dominic and the orders of monks and nuns are proper, Christian, and good.’ This truly bewilders and dismays a person. But after all is said and done, I must say that I dare not accept whatever any man might say; for he may be a pious and God-fearing man and yet be mistaken and err. Therefore I shall not trust myself to them all, as the Lord, according to this text, did not trust Himself to man either. And in another passage, found in the Gospel of Matthew, Christ earnestly warns us to beware of false prophets who will appear and not merely declare that they are Christians, but will also ‘show great signs and wonders, so as to lead astray, if possible, even the elect’ (Matt. 24:24). ~ Pages 256-257.

I remind you how difficult it is to break down the barriers and to realize that holy men such as St. Augustine and others might be mistaken. It distressed me greatly for approximately twenty years; and I debated, struggled, and wrestled with myself before I pressed through to the conviction that not everything the pope says is to be believed, that the church may err, and that I should not follow the fathers blindly. ~ Page 259. 

Therefore we must remember that these holy men may have been saved, but it was Christ who died for us. We must place our trust solely on Him as our only Saviour, and on no other, not on ourselves or our own opinions, however good they may be. Do not trust yourself to your own opinions, but take them to Christ and see whether they are in conformity with the faith (Rom. 12:7) and the Word of the holy Gospel ... It is essential for the heart of a Christian to be firmly convinced that Christ's innocent life, His holy blood, and precious death are our salvation, that we, together with all the saints, must cling to christ alone, and that no saint in heaven ever relied on himself and his own righteousness. ~ Page 272.

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Boethius's Psychology of Discontentment

From Wikimedia Commons.

These are just a few extracts from Boethius' very famous The Consolation of Philosophy. I like how Boethius mentions and explains some false assumptions that we sometimes embrace (even unconsciously) when we allow discontentment to crawl in our minds.

"Whose happiness is so firmly established that he has no quarrel from any side with his estate of life? For the condition of our welfare is a matter fraught with care: either its completeness never appears, or it never remains. One man’s wealth is abundant, but his birth and breeding put him to shame. Another is famous for his noble birth, but would rather be unknown because he is hampered by his narrow means. A third is blessed with wealth and breeding, but bewails his life because he has no wife. Another is happy in his marriage, but has no children, and saves his wealth only for an heir that is no son of his. Another is blessed with children, but weeps tears of sorrow for the misdeeds of son or daughter. So none is readily at peace with the lot his fortune sends him. For in each case there is that which is unknown to him who has not experienced it, and which brings horror to him who has experienced it. Consider further, that the feelings of the most fortunate men are the most easily affected, wherefore, unless all their desires are supplied, such men, being unused to all adversity, are cast down by every little care: so small are the troubles which can rob them of complete happiness. How many are they, think you, who would think themselves raised to heaven if the smallest part of the remnants of your good fortune fell to them? This very place, which you call a place of exile, is home to those who live herein. Thus there is nothing wretched unless you think it to be so: and in like manner he who bears all with a calm mind finds his lot wholly blessed. Who is so happy but would wish to change his estate, if he yields to impatience of his lot? With how much bitterness is the sweetness of man’s life mingled! For even though its enjoyment seem pleasant, yet it may not be surely kept from departing when it will. It is plain then how wretched is the happiness of mortal life which neither endures forever with men of calm mind, nor ever wholly delights the care-ridden.Wherefore, then, O mortal men, seek ye that happiness without, which lies within yourselves? Ye are confounded by error and ignorance. I will shew you as shortly as I may, the pole on which turns the highest happiness. Is there aught that you value more highly than your own self? You will answer that there is nothing. If then you are master of yourself, you will be in possession of that which you will never wish to lose, and which Fortune will never be able to take from you. Yet consider this further, that you may be assured that happiness cannot be fixed in matters of chance: if happiness is the highest good of a man who lives his life by reason, and if that which can by any means be snatched away, is not the highest good (since that which is best cannot be snatched away), it is plain that Fortune by its own uncertainty can never come near to reaching happiness. Further, the man who is borne along by a happiness which may stumble, either knows that it may change, or knows it not: if he knows it not, what happiness can there be in the blindness of ignorance? If he knows it, he must needs live in fear of losing that which he cannot doubt that he may lose; wherefore an ever-present fear allows not such a one to be happy." ~ 2.4.

Why then do you long for them with such railing against Fortune? You seek, I believe, to put want to flight by means of plenty. But you find that the opposite results. The more various is the beauty of furniture, the more helps are needed to keep it beautiful; and it is ever true that they who have much, need much; and on the other hand, they need least who measure their wealth by the needs of nature, not by excess of display. Is there then no good which belongs to you and is implanted within you, that you seek your good things elsewhere, in things without you and separate from you? Have things taken such a turn that the animal, whose reason gives it a claim to divinity, cannot seem beautiful to itself except by the possession of lifeless trappings? Other classes of things are satisfied by their intrinsic possessions; but men, though made like God in understanding, seek to find among the lowest things adornment for their higher nature: and you do not understand that you do a great wrong thereby to your Creator. He intended that the human race should be above all other earthly beings; yet you thrust down your honourable place below the lowest. For if every good thing is allowed to be more valuable than that to which it belongs, surely you are putting yourselves lower than them in your estimation, since you think precious the most worthless of things; and this is indeed a just result. Since, then, this is the condition of human nature, that it surpasses other classes only when it realises what is in itself; as soon as it ceases to know itself, it must be reduced to a lower rank than the beasts. To other animals ignorance of themselves is natural; in men it is a fault." ~ 2.5.

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In Defence of (Good) Labels in Philosophical and Theological Discussion (and, Precision ≠ Pedantry)

I found this on the Internet. I do not know
where it is from exactly. Apologies.

A while ago, I posted on Facebook the following quotation by Herman Bavinck.

"The difference between Augustine and Pelagius, Calvin and Castellio, Gomarus and Arminius is not that the latter were that much more gentle, loving, and tenderhearted than the former. On the contrary, it arises from the fact that the former accepted Scripture in its entirety, also including this doctrine [election and reprobation; they were and always wanted to be theistic and recognize the will and hand of the Lord also in these disturbing facts of life; they were not afraid to look reality in the eyes even when it was appaling. Pelagianism scatters flowers over graves, turns death into an angel, regards sin as mere weakness, lectures on the uses of adversity, and consider this the best possible world. Calvinism has no use for such drivel. It refuses to be hoodwinked. It tolerates no such delusion, takes full account of the seriousness of life, champions the rights of the Lord of lords, and humbly bows in adoration before the inexplicable sovereign will of God Almighty. As a result, it proves to be fundamentally more merciful than Pelagianism. How deeply Calvin felt the gravity of what he said is evident from his use of the expression 'dreadfull decree' [Institutes, 3.23.7]. Totally withouth warrant, this expression has been held against him. In fact, it is to his credit, not to his discredit. The decree, as Calvin's teaching, is not dreadful, but dreadful indeed is the reality that is the revelation of that decree of God, a reality that comes through both in Scripture and in history. To all thinking humans, whether they are followers of Pelagius or Augustine, that reality [of God's decree] remains completely the same. It is not something that can in any way be undone by illusory notions of it." ~ Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics: God and Creation: Vol. 2, 394-395.

