Interview on Luther and Augustine.

Two days ago, on 26 April 2018, in the exact day that celebrated the 500th anniversary of Martin Luther's Heidelberg Disputation (26 April 1518), I had the pleasure and the honour to be interviewed by Iron Sharpens Iron Radio's host Chris Arnzen. We discussed my book, Luther's Augustinian Theology of the Cross. We focused on Luther, the Reformation, Augustine of Hippo, the very strong connections between the two theological giants in matters of salvation, and more. Those who are interested can listen to the recorded interview on the radio's website.

I have never been interviewed in my life before. It was a good and instructing experience. Chris Arnzen is a dear brother and a gracious radio host who made the discussion both enjoyable and engaging at the same time. Iron Sharpens Iron is an enjoyable radio to listen to. This radio has interviewed many influential Reformed exponents in the past, before deciding to significantly lower the standard by interviewing me 😄 (jokes aside, please consider donating to it as donations are one of the vital sustainments of this free web radio). I also enjoyed answering questions from the listeners. I always find humbling to receive feedback telling me that my modest work has been beneficial to others. I was also glad to know that my speech on the radio was understandable in spite of my Italian accent. 🙂

I noticed that my book is available again on Wordery and BookDepository, after a period when it was described as unavailable. As usual, it is available on Amazon USA, on Amazon UK, on Wipf and Stock, and on Kindle E-Book. So far, to those interested in buying it, I personally suggest Wordery because it has free worldwide postage.

I conclude this short blog post (an announcement, more than a blog post as such) by quoting one of my favourite theses from Luther's Heidelberg Disputation, written in his usual and unique provocative style, followed by a long but worthy to be read quotation by Augustine that, in my view, significantly resonates with Luther's own thesis. 

Thesis 20. He deserves to be called a theologian, however, who comprehends the visible and manifest things of God seen through suffering and the cross. 
Proof: The manifest and visible things of God are placed in opposition to the invisible, namely, his human nature, weakness, foolishness. The Apostle in 1 Cor. 1:25 calls them the weakness and folly of God. Because men misused the knowledge of God through works, God wished again to be recognized in suffering, and to condemn "wisdom concerning invisible things" by means of "wisdom concerning visible things," so that those who did not honor God as manifested in his works should honor him as he is hidden in his suffering (absconditum in passionibus). As the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 1:21, "For since, in the wisdom of God, the world did not know God through wisdom, it pleased God through the folly of what we preach to save those who believe." Now it is not sufficient for anyone, and it does him no good to recognize God in his glory and majesty, unless he recognizes him in the humility and shame of the cross. Thus God destroys the wisdom of the wise, as Isa. 45:15 says, "Truly, thou art a God who hidest thyself." So, also, in John 14:8, where Philip spoke according to the theology of glory: "Show us the Father." Christ forthwith set aside his flighty thought about seeing God elsewhere and led him to himself, saying, "Philip, he who has seen me has seen the Father" (John 14:9). For this reason true theology and recognition of God are in the crucified Christ, as it is also stated in John 10 (John 14:6) "No one comes to the Father, but by me." "I am the door" (John 10:9), and so forth.

"There have been some philosophers of this world who have sought for the Creator by means of the creature; for He can be found by means of the creature, as the apostle plainly says, 'For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and glory; so they are without excuse.' And it follows, 'Because that, when they knew God;' he did not say, Because they did not know, but 'Because that, when they knew God, they glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened.' How darkened? It follows, when he says more plainly: 'Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools' (Rom 1:20-22). They saw whither they must come; but ungrateful to Him who afforded them what they saw, they wished to ascribe to themselves what they saw; and having become proud, they lost what they saw, and were turned from it to idols and images, and to the worship of demons, to adore the creature and to despise the Creator. But these having been blinded did those things, and became proud, that they might be blinded: when they were proud they said that they were wise. Those, therefore, concerning whom he said, 'Who, when they had known God,' saw this which John says, that by the Word of God all things were made. For these things are also found in the books of the philosophers: and that God has an only-begotten Son, by whom are all things. They were able to see that which is, but they saw it from afar: they were unwilling to hold the lowliness of Christ, in which ship they might have arrived in safety at that which they were able to see from afar and the cross of Christ appeared vile to them. The sea has to be crossed, and do you despise the wood? Oh, proud wisdom! You laugh to scorn the crucified Christ; it is He whom you see from afar: 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God.' But wherefore was He crucified? Because the wood of His humiliation was needful to you ... be carried in a ship, be carried by the wood: believe in the crucified One, and you shall arrive there. On account of you He was crucified, to teach you humility; and because if He should come as God, He would not be recognized. For if He should come as God, He would not come to those who were not able to see God. For not according to His Godhead does He either come or depart; since He is everywhere present, and is contained in no place. But, according to what did He come? He appeared as a man." ~ Augustine, Sermons on the Gospel of John, 2.4.