Soon, a scholar (who will remain unnamed) commented that "I" (even though I quoted Bavinck's own words) was misinterpreting Arminianism and Pelagianism (a plausible claim when directed to me, quite a grandiose claim when directed to Bavinck). This is because, the person continued, they are theologically and historically not exactly the same (although neither Bavinck nor I ever claimed that they are exactly the same, and that is not even the point of the quotation). Therefore, the person claimed, Arminianism and Pelagianism should not be linked together as Bavinck does. With a fine final touch, the person implicitly but unmistakenly suggested that I should go studying these issues since I did not know enough about them (I was not sure how that is relevant, but it was quite right nonetheless!).

I will set aside the first and the last two curious remarks since this blog post is not at all meant to be a personal matter but an occasion for some considerations. Talking about the real issue here, Bavinck's point is not the theological and philosophical differences between Pelagianism and Arminianism, a point that nobody denied and that is irrelevant here. The real claim is that these two theological positions (Arminianism and Pelagianism) have the same core problem, that is, making salvation ultimately depend on man, and not God (as the reading of the Bavinck's entire chapter, "The Divine Counsel," clearly shows). It is on the basis of those shared common cores that the connections and the labelling are made (between Arminianism and Pelagianism in this case, and in other cases if done correctly), and not on the basis of a supposed full theological equality which nobody has claimed and that is admittedly not there. 

This is nothing new. Augustine of Hippo saw that what we today call Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism have basically the same essential problems. In Letter 217, Augustine described Semi- Pelagianism “as necessarily implying the basal idea of Pelagianism” (B. B. Warfield, Augustine and the Pelagian Controversy; emphasis added). In fact, Augustine writes to Vitalis as follows.

"Here you [Vitalis] are again perhaps going to say that the Lord does this when we read or hear his teaching, if a person assents with his will to the truth that he reads or hears. You say, 'For, if God's teaching were concealed from him, God would not direct his steps in order that, once they had been directed, a man would choose God's way.' And for this reason you think that the Lord directs the steps of a man to choose God's way only in the sense that without God's teaching he could not come to know the truth to which he assents by his will. You say, 'If a man assents to it (something that lies within his free choice), the Lord is correctly said to direct his steps in order that he may choose the way of him whose teaching he follows because he was first persuaded and then assented, which he does by his natural freedom if he wills to, but does not do if he does not will to. And he will receive a reward or punishment in accord with what he has done.' This is the teaching of the Pelagians that is wrongly spread about and rightly condemned, and Pelagius himself, fearing that he would be condemned in the courtroom of the Eastern bishops, condemned the view by which they say that the grace of God is not given for individual actions but lies in free choice or in the law and teaching. Will we be hardhearted to such a point, my brother, that we hold that Pelagian view on the grace of God, or rather against the grace of God, that Pelagius himself condemned with a false heart, but still in fear of Catholic judges?" ~ Augustine, Letter 217, 2.4 (emphasis added).

Augustine was certainly aware of the differences between Pelagius and Vitalis (and of the differences between the Pelagians and the Semi-Pelagians), and Augustine wisely does not expressly call Vitalis a Pelagian (Augustine's intent is corrective and pastoral). Nevertheless, Augustine is clearly making a strong connection between Vitalis and Pelagianism because they have a core doctrine in common (of course, not any core doctrine in common, but one relevant to the debate they were facing).

Robert L. Dabney makes a very similar point while discussing the similarities between Pelagianism and the position of one of his theological adversaries, Albert Taylor Bledsoe (1809-1877).

One more of Dr. Bledsoe's complaints of unfairness remains to be noticed. This is, that we assert his philosophy to be virtually Pelagian. This charge we did undoubtedly make, and intend to repeat. Now, Pelagius and Celestius taught sundry dogmas, such as baptismal redemption, monkery, the existence of unredeemed infants dying in infancy in a happy eternal state which yet is not the Christian's heaven, which Dr. Bledsoe does not hold; nor does the veriest Socinian on whose modern shoulders Pelagius's own mantle has fallen, hold them. They are as antiquated as the Ptolemaic astronomy. These ancient heretics, again, carried out their erroneous first principles with a symmetrical consistency in some results which we never dreamed of ascribing to Dr. Bledsoe; we do him no such injustice. In these senses he is, if he will prefer it so, no Pelagian. But in church history Pelagianism is a given, definite code of doctrines in philosophy and theology, clustering around certain hingepropositions. These hinge-propositions granted, the essential body of the system follows for all consistent minds. What wo mean by calling Dr. Bledsoe a virtual Pelagian is, then, this: that he asserts these hinge-propositions, and the more obvious and important of their consequences." ~ Robert L. Dabney, "The Philosophy of Volition," 222.

The Canons of Dort also make the same kind of connections, several times, between Arminianism and Pelagianism. Some people might be offended by some of the words used by the Canons, which would be missing the point they are getting at. The Canons have been carefully written by some of the best Protestant theologians of the 17th century, they are a very important document and, therefore, they should be considered seriously. The writers of the Canons were not trying to be inflammatory, but they were making an important theological claim regarding the substantial similarities that they saw between Arminianism and Pelagianism. See Canons of Dort, Head 2, Error 3, Error 6; Head 3 and 4, Article 2, Error 7, 9; Head 5, Error 2.

Again, it is on the basis of those shared common cores that the connections and the labelling are made (between Arminianism and Pelagianism in this case, and in other cases if done correctly), and not on the basis of a supposed full theological equality which nobody has claimed and that it is admittedly not there. Bavinck's, Dabney's, and the Canons' claims are refuted by proving that there are no core shared doctrines between Arminianism and Pelagianism (good luck with that!), and not simply by pointing to the obvious fact that those two positions do not teach exactly the same things and that they raised in the midst of two different historical contexts. Moreover, if this kind of connections and labelling should be made only when two positions are theologically and philosophically fully the same, then the necessity of such connections and labels will disappear altogether because then we will have, not two teachings with similar core doctrines, but one and the same teaching, thus making the useful practice in question virtually impossible. It is an unreasonable criterion. 