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A Passage from Augustine on Divine Immutability and Simplicity

Augustine of Hippo is one of those writers that you can read as carefully as possible, but at the second reading, you will always say at least once: "I forgot about this beautiful passage," or "I didn't really notice this before," or something like that. In a beautiful and very interesting passage, one of those I forgot about for years (I do not know how) of his On The Trinity (5.16.17), Augustine discusses the possibly problematic question of the relationship between the immutable and simple God and the composed and changeable creature. This difficulty has partly to do with some of the Biblical names ascribed to God, such as Lord and Master. The African theologian starts by asking a question that seems to posit some difficulties in conceiving a relationship between the immutable Creator and the mutable Creature. 

If a lord also is not so-called unless when he begins to have a slave, that appellation likewise is relative and in time to God; for the creature is not from all eternity, of which He is the Lord. How then shall we make it good that relative terms themselves are not accidental, since nothing happens accidentally to God in time, because He is incapable of change, as we have argued in the beginning of this discussion? 

Put in other words: if God is unchangeable, then He is eternally Lord. But, as Lord, He has to be Lord over something. But creation is not eternal but had a temporal beginning. Then, how can God be possible called "Lord" since there was not always something to be Lord over? Augustine offers an initial answer relying on the atemporality of God and the temporality of creation.

God, indeed, is alone eternal, and that times are not eternal on account of their variety and changeableness, but that times nevertheless did not begin to be in time (for there was no time before times began, and therefore it did not happen to God in time that He should be Lord, since He was Lord of the very times themselves, which assuredly did not begin in time). 

However, there could still be a difficulty if we think to those things that were not created at the very beginning, not with time but in time, such as, for instance, mankind itself, created on the sixth day of creation, according to the account of Genesis 2.

What will he reply respecting man, who was made in time, and of whom assuredly He was not the Lord before he was of whom He was to be Lord? ... How then shall we make it good that nothing is said of God according to accident?

For Augustine, there is only one possible answer worthy of the glorious being of God.

Nothing happens to His nature by which He may be changed, so that those things are relative accidents which happen in connection with some change of the things of which they are spoken.

God has always been Lord, Master, Creator, and so on. He did not need creation or any creature in order to be so because the concept of “need” presupposes a prior lack of something, but there is no lack of anything in God because He is fully self-sufficient and a se. Since God is the ultimate ground of all reality, and everything receives its existence from Him, these names that Augustine calls "relative accidents" denotes a change in the creature, not in the Creator.

We ought to admit, concerning that unchangeable substance of God, that something may be so predicated relatively in respect to the creature, that although it begin to be so predicated in time, yet nothing shall be understood to have happened to the substance itself of God, but only to that creature in respect to which it is predicated.

This is also true for the believer. The elect believer passes from a state of alienation from God to a state of communion with God. However, this does not necessarily imply mutability in God.

"Lord," it is said, "You have been made our refuge." God, therefore, is said to be our refuge relatively, for He is referred to us, and He then becomes our refuge when we flee to Him; pray does anything come to pass then in His nature, which, before we fled to Him, was not? In us therefore some change does take place; for we were worse before we fled to Him, and we become better by fleeing to Him: but in Him there is no change. So also He begins to be our Father, when we are regenerated through His grace, since He gave us power to become the sons of God. Our substance therefore is changed for the better, when we become His sons; and He at the same time begins to be our Father, but without any change of His own substance. Therefore that which begins to be spoken of God in time, and which was not spoken of Him before, is manifestly spoken of Him relatively; yet not according to any accident of God, so that anything should have happened to Him, but clearly according to some accident of that, in respect to which God begins to be called something relatively.

Now, elsewhere Augustine also says that "the Father loved us also before, not only before the Son died for us, but before He created the world; the apostle himself being witness, who says, 'According as He has chosen us in Him before the foundation of the world'" (13.11.15). Therefore, God "becomes" the believer's Saviour, Lord, Master, etc., only in an improper or relative sense, since He, as He is in Himself, has always been the Saviour, Lord, and Master of his elect people. 