But does all this simply have to do with Arminianism and Pelagianism? Not really. Then why have I bathed in all this cybernetic ink? The reason is that the Facebook event described above gives me the occasion to discuss the usefulness (and possible dangers) of using labels. I think the reason that explains the response I received is not related to an ordered desire to be theologically and historically precise but rather has more to do with a desire of making unnecessary qualifications, ignoring substantial common issues, and not realising the necessity of labels and designations in order not to get lost in an endless web of tangential qualifications and distinctions. Already in the 18th century, Jonathan Edwards faced this kind of protests. I believe his words are quite to the point.

"Many find much fault with the calling professing Christians, that differ one from another in some matters of opinion, by distinct names; especially calling them by the names of particular men, who have distinguished themselves as maintainers and promoters of those opinions: as the calling some professing Christians 'Arminians,' from Arminius; others 'Arians,' from Arius; others 'Socinians,' from Socinus, and the like. They think it unjust in itself; as it seems to suppose and suggest, that the persons marked out by these names, received those doctrines which they entertain, out of regard to, and reliance on those men after whom they are named; as though they made them their rule: in the same manner, as the followers of Christ are called 'Christians'; after his name, whom they regard and depend upon, as their great Head and Rule. Whereas, this is an unjust and groundless imputation on those that go under the forementioned denominations. Thus (say they) there is not the least ground to suppose, that the chief divines, who embrace the scheme of doctrine which is by many called Arminianism, believe it the more because Arminius believed it: and that there is no reason to think any other, than that they sincerely and impartially study the Holy Scriptures, and inquire after the mind of Christ, with as much judgment and sincerity, as any of those that call them by these names; that they seek after truth, and are not careful whether they think exactly as Arminius did; yea, that in some things they actually differ from him. This practice is also esteemed actually injurious on this account, that it is supposed naturally to lead the multitude to imagine the difference between persons thus named and others, to be greater than it is; yea, as though it were so great, that they must be as it were another species of beings. And they object against it as arising from an uncharitable, narrow, contracted spirit; which, they say, commonly inclines persons to confine all that is good to themselves and their own party, and to make a wide distinction between themselves and others, and stigmatize those that differ from them with odious names. They say moreover, that the keeping up such a distinction of names has a direct tendency to uphold distance and disaffection, and keep alive mutual hatred among Christians, who ought all to be united in friendship and charity, however they can't in all things think alike." ~ Jonathan Edwards, The Freedom of the Will, Preface.

Does that mean that one can use labels and make connections indiscriminately? For instance, can we put Calvinism and fatalism on the same category? The answer is no. The similarities between Calvinism and fatalism are very far from being substantial (therefore, we lack what is needed to make the connection and use the label), but they are either only in appearance or straightforwardly fabricated (Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 277-311, 365-371, 375-412; John Gill, The Cause of God and Truth, 183-198;  C. Hodge, Systematic Theology: Vol. 2, 278-309; R. L. Dabney, The Practical Philosophy, 153-155; G. H. Clark, “Religion, Reason, and Revelation,” in Christian Philosophy, 238-270; T. J. Williams, Love, Freedom, and Evil, 43-58, 103-116, 119-185; S. Christensen, What About Free Will?, 224-237; J. N. Anderson, “Calvinism and the First Sin,” in D. E. Alexander and D. M. Johnson, Calvinism and the Problem of Evil, 200-229; G. Bignon, Excusing Sinners and Blaming God, 167-232). Edwards admits that too often labels are given and connections are made where there is no real or enough warrant and simply in order to uncharitably censure others.

"I confess, these things are very plausible. And I will not deny, that there are some unhappy consequences of this distinction of names, and that men's infirmities and evil dispositions often make an ill improvement of it. But yet I humbly conceive, these objections are carried far beyond reason. The generality of mankind are disposed enough, and a great deal too much, to uncharitableness, and to be censorious and bitter towards those that differ from them in religious opinions: which evil temper of mind will take occasion to exert itself, from many things in themselves innocent, useful and necessary." ~ Ivi.

"Calling a spade a spade" should not degenerate in "calling a spoon a spade." However, to dismiss a good practice because it is often abused is not a reasonable response.

"But yet there is no necessity to suppose, that the thus distinguishing persons of different opinions by different names, arises mainly from an uncharitable spirit. It may arise from the disposition there is in mankind (whom God has distinguished with an ability and inclination for speech) to improve the benefit of language, in the proper use and design of names, given to things which they have often occasion to speak of, or signify their minds about; which is to enable them to express their ideas with ease and expedition, without being incumbered with an obscure and difficult circumlocution. And the thus distinguishing persons of different opinions in religious matters, may not imply, nor infer any more than that there is a difference, and that the difference is such as we find we have often occasion to take notice of, and make mention of. That which we have frequent occasion to speak of (whatever it be, that gives the occasion) this wants a name: and 'tis always a defect in language, in such cases, to be obliged to make use of a description, instead of a name." ~ Ivi.

This is a very common habit that humanity practices in several different circumstances.

"Thus we have often occasion to speak of those who are the descendants of the ancient inhabitants of France, who were subjects or heads of the government of that land, and spake the language peculiar to it; in distinction from the descendants of the inhabitants of Spain, who belonged to that community, and spake the language of that country. And therefore we find the great need of distinct names to signify these different sorts of people, and the great convenience of those distinguishing words, 'French,' and 'Spaniards'; by which the signification of our minds is quick and easy, and our speech is delivered from the burden of a continual reiteration of diffuse descriptions, with which it must otherwise be embarrassed. That the difference of the opinions of those, who in their general scheme of divinity agree with these two noted men, Calvin, and Arminius, is a thing there is often occasion to speak of, is what the practice of the latter, itself confesses; who are often, in their discourses and writings, taking notice of the supposed absurd and pernicious opinions of the former sort. And therefore the making use of different names in this case can't reasonably be objected against, or condemned, as a thing which must come from so bad a cause as they assign. It is easy to be accounted for, without supposing it to arise from any other source, than the exigence and natural tendency of the state of things; considering the faculty and disposition God has given mankind, to express things which they have frequent occasion to mention, by certain distinguishing names. It is an effect that is similar to what we see arise, in innumerable cases which are parallel, where the cause is not at all blameworthy." ~ Ivi.

The presence of substantial similarities in the pillar teachings of position a and position b is a sufficient reason to make the connections and to use the kind of labels we have been discussing so far. That said, labels should only be used when such substantial similarities are actually there, and should not be used as mere attempts to negatively characterize or demonize. Finally, both labels and warranted theoretical connections are made necessary by the very nature of language, by the need of communicative effectiveness and concision, and by the need to avoid "obscure and difficult circumlocution[s]." As long as integrity is maintained, the meanings of the words and the doctrines involved are accurate, and the connections are grounded, the academic and the minister, as well as the non-academic and the layperson, should not fear to adopt the practices here discussed when necessary simply because he or she does not have a graduate degree in Late Antiquity Christian theology, Early Modern Protestant thought, or similar. Once the criteria just mentioned are satisfied (although I realise they are only introductory and general), the practices at issue are legit and those who adopt them should not worry if, for example, someone does not like the fact of being theologically and philosophically close to Pelagianism, Semi-Pelagianism, Arminianism, or some other doctrine. Accuracy is essential, courtesy is always welcome, and charity is required. Pedantry and evasiveness are not.

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Alvin Plantinga on Divine Impassibility, Passibility, and the Incarnation: A Few Considerations

I have recently enjoyed reading Prof Alvin Plantinga's Knowledge and Christian Belief (KCB). It is a very well written book. Being an abridged and revised version of the much bigger Warranted Christian Belief, KCB not only offers a good introduction to Prof Plantinga's philosophy but it also contains a good overview of the academic issues it discusses. There are a few minor disagreements I have with Prof Plantinga's epistemological and apologetic treatment on the rationality and warrant of theistic Christian belief, and here I will not mention any of these issues. However, I came across a section of this book that I found both unexpected (in the light of the specific nature of the volume) and weak. In this section, Prof Plantinga denies the classical Christian doctrine of divine impassibility, claiming that the incarnation of Christ makes it severely problematic. The doctrine of divine impassibility is as follows.

“Impassibility is that divine attribute whereby God is said not to experience inner emotional changes of state whether enacted freely from within or effected by his relationship to and interaction with human beings and the created order. More specifically, impassibility means that God does not experience suffering and pain, and thus does not have feelings that are analogous to human feelings. Divine impassibility follows upon His immutability, in that, since God is changeless and unchangeable, his inner emotional state cannot change from joy to sorrow or from delight to suffering.” ~ Thomas Weinandy, "Impassibility of God," in New Catholic Encyclopedia: Vol. 7, 357. (Note: the definition rightly connects impassibility and immutability, and I will referr to both these doctrines).

Differently, Prof Plantinga says what follows.

"I believe God can and does suffer; his capacity for suffering exceeds ours in the same measure that his knowledge exceeds ours. Christ’s suffering was no charade; he was prepared to endure the agonies of the cross and of hell itself ('My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?'). God the Father was prepared to endure the anguish of seeing his Son, the second person of the trinity, consigned to the bitterly cruel and shameful death of the cross. And isn’t the same true for other passions? 'There is more rejoicing in heaven over one sinner who repents than over ninety-nine righteous persons who do not need to repent' (Luke 15:7); is God himself to be excluded from this rejoicing?" ~ KCB, 77.

Prof Plantinga's denial seems rather out of place and unexpected because his argument works equally well also assuming the traditional view of God's impassibility. But I am getting ahead of myself. 

The Context of the Argument
It is not necessary to give a detailed overview of KCB's goal. For clarity's sake, it is sufficient to say that his book is dedicated to demonstrating how the religious beliefs of a Christian believer "enjoy justification, rationality, and warrant" (KCB, 70), independently of whether the believer is philosophically, theologically or scientifically trained or not. Plantinga defines warrant as follows.

"A belief has warrant for a person S only if that belief is produced by cognitive faculties [such as perception, memory, introspection, reason, and testimony] functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment that is appropriate for S's kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plan that is successfully aimed at truth." ~ KCB, 28.

Again, I will not go through Prof Plantinga's book because it is not necessary for my current purpose. There are several reviews and summaries available online for those who are interested. Alternatively, the reader might read the book itself, which is easy to read and not long. It is sufficient to say at this point that in chapters 1 and 2, Prof Plantinga offers a summary of the academic debate. In chapters 3 to 5, Prof Plantinga discusses and argues for the warrant of holding, not only belief in God, but belief in the triune God of Christianity and Jesus Christ the incarnate Word of God.  

Divine impassibility?
Chapter 6 continues what Prof Plantinga already started in chapter 5, that is, discussing the affective and volitional side of Christian faith and belief in addition to the intellectual one. Close to the end of the chapter, however, severe problems start to arise. Prof Plantinga wants to argue that, within the life of the three persons of the Trinity, there is love. This is a rather uncontroversial claim which is held (albeit with different explanations) throughout the entire Christian theological tradition, starting from "God is love" (1 John 4:8) to the present day. Prof Plantinga argues for a specific kind of love: eros. Erotic love, as Prof Plantinga defines it, is "longing, desire, a desire for some kind of union ... " (KCB, 74). The Bible ascribes this love to the three persons of the Trinity and, Prof Plantinga claims, is, therefore, incompatible with the classical Christian doctrine of divine impassibility. Prof Plantinga defines and describes the latter doctrine as follows.

"Now a widely shared traditional view of God has been that he is impassible, without desire or feeling or passion, unable to feel sorrow at the sad condition of his world and the suffering of his children, and equally unable to feel joy, delight, longing, or yearning. The reason for so thinking, roughly, is that in the tradition originating in Greek philosophy, passions were thought of (what else?) as passive, something that happens to you, something you undergo, rather than something you actively do. You are subject to and undergo anger, love, joy, and all the rest. God, however, doesn't undergo anything at all; he acts, and is never merely passive; and he isn't subject to anything. As far as eros is concerned, furthermore, there is an additional reason for thinking that it isn't part of God's life: longing and yearning signify need and incompleteness. One who yearns for something doesn't yet have it, and needs it, or at any rate thinks he needs it; God is of course paradigmatically complete and needs nothing beyond himself. How, then, could he be subject to eros? God's love, according to this tradition, is exclusively agape, benevolence, a completely other-regarding, magnanimous love in which there is mercy but no element of desire. God loves us, but there is nothing we can do for him; he wishes nothing from us." (KCB, 76-77). 

I believe that the quotation above does not accurately describe the classical Christian theistic view of God's impassibility, and I will attempt to show why. As a disclaimer, I am not arguing that Prof Plantinga has nowhere offered better support for his claims, and I will limit my analysis to the sixth chapter of KCB.

Actus Purus and the Incarnation
In Prof Plantinga's account there is an element that Prof Plantinga briefly mentions but that is not sufficiently discussed in his description of divine impassibility, that is, that God is actus purus (pure act, or purely active). This is an essential point because if we want to accept or reject an idea, it is important to have a proper view of that idea in front of our eyes. 