When a righteous man begins to be a friend of God, he himself is changed; but far be it from us to say, that God loves any one in time with as it were a new love, which was not in Him before, with whom things gone by have not passed away and things future have been already done. Therefore He loved all His saints before the foundation of the world, as He predestinated them; but when they are converted and find them; then they are said to begin to be loved by Him, that what is said may be said in that way in which it can be comprehended by human affections. So also, when He is said to be angry with the unrighteous, and gentle with the good, they are changed, not He: just as the light is troublesome to weak eyes, pleasant to those that are strong; namely, by their change, not its own.

To enlarge Augustine's parallel between God and light, let us say (with reverence) that God is like a sun, our Sun. The rays of the Sun hit man x and man y. x's skin is covered with a suncream graciously given to him by a merciful Stranger, while y does not possess that gift. Through the protection of the suncream, x is enlightened and beautified. Without the suncream, y is blinded and burnt. The sunbeams are the same sunbeams, coming from the same Sun. Recognizing the limitation of human speech and the inevitable imperfections of the analogy, it can be said that so is the Triune God, shining in His immutable nature as one glorious simple being. The suncream is God's righteousness given in Christ through which x can benefit from God through Christ. God, in the simplicity of His nature and in the sameness with and of His attributes, acts and shines equally towards the elect whom He loves and the unrighteous whom He hates. The difference is that the elect are elected in the Son and loved by the Holy Spirit in eternity and redeemed by the Son incarned in time (a necessary thing, since they are temporal creatures) in order to be justified before God, reconciled to Him (and not Him to them, since He always loved them and was eternally favourable to them in Christ), and to partake of the Divine life through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit who, acording to Augustine, is the personal love and communion of God, love Himself, of the same essence of Father and of the Son (15.17.27-19-37). Differently, the reprobate are outside Christ (Sermons on John, 111.5) and, therefore, recipients of judgment, since God in His perfection cannot bear sin. In all this, "when He is said to be angry with the unrighteous, and gentle with the good, they are changed, not He: just as the light is troublesome to weak eyes, pleasant to those that are strong; namely, by their change, not its own" (5.16.17). 

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My Initial Two Cents Inspired by Dolezal-Frame: Metaphysical Disdain for Metaphysics

At the moment, in Protestant circles, there is a rather lively debate going on about the doctrine of God's nature. It seems it has been triggered by John Frame's review (followed by a 2nd and 3rd part) of J. E. Dolezal's book. In my opinion, the understanding of the God of Scripture is the real issue. The focus is especially on some of the divine incommunicable attributes, such as simplicity, immutability, and impassibility. I think this is the hinge of the entire dispute, and not merely the adoption or rejection of "Thomism" or of some tenets of that or of some other tradition (which would be a rather simplistic and reductionist view of the controversy).

What I would like to do here is to offer some very introductory considerations about the debate in relation to a rhetorical device I have seen in the controversy in question. I am referring to what I have called the metaphysical disdain for metaphysics that I have seen among many critics of Christian classical theism. With that, I am referring to the self-contradictory and demonizing lament of some adversaries of classical theism who never seem to miss the occasion to cry: "That's metaphysics, not exegesis!" I think that is an unnecessary and false dichotomy. I believe one thing on the background of the criticism of classical theism is the unnecessary and not-long-ago-produced dualism between biblical exegesis and systematic theology. In addition to this, In order to show why I think such claim is self-contradictory and demonizing, I will offer an imaginary dialogue to my reader. The following is not meant to represent any anti-classical theist in any accurate way. It is just a fictional dialogue, so no particular individual should feel offended. Nevertheless, it contains specific objections and attitudes that I have met on different occasions.

Anti Classical Theist: "Unlike you, I don't think we should interpret the Bible verses where God says to change His mind. I read them for what they 'simply' mean."

Classical Theist: "What about the verses that say that God or His mind do not change?"

ACT: "Well, you should interpret them."

CT: "...No way!"

ACT: "We ACTs interpret the Bible faithfully. Malachi 3:6 talks about the unchangeable plan of God, not about his nature. It's merely covenantal." 

CT: "Actually, the verse crystal clearly says that God's plan for his people doesn't change because He doesn't change. And what about James 1:13-18? Or Job 23:13? Are those "merely covenantal," too? Moreover, you have to prove that a passage which is covenantal logically excludes the fact that it is teaching us something about the nature of God. You can't just assume that acritically." 

ACT: "We ACTs interpret the Bible for what it really says."

CT: "You kinda said that already. What about the passage?"

ACT: "We ACTs don't ground exegesis on Greek philosophy."

CT: "That sounds like a strawman. Neither do we CTs. But if something is true, it's true, no matter who said it. So, Malachi..."

ACT: "We ACTs do not use metaphysics."