The God of classical Christian theism is a purely active God, "most high, most excellent, most potent, most omnipotent; most piteous and most just; most hidden and most near; most beauteous and most strong, stable, yet contained of none; unchangeable, yet changing all things; never new, never old; making all things new, yet bringing old age upon the proud and they know it not; always working, yet ever at rest; gathering, yet needing nothing; sustaining, pervading, and protecting; creating, nourishing, and developing; seeking, and yet possessing all things. You love, and burn not; You are jealous, yet free from care; You repent, and have no sorrow; You are angry, yet serene; You change Your ways, leaving unchanged Your plans; You recover what You find, having yet never lost; You are never in want, while You rejoice in gain; You are never covetous, though requiring usury" (Augustine, Confessions, 1.4.4).

In order to have a proper view of classical Christian theism, when we mention God's impassibility it is essential to properly mention also the other side of this doctrine, that is, God's utter actuality. Stephen Charnock describes God's pure actuality and absolute  and blessed fullness of being in reference to the believers' future state of glory.

"The enjoyment of God will be as fresh and glorious after many ages, as it was at first. God is eternal, and eternity knows no change; there will then be the fullest possession without any decay in the object enjoyed. There can be nothing past, nothing future; time neither adds to it, nor detracts from it; that infinite fulness of perfection which flourisheth in him now, will flourish eternally, without any discoloring of it in the least, by those innumerable ages that shall run to eternity, much less any despoiling him of them: 'He is the same in his endless duration' (Psalm 102:27). As God is, so will the eternity of him be, without succession, without division; the fulness of joy will be always present; without past to be thought of with regret for being gone; without future to be expected with tormenting desires. When we enjoy God, we enjoy him in his eternity without any flux; an entire possession of all together, without the passing away of pleasures that may be wished to return, or expectation of future joys which might be desired to hasten. Time is fluid, but eternity is stable; and after many ages, the joys will be as savory and satisfying as if they had been but that moment first tasted by our hungry appetites. When the glory of the Lord shall rise upon you, it shall be so far from ever setting, that after millions of years are expired, as numerous as the sands on the seashore, the sun, in the light of whose countenance you shall live, shall be as bright as at the first appearance; he will be so far from ceasing to flow, that he will flow as strong, as full, as at the first communication of himself in glory to the creature. God, therefore, as sitting upon his throne of grace, and acting according to his covenant, is like a jasper-stone, which is of a green color, a color always delightful (Rev. 4:3); because God is always vigorous and flourishing; a pure act of life, sparkling new and fresh rays of life and light to the creature, flourishing with a perpetual spring, and contenting the most capacious desire; forming your interest, pleasure, and satisfaction; with an infinite variety, without any change or succession; he will have variety to increase delights, and eternity to perpetuate them; this will be the fruit of the enjoyment of an infinite and eternal God: be is not a cistern, but a fountain, wherein water is always living, and never putrefies." ~ Stephen Charnock, The Existence and Attributes of God, Volume 1, 298-299.

God's immutability and impassibility point to God's pure actuality, absolute perfection, blessed fullness, and absolute lack of any need. Quite rightly, R. D. Culver titled the chapter of his Systematic Theology dedicated to divine impassibility: "God's Blessedness, or Impassibility" (216; emphasis mine). Missing this point means giving an inaccurate account of the doctrine at issue. 

There is also another point that is absent from Prof Plantinga's account which only initially seems minor. Prof Plantinga says that in the classical Christian view of God, "God is impassible, without desire or feeling or passion, unable to feel sorrow at the sad condition of his world and the suffering of his children, and equally unable to feel joy, delight, longing, or yearning" (KCB, 76). Although these statements are correct, they offer a partial and mutilated view of classical Christian (i.e., incarnational) theism. Prof Plantinga has left out the unmeasurable amount of ink that classical Christian theists have used to expound and discuss God's sympathy in the incarnation of the Word: "Seeing then that we have a great high priest, that is passed into the heavens, Jesus the Son of God, let us hold fast our profession. For we have not an high priest which cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities; but was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin. Let us therefore come boldly unto the throne of grace, that we may obtain mercy, and find grace to help in time of need" (Hebrews 4:14-16, KJV). John Calvin says as follows.

"Another principal part of our reconciliation with God was, that man, who had lost himself by his disobedience, should, by way of remedy, oppose to it obedience, satisfy the justice of God, and pay the penalty of sin. Therefore, our Lord came forth very man, adopted the person of Adam, and assumed his name, that he might in his stead obey the Father; that he might present our flesh as the price of satisfaction to the just judgment of God, and in the same flesh pay the penalty which we had incurred. Finally, since as God only he could not suffer, and as man only could not overcome death, he united the human nature with the divine, that he might subject the weakness of the one to death as an expiation of sin, and by the power of the other, maintaining a struggle with death, might gain us the victory." ~ John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2.12.3.

Just like God's pure actuality, God's condescension and mercy in Christ cannot be missing from an accurate account of classical Christian theism. In fact, I could give many other references from eminent Christian thinkers who skilfully describe both God's immutable and impassible being and His condescension in the incarnation, where the former is a reason that magnifies God's condescension in the incarnation. See, among many examples, Anselm of Canterbury's Cur Deus Homo; Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology: Vol 2, 302-303; Peter Sanlon, Simply God, 122-143.

KCB's lack of proper references to similar key elements of the traditional view of God (God as purely active and the incarnation) is a flaw that should not be overlooked. With these missing links in mind, we now have a more accurate and heart-warming picture of classical Christian theism. 

Agape, Eros, and Impassibility
Let us, for the sake of argument, assume a distinction between erotic love and agape love, a distinction that is key to Prof Plantinga's claims. According to Prof Plantinga, the God of classical theism cannot posses eros love, but only agape love. This is because, according to him, eros implies "longing and yearning" which "signify need and incompleteness" (KCB, 76). "One who yearns for something," Prof Plantinga continues, "doesn't yet have it, and needs it, or at any rate thinks he needs it; God is of course paradigmatically complete and needs nothing beyond himself. How, then, could he be subject to eros? God's love, according to this tradition, is exclusively agape" (KCB, 76). Contrary to the "traditional view of God," erotic love, Prof Plantinga claims, can and has to be ascribed to the life of the Trinity.  