CT: " Oh, really? I wonder where terms and concepts such as essence, being, person, hypostasis, nature, and so on, come from. They are not literally in the Bible. Do you want to get rid of those, too? I guess you won't reject those, because they are found in the writings of the Fathers of the ancient church, thus being inconsistent with your own approach. God has to be explained somehow as much as it's possible, and words and definitions are useful for that. Of course you use metaphysics, just not the general framework that Christians has used for centuries."

ACT: "Nothing I have suggested disparages the use of extra-biblical terminology. Nobody does theology without using extra-biblical terminology."

CT: "No, sorry, but it isn't just a matter of mere 'terminology.' I fully agree with sola Scriptura and all its principles, and I also agree that exegesis is foundational. But your 'extra-biblical terminology' isn't just a gaseous set of merely neutral terms floating inactively in the air with no philosophical or ontological meaning, but they constitute a system that claims to understand better something. So, if you claim that the I need to make my case for using categories, exactly the same applies to you and to what you simplistically call 'extra-biblical terminology.' You cannot selectively and conveniently decide where to make that request to justify the method, but it applies to all cases, your 'extra-biblical terminology' not excluded. You should do that in a sufficiently clear way (and even then, I wonder how many terms and concepts you will still borrow from Scholasticism generally intended)."

ACT: "Wow! It looks like everybody's an expert metaphysician, now."

CT: "That's beside the point. Moreover, contrary to the implicit claim behind your sardonic remark, using metaphysical categories is not the same thing as being a professional metaphysician. If I teach theology to 9th graders, that doesn't necessarily mean I am a professional theologian, nor I necessarily need to be one in order to do that."

ACT: "You mentioned Scholasticism, but Aquinas hasn't solved everything."

CT: "Are you even listening to me? I never even mentioned Aquinas. But he has many good things to s..."

ACT: "Frame, Wright, and Bauckham agree with me."

CT: "You just implicitly accused me to merely rely on an authority I never mention, and now you mention three of your authorities just like that?"

ACT: "There is no detailed exegetical treatment of the doctrine of divine simplicity."

CT: "That is actually not true. First of all, you can find several exegetical nuggets not only in some Patristic and Medieval theologians, but also among the Reformed Scholastics. That they are not gathered in one single place or volume, that does not make your statement true. Then, I can think of one, or two, or three contemporary examples that directly contradict your claim. Plus numerous articles and book chapters."

ACT: "Sounds like docetism."

CT: "..."

I repeat what I have already said through CT in the imaginary dialogue. I think exegesis is foundational. But I wonder where categories such as essence, being, person, hypostasis, nature, and so on, come from. Certainly, we do not find them literally in the Bible. Shall we get rid of them, too? I guess today's Protestant theological revisionists will not reject these categories because they are found in the writings of the Fathers of the ancient church, thus being inconsistent with their own assumed approach. In fact, these terms and concepts are not just mere neutral terms that fly in the air like inactive ectoplasms with no ontological meaning whatsoever, but each of them does convey a specific meaning. God has to be explained somehow as much as it is possible, and words and definitions are useful for that. Protestant theological revisionists do use a metaphysics, they just do not use the general framework that Christianity has productively used for centuries.

Such unjustified shock for the teachings of Christian classical theism, and especially for the traditional categories used to express those teachings, reminds me of the following words of Jonathan Edwards. He wrote them in the context of his debate with Arminians and libertarians, but I think they are applicable also in our specific case.

It has often been objected ... [that we] run into nice scholastic distinctions, and abstruse metaphysical subtleties ... that it is very abstracted and metaphysical. If that be made an objection against the foregoing reasoning, that it is metaphysical, or may properly be reduced to the science of metaphysics, it is a very impertinent objection; whether it be so or no, is not worthy of any dispute or controversy. If the reasoning be good, 'tis as frivolous to inquire what science it is properly reduced to, as what language it is delivered in: and for a man to go about to confute the arguments of his opponent, by telling him, his arguments are "metaphysical," would be as weak as to tell him, his arguments could not be substantial, because they were written in French or Latin. The question is not, whether what is said be metaphysics, physics, logic, or mathematics, Latin, French, English, or Mohawk? but, whether the reasoning be good, and the arguments truly conclusive? The foregoing arguments are no more metaphysical, than those which we use against the Papists, to disprove their doctrine of transubstantiation; alleging, it is inconsistent with the notion of corporeal identity, that it should be in ten thousand places at the same time. 'Tis by metaphysical arguments only we are able to prove, that the rational soul is not corporeal; that lead or sand can't think; that thoughts are not square or round, or don't weigh a pound. The arguments by which we prove the being of God, if handled closely and distinctly, so as to show their clear and demonstrative evidence, must be metaphysically treated. 'Tis by metaphysics only, that we can demonstrate, that God is not limited to a place, or is not mutable; that he is not ignorant, or forgetful; that it is impossible for him to lie, or be unjust; and that there is one God only, and not hundreds or thousands. And indeed we have no strict demonstration of anything, excepting mathematical truths, but by metaphysics. We can have no proof, that is properly demonstrative, of any one proposition, relating to the being and nature of God, his creation of the world, the dependence of all things on him, the nature of bodies or spirits, the nature of our own souls, or any of the great truths of morality and natural religion, but what is metaphysical. I am willing, my arguments should be brought to the test of the strictest and justest reason, and that a clear, distinct and determinate meaning of the terms I use, should be insisted on; but let not the whole be rejected, as if all were confuted, by fixing on it the epithet "metaphysical." ~ Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, Part 4, Section 13.

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Young Thomas Aquinas Goes to Sunday School

"Come on, Tommy boy! Sing with us! 🎶 I have decided to follow Jesus! No turn... 🎶"

Thomas: "On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that 'predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits.' But foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who predestines, and not in the predestined. I answer that, predestination is not anything in the predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider, as was proved above (I:22:1). But the execution of providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active way in the governor. Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The execution of predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle (Romans 8:30): "Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He also magnified [Vulg. 'justified']." For more on this, see my forthcoming Summa Theologiae, 1st part, Q 23, A 2. See also Summa Theologiae, 1st part, A 23, Q 5."

"😐 ......Alrighty, then! I am sure you will like this new song. C' mon, Tom, join us! ♬ If you happy and you know it, clap your hands (clap👏 clap👏)! And if you are happ... ♫"

T.: "On the contrary, happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation. I answer that a thing may belong to happiness in three ways: 1) essentially, 2) antecedently, 3) consequently. Now the operation of sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man's happiness consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated Good, Which is his last end, as shown above (Article 1): to Which man cannot be united by an operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because, as shown above (I-II:2:5), man's happiness does not consist in goods of the body, which goods alone, however, we attain through the operation of the senses. Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the operation of the intellect demands a previous operation of the sense; consequently, in that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the resurrection, 'from the very happiness of the soul,' as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) "the body and the bodily senses will receive a certain overflow, so as to be perfected in their operations"; a point which will be explained further on when we treat of the resurrection (II-II:82-85). But then the operation whereby man's mind is united to God will not depend on the senses. You can read more on this in my forthcoming Summa Theologiae, 1st part of 2nd part, Q 3, A 3."

"😑 ......Thomas, sometimes, you really are no fun."

T.: "On the contrary, I answ..."

"Drop it."

T.: "Ok."

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Words in grey are my own and not Aquinas'.

R. L. Dabney on Natural and Revealed Theology

R. L. Dabney (1820–1898).

R. L. Dabney's The Practical Philosophy: Being the Philosophy of the Feelings, of the Will, and of the Conscience, With the Ascertainment of Practicular Rights and Duties (1897) is a very interesting book (there is also an open-access online version). I have read and consulted its third book, "The Will," because it seems to have some significant similarities with Jonathan Edwards' approach to the matter. I hope to have the time to write something about it in the future, also consulting other relevant places from Dabney's works.

While I was browsing the book, I came across the last chapter of the volume where Dabney discusses moral duties in relation to God. He then concludes with some remarks on natural and revealed theology. I find his words quite interesting, and I thought to report them here.

By the prevalent native disposition of men, duty to God for its own sake alone is not preferred, but disliked. The light of Natural Theology can do no more than present to the mind objects which, were the mind fundamentally moral, would attract it; but which naturally and in fact do not attract the immoral mind. What effective resource has Natural Theology, then, to work this moral revolution in which alone true reform and moral blessedness can originate?
Whence, then, are the effectual remedies for guilt and immorality to come? Philosophy is silent; it has no answer. To ascertain the solution we must pass into the domain of Revelation, the inculcation of which is the function of the Christian Church. Here, then, our study must end. And this is the impressive proof of its inferiority to its elder and divine sister, Christianity, that Philosophy, after leading us up to the greatest and most urgent of all problems, and redisclosing to us our guilt and moral disease, is compelled to turn over the great question of the remedy to the recorded Word of God, and retire confessing her own weakness to heal and save. Has this long course of her training been therefore useless? No; it has trained our power of thought. It has shown us many truths which are valuable, though they may not claim the primal worth and infallible certainty of God's messages. And its best gift to us will be derived if we learn its closing lesson of humility and of reverence for the "more sure word of Prophecy."