"According to Jonathan Edwards, 'The infinite happiness of the Father consists in the enjoyment of His Son.' This presumably isn’t agape. It doesn’t involve an element of mercy, as in his love for us. It is, instead, a matter of God’s taking enormous pleasure, enjoyment, delight, happiness, delectation in the Son. Given the necessary existence of the Father and the Son, and their having their most important properties essentially, there is no way in which God could be deprived of the Son; but if (per impossible) he were, it would occasion inconceivable sadness. The love in question is eros, not agape. It is a desire for union that is continually, eternally, and joyfully satisfied." ~ KCB, 77-78.

Prof Plantinga's claims, nevertheless, are far from being obvious. 

First of all, the essential meaning of "longing" and "yearning" is to strongly will something. The absence of the thing yearned or longed for is an accidental and unnecessary element that Prof Plantinga adds to the essential meaning of the terms. In fact, the Cambridge Dictionary defines "yearn" as "to desire something strongly, especially [but not exclusively] something difficult or impossible to obtain," and "long" as "to want something very much [absence of that something is not necessary to the definition]". The same is true for the definitions found in the Oxford Dictionary. In fact, a husband may deeply and strongly yearn and long for his wife even in the very moment when the two are physically very close to each other, and there is not the slightest contradiction in such a state of things.

Secondly, in the preceding pages of his book (KCB, 74-76), Prof Plantinga gives a very brief overview with definitions (referring mostly to William James and Jean-Paul Sartre) to explain why eros and agape love cannot be placed together in the God of classical Christin theism. Also here, however, the treatment is not easy to follow. The treatment seems quite ad hoc inasmuch as it defines eros and agape in a certain way (as we have seen above) only to conclude that it is not applicable to an impassible God. Moreover, apart from a few anecdotal examples that Prof Plantinga quotes, it seems to find a good number of counterexamples from the Christian tradition. In fact, theologian Thomas C. Oden (who held to divine immutability and impassibility) sees no conflict whatsoever in placing both agape and eros in the immutable and impassible life of God

"Although agapē and eros seem to be opposites, they may come together and flow in balanced simultaneity and support each other's impulses. Both are expressions of the inestimably high value the heart sets upon that which is loved. Both involve a prizing: Love prizes the beloved so earnestly that it cannot rest without its possession (eros), without experiencing the completion of itself in the other. Love prizes the beloved so highly that it does not withhold any feasible gift or service (agapē). Both involve a yearning: love as eros yearns for the self's fulfillment through another; love as agapē yearns for the other's fulfillment even at a cost to oneself. To separate eros and agapē or to oppose them or set them sharply off against each other may fail to understand how one dimension may strengthen the other." ~ Thomas C. Oden, Systematic Theology: Vol. 1: The Living God, 119 (Note: Oden's full section offers a more historically comprehensive account of eros and agape than the one offered by Prof Plantinga).

The Trinity
Prof Plantinga claims that "given the necessary existence of the Father and the Son, and their having their most important properties essentially, there is no way in which God could be deprived of the Son," adding in a footnote that "this is the answer to one of the traditional arguments for the conclusion that God has no passions: the Father and the Son do indeed need each other, but it is a need that is necessarily and eternally fulfilled" (KCB, 78).

Prof Plantinga does not offer any explanation of why what he says in the footnote constitutes the answer to one of the traditional arguments for divine impassibility, and it is unclear why that should be the case. Rather, the eternal and necessary nature of the inter-trinitarian relationships that he mentions seems to play against his passibilistic claims. If the supposed "need" is necessarily and eternally fulfilled, then the fact is that there is not, there has never been, and there will never be any real need whatsoever in the inter-trinitarian relationships because, in this case, “there is no state of the Father that is not a begetting of the Son, and no state of the Son which is not a being begotten by the Father … There is no possible world where the Father exists and not the Son” (P. Helm, Eternal God, 285-286). There has never been a "need" to begin with, and this because Father-Son-Holy Spirit are just what they are and it is absolutely impossible that they cannot not be what they are. Therefore, the concept of "need" can be used in reference to the triune life of God only for explanatory purposes, and not concretely, as Prof Plantinga's position seems to require.

It is, therefore, fully possible to maintain that the three Persons of the immutable and impassible triune God exercise both agape and eros towards each other. Saying that the Father longs and yearns to dwell with the Son and that the Son longs and yearns to dwell in the Father through the Spirit does not necessarily imply any passibility, mutability, or lack (as Prof Plantinga claims). The Father does not become the Father, nor the Son become the Son, nor the Holy Spirit become the Holy Spirit. The three persons are in eternal relationship to each other so that the Father is eternally the Father, the Son is eternally the Son, and the Holy Spirit is eternally the Holy Spirit. The Father eternally begets the Son. We read of the eternal generation of the Son in John 1:14, John 3:16 and Psalm 2 (even though this Psalm talks primarily of Christ’s resurrection, as Acts 13:33 tells us). The Son is different from the Father inasmuch as the Father is the logical source of the Deity and he is the Person who plans and leads the plan of salvation. The Son is eternally generated by the Father and is the Person who reveals in time through his incarnation the plan of redemption of the Father. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son and applies the redemption in time. The eternal generation, begetting of the Son is:

"An act of both the Father and the Son, of the one generating and one generated, actively performed by the Father, passively accomplished by the Son. Scripture explicitly refers to the generation of the Son (Psalm 2:7) and to the fact that the Son is beloved (dilectus: Matt. 4:17; 17;5), the proper (propius) Son of God (John 5:18; Rom. 8:32), and only begotten (unigenitus: John 1:14, 18; 3:16; 1 John 4:9). This generation is, moreover, eternal and perpetual, and unlike the generations of things in the physical world. Marckius argues, thus, that the generation of the Son is not a physical but a 'hyperphysical generation from which–as in the via negativa approach to the attributes–all 'imperfection, dependence, succession, mutation, division, and multiplication' is absent. Nonetheless, this is a 'proper,' not a 'metaphysical,' generation, a genuine filiation flowing (fluens) from the Father according to which the Son is the true image of the invisible God, the representation of the glory and character of the Father’s person (cf. Col. 1:15; Heb. 1:3). By this generation, the Son is 'produced from the Father' in an 'eternal and incomprehensible communication of the unitary divine essence.'" ~ Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: Volume 4: The Triunity of God, 287.

Simply assuming definitions of love that necessarily require passibility and mutability to work, and then applying them to the inter-trinitarian relationship of the divine Being, seems somewhat question-begging.

“Clearly, in a finite essence, generation implies some sort of division or separation–but in the infinite, simple divine essence, generation does not indicate a division or separation, much less a partitioning of the divine essence … The claim that such a generation is impossible, [John] Owen comments, rests on the error of arguing limitations of the divine on the basis of ‘properties and attendancies of that which is finite.’” ~ Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: Volume 4: The Triunity of God, 287.