 ~ R. L. Dabney, The Practical Philosophy (Harrisonburg, VA: Sprinkle Publications, 1984), 521.

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REFORMATION POST: Two Books on Justification, and Thoughts on the Office of Believers

Happy Reformation Day!

Contrary to Bergoglio's wishful thinking (according to which the Reformation is over) and in opposition to Peter Leithart's claim according to which the Reformation failed (that is, paraphrased, it failed because it did not promote and/or it failed to actualize Leithart's own contemporary ecumenical ideology that the 16th century Reformation never ever intended to achieve), today is a day that testifies to the fact that the Triune God and his gospel will always win, even when things look as dark as they can be. Today is the 500th anniversary of the Protestant Reformation. Today, 31 October 1517, 500 years ago, Martin Luther nailed his 95 Theses to the door of the church in Wittenberg. 

To commemorate this vital event, in addition to having worked for the publication of my book, I would also like to suggest two books from which I have greatly benefited. The first is an old but gold, the second is a book published just this year. 

A picture of the unabridged version of Luther's

Commentary on Galatians that I own.

The first book I am referring to is Luther's monumental Commentary On Galatians. It is a repetitive book, but that is not an accident nor a negative thing. In fact, Luther himself says several times that the gospel of salvation by grace alone through faith alone is too important, and natural man is so prone to forget it, that it needs to be repeated and expounded continually. More importantly, this volume shows Luther at the best of his exegetical, theological, and pastoral genius.  Regarding exegesis, Luther demolishes the erroneous interpretations of the epistle to the Galatians, such as the most peculiar claim according to which Paul, in saying that we are not justified by the law, is referring only to the civil and ceremonial law. Theologically (and, I would personally add, philosophically), the commentary presents Luther as a man of unshakable commitment to the Biblical gospel of justification by faith alone, as well as of the atoning death of Christ and of penal substitution and imputation, all points that he was totally adamant to maintain and not to compromise with anyone. Pastorally, it is a sweet spiritual medicine for the soul, where Luther continually comforts the reader with the gospel of pure grace, exhorting him to look away from himself or herself and to fix the eyes only on Christ for salvation and any spiritual good, also in the light of Luther's encouraging accounts of his own intense temptations and dreadful depressions (other than myself, also John Bunyan witnesses [see 129-130] of the great usefulness of the book in this regard). There is an abridged version of this commentary online for free, and also a very nice abridged paperback. For the real nerds, there are the Luther's Works series, Volume 1 and 2. To the reader who has enough time but not enough money for the LW series, I warmly suggest taking the time to read the unabridged version, available in one or two published versions, and one free online.

Available both in America and Europe.

The second book I would like to recommend is, as I said, a recent publication: Gospel Truth of Justification: Proclaimed, Defended, Developed, by Prof emeritus David J. Engelsma. I do not intend to compare Engelsma to Luther (Engelsma himself would reject the comparison), but I find some similarities between Luther's Commentary on Galatians and Engelsma's book. Firstly, the book is exegetical: Engelsma not only offer coherent and sound exegesis of the relevant Scriptural passages, but he also inflicts deadly blows not only to the Roman Catholic interpretations of those Biblical places, but also the more nominally Protestant versions of justification by faith and works, such as the unbiblical teaching of the Federal Vision and the New Perspective on Paul (regarding the latter, Engelsma efficaciously shows that these "New" Perspectives are not new at all, but are the old "gospel" of faith and works with a different and perhaps more academic appearance). Secondly, the book is outstandingly theological in that it interacts not only with the Protestant confessions and creeds but also with a wide range of orthodox (and unorthodox) sources. Thirdly, the book is pastoral. Engelsma rightly recognizes the vital role of justification by grace alone through faith alone both for the preservation of the instituted church of Christ and for the spiritual health and comfort of the believers. I do not hesitate to say that the love for the church and for the individual believer is the main reason that led Engelsma to write this book, a book born "out of love for the truth and the desire to bring it to light," to use Luther's words. In this latest regard, the book is also repetitive, and this is meant in a good way, namely, in the same sense that Luther's commentary is repetitive: the author regularly reminds the needy believer of the gospel of grace alone through faith alone. Engelsma's book also treats other important theological doctrines (such as God's unconditional covenant of grace with his elect people) and, with its polemics against modern distortions of justification, it makes a great couple with Luther's commentary.

I would also like to make some considerations about the doctrine of the office of believers in connection with the current controversies within Protestantism. This is because more and more frequently I read from some leaders and non-leaders (especially some of those who identify themselves with the New Perspectives on Paul and the Federal Vision) patronizing and condescending words and tones towards those who hold to justification by grace alone through faith alone, excluding works as a cause or condition of salvation. When you criticize a Federal Visionist or a FV inclined guy (or New Perspective guy, or any other modern justification by faith and works guy), some of the answers I have often come across are:

1) you misunderstood him (greatest hit)
2) you do not have enough theological degrees or peer-reviewed published papers to have something serious to say
3) you are disqualified because have not read enough some forgotten fantastically decisive and greatly relevant personal notes in Latin by some past Protestant theologian
4) you are "uncharitable"
5) a combination of the previous 4, or all of them together.

The following is only one of many examples that can be found in books or on social media.

"The controversy about Shepherd has become so heated that some of his critics, including official statements of two denominations, have accused him of denying the gospel or of preaching 'another gospel.' In the light of Shepherd’s writing here, quite consistent with his writings elsewhere, it should be plain that such criticisms are stupid, irresponsible, and divisive. Theological professors who make such comments, in my judgment, do not have the intellectual, theological, or spiritual maturity to prepare students for gospel ministry." - John Frame, in P. Andrew Sandlin, Backbone of the Bible (Covenant Media Foundation, 2004), xii. Emphasis added.

So, according to Frame, if a theological professor accuses Shepherd to promote an unbiblical message, this person does not possess "intellectual" (my point 1), "theological" (point 2 and 3), "or spiritual maturity" (point 4): a good example of point 5. And if this is the sentence upon theological professor, one wonders what kind of judgment Frame has towards non-academic or laypeople who reject Shepherd's teaching. I am not aware of any apology issued by Frame for this grossly grandiose assertion. Apology or not, the point is that this attitude and tone is clearly present among many FV and NPOP supporters. 

One never wins with them, one seems to be always wrong by definition, by the very fact of disagreeing with them, either because "unlearned," or unable not to "misunderstand" any given point, or because of any other similar irrelevant claim. According to some of these individuals, if one dares to criticize those theologians who make good works either a cause or a condition of salvation, then these critiques need to get some seminary training and to publish in peer-reviewed journals before they can be taken seriously. It seems to me that this is a sort of modified mild Gnosticism. Although, it has to be said that (some of the ancient) gnostics had at least some explicit (although erroneous) philosophical reasons upon which they grounded their intellectual snobbery. In the cases I am referring to, the attitude most often does not seem to be anything but a mere "Well, you disagree because you are stupid and/or ignorant." As a consequence of that, in the contexts at issue, justification is sometimes depicted a mere "academic question." Whether Paul wrote or not Hebrews is a mere academic question, not justification. Luther and Calvin were not willing to go to the steak for a mere "academic question" (Luther and Calvin whom, of course, according to some FV people also supposedly agree with them, according to the theological monopoly that some of the FVists want to impose basically over most of the Christian theological production).

Of course, these sorts of attitudes are an implicit but clear denial of the Biblical teaching of the office of believers, beautifully expounded in Luther's Freedom of the Christian. However, I am not entirely surprised by these attitudes, and the reason is strictly connected to the doctrine of justification: when one loses the Biblical doctrine of justification by grace alone through faith alone, also the right view of the law is inevitably distorted (the "law of love," as Luther calls it in his commentary to Galatians). In this cases, academic learning, at least in a sense, takes the place of what once was the supposed spiritual superiority of monks and nuns in the monasteries. It is also in opposition against these unchristian behaviors that I desired to recommend here the two books described above, two books that encourage, equip, and tell us that every Christian, scholar or not, has not only the right but also the spiritual ability to promote, in Christian love and truth, the true Biblical doctrine of salvation by grace alone through faith alone, and to condemn any teaching that opposes it. 

"This doctrine [of justification by grace alone through faith alone] can never be taught, urged, and repeated enough. If this doctrine be lost, then is also the whole knowledge of truth, life, and salvation lost and gone. If this doctrine flourishes, then all good things flourish, religion, the true service of God, the glory of God, the right knowledge of all things and states of life." ~ Martin Luther, Commentary on Galatians (London: James Clarke, 1961), 21.

Sola Fide.
Sola Scriptura.
Solus Christus.
Sola Gratia.
Soli Deo Gloria.

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Subordinationism (3): Aquinas

What follows is merely a collection of quotations from Thomas Aquinas dedicated to the topic of the equality of the three persons of the Trinity. Aquinas is one of my subsidiary interests. He is a systematic and (needless to say) deep writer. This is to say that I need more time and reading in order to expound further without sounding repetitive. However, one thing seems clear to me: one of Aquinas' intentions is to avoid and/or reject the ancient error of subordinationism.