It is fully correct to say that God eternally begets the Son in infinite love, either eros or agape love. But this love is not something outside himself or even something that has a start inside himself, but it is the Holy Spirit himself (Augustine, On the Trinity, 6.5.7; Anselm, Monologion, 49-55; Thomas Aquinas, Compendium of Theology, 45-46; Jonathan Edwards, “Discourse on the Trinity,” 121-132), coequal and coeternal with the Father and the Son, so that God's simplicity, sufficiency and impassibility are preserved, since God has all that he "needs" (so to speak!) eternally and necessarily in Himself for the inter-trinitarian life. 

God's relationship with creatures does not change what has been said. His people are in Christ before the foundation of the world (Ephesians 1), and they are included into Christ by the operation of the Holy Spirit present in them (2 Corinthians 16:14) so that they are in God and God is in them. In this, the believers change and something is added to them, but nothing changes and nothing is added to God. We can consider the many Scriptural references that describe God's saving desire towards elect humans as efficaciously satisfied not only in time ("All that the Father giveth me [to Christ] shall come to me" John 6:37; John 10) but also in and "from" eternity (Ephesians 1-2; Romani 8). See Augustine for some more on this.

The Incarnation, Again

"Can we say that Christ qua human being (according to his human nature) suffered while Christ qua divine (according to his divine nature) did not? This is hardly the place to try to address a question as ancient and deep as this one, but I'm inclined to think this suggestion incoherent. There is this person, the second person of the divine trinity who became incarnate. It is this person who suffers; if there really were two centers of consciousness here, one suffering and the other not, there would be two persons here (one human and one divine) rather than the one person who is both human and divine." ~ KCB, 77.

Prof Plantinga says that "this is hardly the place to try to address a question as ancient and deep as this one" (KCB, 77). However, answering this question is foundational for the entire structure of his discourse. In this regard, Prof Plantinga's claim collapses because of the way he frames the issue. His argument can be summarised as follows.

a.) According to classical Christian theism, Christ suffered only according to his human nature, and not as according to his divine nature. 

b.) a  implies "two centres of consciousness," one suffering (the human nature) and the other not (the divine nature). 

c.)  b implies "two persons here (one human and one divine) rather than the one person who is both human and divine." 

d.) c is unorthodox (a sort of Nestorianism). 

e.) Therefore, a is false.

This is a rather confused argument. a is the classical Christian position. However, Prof Plantinga interprets it not according to its own classical Christian theological categories, but according to the terms found in b which are not the theological categories through which a is usually explained. Prof Plantinga's theological categories of b ("three centres of consciousness") belong to the recent reformulation of the doctrine of the Trinity. To interpret the classical position through contemporary categories only to conclude that the classical position is wrong is simply circular reasoning.

a does not imply b ("two centres of consciousness," whatever Prof Plantinga means with that, he does not define it in the chapter). Therefore, c is false. a implies two natures, one suffering and the other not. "Nature" does not necessarily equal "centre of consciousness" and, therefore, it is correct to say that there are not two persons (as premise c mistakenly says) but one person and two natures. For these reasons, Prof Plantinga's argument does not pose any problem for a (and, by implication, for the doctrine of divine impassibility) simply because it uses terms and categories (b and c) that do not belong to a and that a actually rejects at the very outset.

"Others ... have had recourse to the supposition of a twofold personality in the Saviour—holding that the Son of God, when He became incarnate, united Himself to 'the man Christ Jesus,' and that the union between these two persons was somewhat the same in kind with that which is constituted by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in believers, although doubtless much more intimate and indissoluble. This notion also is at variance with the facts of the case. For, so far as we are taught in Scripture, the human nature of our Lord never had any existence by itself as a distinct and separate person. It existed from the first, and still continues to exist, in union with the divine nature of the Son of God, and no otherwise. The incarnation, therefore, is not at all the case of one person joining himself to another person; but the case of one person, possessed of the divine nature, assuming the nature and attributes of humanity into union with those of divinity which had previously pertained to Him. 

How this was done, it would very ill become us, in the silence of revelation, to conjecture. But, that it was done, is the plain doctrine of the Scriptures. They everywhere speak of the Saviour as one person, although they ascribe to Him, in His incarnate state, such a union of human with divine attributes as is nowhere else to be found in one person. In some passages they represent Him as divine, while in other passages they represent Him as human; but both of these representations are applicable to one and the same person, Jesus Christ our Lord. Nay, sometimes, when He is denominated by one or other of His divine titles, we find things said of Him which are only attributable to His human nature, as when we read that 'the Lord of glory was crucified' (1 Cor. 2:8) and sometimes also, when He is denominated by one or other of His human titles, we find things said of Him which are only attributable to His divine nature, as when 'the Son of Man' is said to have 'come down from heaven.' This 'communion of attributes,' as it has been called—when things which properly pertain to the one nature are ascribed to Christ when designated with reference to the other nature—evidently implies the sameness of the person to whom both classes of names and attributes equally belong, and who, as possessing both, may have the one in combination with the other appropriately assigned to Him." ~ T. J. Crawford (1812-1875), The Mysteries of Christianity, 205-206 (for more on the issue of the communication of attributes [communicatio idiomatum], see Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology: Vol 2, 321-332; Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics: Vol. 3, 308-316).

For more on this, see Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology: Vol 2, 310-321; Bavinck, Our Reasonable Faith, 326-327; Reformed Dogmatics: Vol. 3, 256-259, 298-308. I warmly suggest reading W. G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, 613-644 (especially the section "Incarnation and Divine Immutability"), 649-658. In addition to being clearly written, Shedd's pages are a good corrective for most (if not all) the misunderstandings contained in Prof Plantinga's argument. Shedd's Dogmatic Theology can also be found online.

Final Issues

"The thought that God is triune distinguishes Christianity from other theistic religions; here we see a way in which this doctrine makes a real difference, in that it recognizes eros and love for others at the most fundamental level of reality. Does this suggest that we should lean toward a social conception of the trinity, the conception of Gregory and the Cappadocian fathers, rather than the Augustinian conception, which flirts with modalism?" ~ KCB, 78. Emphasis added.