Compendium of Theology, Chapter 43 (The Divine Word not Distinct from the Father in Time, Species, or Nature): "Among things that are not distinct in essence, there can be no distinction according to species, time, or nature. Therefore, since the Word is consubstantial with the Father, He cannot differ from the Father in any of these respects. There can be no difference according to time. The divine Word is present in God for the reason that God understands Himself, thereby conceiving His intelligible Word. Hence, if at any time there were no Word of God, during that period God would not understand Himself. But God always understood Himself during His whole existence, for His understanding is His existence. Therefore His Word, also, existed always. And so in the rule of Catholic faith we say that the Son of God 'is born of the Father before all ages.'"

Summa Theologiae, Part 1, Q. 42 (Equality and Likeness Among the Divine Persons), A. 1 (Whether there is equality in God)): "We must needs admit equality among the divine persons. For, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x, text 15,16, 17), equality signifies the negation of greater or less. Now we cannot admit anything greater or less in the divine persons; for as Boethius says (De Trin. i): "They must needs admit a difference [namely, of Godhead] who speak of either increase or decrease, as the Arians do, who sunder the Trinity by distinguishing degrees as of numbers, thus involving a plurality." Now the reason of this is that unequal things cannot have the same quantity. But quantity, in God, is nothing else than His essence. Wherefore it follows, that if there were any inequality in the divine persons, they would not have the same essence; and thus the three persons would not be one God; which is impossible. We must therefore admit equality among the divine persons."

Part 1, Q. 42, A. 2 (Whether the person proceeding is co-eternal with His principle, as the Son with the Father): "We must say that the Son is co-eternal with the Father. In proof of which we must consider that for a thing which proceeds from a principle to be posterior to its principle may be due to two reasons: one on the part of the agent, and the other on the part of the action. On the part of the agent this happens differently as regards free agents and natural agents. In free agents, on account of the choice of time; for as a free agent can choose the form it gives to the effect, as stated above (I:41:2), so it can choose the time in which to produce its effect. In natural agents, however, the same happens from the agent not having its perfection of natural power from the very first, but obtaining it after a certain time; as, for instance, a man is not able to generate from the very first. Considered on the part of action, anything derived from a principle cannot exist simultaneously with its principle when the action is successive. So, given that an agent, as soon as it exists, begins to act thus, the effect would not exist in the same instant, but in the instant of the action's termination. Now it is manifest, according to what has been said (I:41:2), that the Father does not beget the Son by will, but by nature; and also that the Father's nature was perfect from eternity; and again that the action whereby the Father produces the Son is not successive, because thus the Son would be successively generated, and this generation would be material, and accompanied with movement; which is quite impossible. Therefore we conclude that the Son existed whensoever the Father existed and thus the Son is co-eternal with the Father, and likewise the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with both."

Part 2, Q. 42, A. 4 (Whether the Son is equal to the Father in greatness): "The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in greatness. For the greatness of God is nothing but the perfection of His nature. Now it belongs to the very nature of paternity and filiation that the Son by generation should attain to the possession of the perfection of the nature which is in the Father, in the same way as it is in the Father Himself. But since in men generation is a certain kind of transmutation of one proceeding from potentiality to act, it follows that a man is not equal at first to the father who begets him, but attains to equality by due growth, unless owing to a defect in the principle of generation it should happen otherwise. From what precedes (I:27:2; I:33:3), it is evident that in God there exist real true paternity and filiation. Nor can we say that the power of generation in the Father was defective, nor that the Son of God arrived at perfection in a successive manner and by change. Therefore we must say that the Son was eternally equal to the Father in greatness. Hence, Hilary says (De Synod. Can. 27): 'Remove bodily weakness, remove the beginning of conception, remove pain and all human shortcomings, then every son, by reason of his natural nativity, is the father's equal, because he has a like nature.'"

Part 1, Q. 42, A. 6 (Whether the Son is equal to the Father in power): "The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in power. Power of action is a consequence of perfection in nature. In creatures, for instance, we see that the more perfect the nature, the greater power is there for action. Now it was shown above (Article 4) that the very notion of the divine paternity and filiation requires that the Son should be the Father's equal in greatness--that is, in perfection of nature. Hence it follows that the Son is equal to the Father in power; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost in relation to both."

The Compendium, though incomplete, is still a very helpful summary of Aquinas' theology, and I personally find it a great introduction to his thought (after perhaps his On Being and Essence). Summa Theologiae does not need any introduction. I will only say that, although I have reported here only a selection of quotations from 1:42, the entire section is very worth meditating. 

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