The reader should not take these claims at face value. They are swift and inaccurate generalizations which require long answers. However, suffice here to say the same kind of claims Prof Plantinga's makes (the ones in italic) broadly belong to the recent reformulations of trinitarian thinking and have been heavily disputed by many scholars. For instance, "social trinitarianism is a recent departure from classic Trinitarianism and provides an alternative answer to how God is one in essence and three in person: the three persons are distinguished not by their relations of origin but by relationships. That is, the three persons of God each possess what we would call a personality, including a distinct volitional will, and how these relate to one another is what distinguishes Father, Son, and Spirit. Typically, both the economic roles and the volitional relationships that bind them (e.g., eternal material subordination) distinguish Father, Son, and Spirit" (M. Y. Emerson, "The Role of Proverbs 8: Eternal Generation and Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern," in Retrieving Eternal Generation, 46). Here, I will limit myself to give suggestions for further reading.

The claim that the Cappadocian Fathers supported what is today called "social trinitarianism" is, at the very best, highly doubtful.  Rather, many have argued that "social trinitarianism [is] a seemingly modern innovation and one lacking in biblical warrant" (Emerson, "The Role of Proverbs 8," 65). See, among several examples, Stephen R. Holmes, The Quest for the Trinity, 30-32, 56-146.

Prof Plantinga also claims that the classical doctrine of divine impassibility "is one of those places where it has paid too much attention to Greek philosophy and too little to the Bible" (page 77). In this case also, this grandiose claim (as it intends to cover over 2000 years of Christian theological production in just a few words) is without any support and is, in fact, misleading. See, among many examples, see Vv.Aa., Confessing the Impassible God, 89-223; R. B. Culver, Systematic Theology: Biblical and Historical, 216-225.

Augustine is certainly not the last word, but the claim that his doctrine of the Trinity "flirts with modalism" (KCB, 78) is very far from being an uncontroversial statement and, in my opinion, mistaken. See, among several examples, Lewis Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity.

Passibility Unproved (and Unnecessary)

Simply put, divine passibility is left without any successful philosophical argument in the section of Prof Plantinga's KCB I have examined. This is true also theologically inasmuch as simply quoting a few biblical passages is neither arguing nor exegeting. Prof Plantinga quotes Matthew 27:46 and Luke 15:7, and Isaiah 62:5, but he does not explain why they are supposed to support his theological claims. For developed discussions on this issue (the so-called "communication of attributes or properties," communicatio idiomatum), see the references at the end of the indented quote from T. J. Crawford. 

More importantly and even more puzzling is the fact that Prof Plantinga's epistemological argument for the warranted nature of Christian belief does not need divine passibility in order to work. The goal of chapter 6 was to expand the volitional and affective side of his epistemological model. That model requires mutable and passible receptiveness from the finite moral agents who become involved in and recipients of the salvific work of God, and the chapter does not explain at all why said epistemological model should require mutability and passibility in God himself. Nevertheless, Prof Plantinga unexpectedly brings up a controversial doctrine (divine passibility) that is philosophically unnecessary for his epistemological argument and that does not have any sufficient exegetical or theological support in the section I have examined. Why such tangential and unsubstantiated theological claims are extensively mentioned in the middle of the good argument of a good book is, for me, hard to understand.

©

Herman Bavinck on Faith and Works

Herman Bavinck (1854-1921).

Disclaimer: in spite of its length, what follows is only a small part of a much longer discussion that Herman Bavinck (1854–1921) offers on the topic of justification. For Bavinck's fuller treatment, see Chapter 3 of the work referenced at the end of the quotation.

"It [is] possible for us to regard faith as simultaneously a receptive organ and an active power. If in every respect justification comes after faith, faith becomes a condition, an activity that has to be performed in advance and cannot be purely receptive. But if the righteousness on the basis of which we are justified exists completely outside of us in Christ Jesus, it can naturally be appropriated by us only because we accept it in childlike faith. 'The forgiveness of sins is a thing promised for Christ's sake. Therefore it can be accepted only by faith, since a promise can be accepted only on faith' (Apology of the Augsburg Confession, art. 4, pars. 40-47). Faith, therefore, is not the material or formal cause of justification; it is not even a condition or instrument (instrumental cause) of justification, for it does not relate to justification as, for example, the eye to seeing or the ear to hearing. Faith is not a condition on which, and not an instrument or organ by which, we receive this benefit, but the very act of accepting Christ and all his benefits as he by his Word and Spirit offers himself to us, and faith therefore includes the consciousness that he is my Lord and that I am his possession. Faith therefore is not an instrument in the true sense, one that serves as the means by which a person accepts Christ, bur is a sure knowledge and firm confidence that the Holy Spirit works in one's heart and by which he [the Spirit] persuades and assures people that, despite all their sins, they share in Christ and all his benefits.

But if this is saving faith, it cannot be a 'knowledge of history' or a 'bare assent' to certain truths; then it is by in very nature a living and active faith, and it is nor in every respect antithetical to all work. It constitutes a contrast to the works of the law in a double sense, that is, in the fact that the latter can neither be the material nor the instrumental cause of justification. It is also antithetical to the works of faith (infused righteousness, obedience, love) the moment these are in even the slightest degree regarded as a ground for justification, as constituting in part or in whole the righteousness on the basis of which God justifies us. For that is Christ and Christ alone. Faith itself is not a ground for justification; neither, therefore, are the works that proceed from it. 

But faith is not opposed to working if by it one should mean that only a dead inactive faith can justify us. For the dispute between Rome and the Reformation was not about whether we are justified by an active or an inactive faith, by a living or a dead faith. But the question was, as it was for Paul, whether faith with its works justifies us before God or in our conscience, or whether faith justifies apart from works. Nor is faith opposed to the works of faith insofar as these works, as the fruits of faith, are used by the Holy Spirit to assure believers of the genuineness of their faith and thus of their salvation. In this sense faith itself is even a work (John 6:29), the best work and the principle of all good works. The Reformed therefore also said that indeed, 'it is faith alone that justifies: nevertheless the faith that justifies is not alone,' and spoke, in addition to 'the justification of the sinner' also of a 'justification of the righteous.' In this sense Paul and James are also in agreement. Granted, it is not correct to say that Paul speaks only of the 'justification of the sinner' whereas James speaks of the 'justification of the righteous.' Bur both deny that the ground of our justification consists in the works of the law, and both acknowledge that faith, that is, living faith, the faith that includes and produces good works, is the means by which the Holy Spirit assures us of our righteousness in Christ. In this connection the only difference is that Paul fights against dead works while James wages a campaign against a dead faith. The faith that justifies is the certainty—produced in our hearts by the Holy Spirit—of our righteousness in Christ. Therefore, not the more passive but the more lively and forceful it is, the more it justifies us. Faith, accordingly, is active along with works and is 'brought to completion by the works' (James 2:22)."

Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics: Vol. 4: Holy Spirit, Church, and New Creation (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2008), 221-223.