Inattentive Existence

“Due to our anxiety over the future and our guilt over the past, we ignore and flee the present. Our lives are so bound up in living falsely toward the past and falsely toward the future that the momentous gift of the present is unreceived. We experience an inattentive, absentee existence, which disregards the promise of the now ... Receive each moment afresh as a new arena for value actualization. This is what our time should be filled with: receiving and creating contextual values. But instead we are ‘bored’ with this now. Because of our preoccupation with the dead past and the possible future, our ears are dulled to the address of reality in the moment. Instead of experiencing the fullness of time in the present, as if now were eternity entering time, we feel on our hands the slow emptiness of time. Instead of understanding this moment as the only moment we actually ever live, we feel that this moment is perhaps the dullest, least interesting of all. It is only some past moment that we cherish, or only some future moment which we idealize as fulfilling for us. So we play a game with time, pretending a glorious past and a promising future, but no present. Although it is a fantasy, we take the game with a certain absurd seriousness. In our romanticism we dream of those good old days, and in our messianism we dream of the great deliverances to come; but in the meantime we live as if the present had no being, or as if its being had no value. Real values and meanings lie behind us and before us in time, but certainly not now. Like the characters in Waiting for Godot, we wait for something that is constantly meeting us. The one we wait for visits us every day, but we do not recognize him, since we cannot believe he could be so near.” ~ Thomas C. Oden, The Structure of Awareness, 188.

Kierkegaard on Christ and the Ethics of Helping

Søren Kierkegaard,
by Luplau Janssen  (1869–1927).

"With Him [Christ] is rest, and He makes no difficulties, He does but one thing, He opens his arms. He will not first (as righteous people do, alas, even when they are willing to help)–He will not first ask thee, ‘Art thou not after all to blame for thy misfortune? Hast thou in fact no cause for self-reproach?’ It is so easy, so human, to judge after the outward appearance, after the result–when a person is a cripple, or deformed, or has an unprepossessing appearance, to judge that ergo he is a bad man; when a person fares badly in the world so that he is brought to ruin or goes downhill, then to judge that ergo he is a vicious man. Oh, it is such an exquisite invention of cruel pleasure, to enhance the consciousness of one's own righteousness in contrast with a sufferer, by explaining that his suffering is God's condign punishment [John 9:2], so that one hardly even dares to help him; or by challenging him with that condemning question which flatters one's own righteousness in the very act of helping him. But He will put no such questions to thee. He will not be thy benefactor in so cruel a fashion. If thou thyself art conscious of being a sinner, he will not inquire of thee about it, the bruised reed He will not further break [Matt. 12:20], but he will raise thee up if thou wilt attach thyself to Him. He will not single thee out by contrast, holding thee apart from Him, so that thy sin will seem still more dreadful; He will grant thee a hiding-place within Him, and once hidden in Him he will hide thy sins. For He is the friend of sinners: When it is question of a sinner He does not merely stand still, open His arms and say, ‘Come hither;’ no, he stands there and waits, as the father of the lost son waited, rather He does not stand and wait, he goes forth to seek, as the shepherd sought the lost sheep, as the woman sought the lost coin. He goes–yet no, he has gone, but infinitely farther than any shepherd or any woman. He went, in sooth, the infinitely long way from being God to becoming man, and that way He went in search of sinners." 

~ Søren Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity, 1.1.2, pp. 19-20.

Abraham Kuyper on the Necessity of Philosophy

Abraham Kuyper
(1837-1920).

"The need of philosophy is a necessity which arises out of the impulse of the human consciousness for unity, and is therefore of equal importance to those who stand outside, as to those who are in the regeneration. To say that a Christian is less in need of philosophy is only the exhibition of spiritual sloth and lack of understanding. The more the enlightening restores harmony in our consciousness, the stronger must be the awakening of the impulse after an unitous (einheitlich) organic knowledge. While, on the other hand, the richer the data at our service, the better the hope of success in this. Philosophy which reckons only with natural data will always vibrate between a pantheistic, deistic and materialistic interpretation, and will never do more than form schools, while Christian philosophy, whose theistic point of departure is fixed, is able to lead to unity of interpretation within the circle of regeneration. But for this very reason theology will be able to go hand in hand with a Christian philosophy. It is the task of philosophy to arrange concentrically the results of all the other sciences, and if non-Christian philosophy ignores the results of theology, as though it were no science, theology is in duty bound to enter her protest against this. If, on the other hand, the philosopher himself is regenerate, and is historically and ecclesiastically in union with the life of palingenesis, then of course in his studies he includes the results of theology, together with the results of all the other sciences; and it is his care, architectonically to raise such a cosmological building that of themselves the results of theology also find their place in it."

 ~ Abraham Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1898), 614-615.

Herman Bavinck on General and Special Revelation

Herman Bavinck (1854-1921)

Nowadays, the truth of the sufficiency of Scripture is often used as a catchphrase that is supposed to sound biblical and devout. Scripture is sufficient, but sufficient for what? For absolutely every single thing, activity, and work in life? If we don't qualify what does it mean that Scripture is sufficient, if we don't qualify for what Scripture is sufficient and that Scripture is sufficient for what is meant to be sufficient (see 2 Tim. 3:16-17), we may sound pious and spiritual but we are being illogical; we may sound like honoring Scripture as the Word of God, but we are actually misunderstanding its purpose and abasing it to the level of an instruction manual. Herman Bavinck seems to have known this quite well. 

"Does special revelation swallow everything that lies before us in nature and history, such that, in order to know everything about it (nature and history), we need to do nothing other than to investigate the Scriptures? There are indeed those who theoretically reason this way, but at the same time they contradict the practice in their own life. After all, they go to school, receive instruction in the subjects that they need for life, and permit themselves to receive training for that trade or calling which they wish someday to practice in society. Agriculture, animal husbandry, business, industry, etc.—they are all learned from nature in school and in life. This instruction, too, comes to them from God, but they do not receive this instruction from Scripture, but from nature. God instructs them in the way they must act through the nature of things; and this also comes from the Lord of hosts who is wonderful in counsel, and excellent in working (Isa. 28:23–29)." ~ Herman Bavinck, Biblical and Religious Psychology (Jenison, MI: Reformed Free Publishing Association, 2024), 8.

That said, although Scripture does not say everything that can be said about everything, Scripture still says something about all things, in one way or another. Therefore, Scripture plays a vital role in all disciplines and activities practiced by mankind.

"But on the other side, are the Scriptures so detached from nature that they never in any way concern themselves with, never speak of, and shed absolutely no light on it? Is Scripture alone a light on the path to heaven, and is it in no respect a lamp for our feet as we walk in the paths of this earth [Ps. 119:105]? This is equally contrary to reality, because Scripture by no means limits itself only to purely religiousethical and heavenly things; but each moment it also deals with those matters that concern earthly life. As you know, it tells of the creation of heaven and earth, the origin of man, of man’s sin and misery in this life. In its first chapters, Scripture takes the whole of humanity into consideration; it lets special revelation flow forth through the prophets and in Christ to the whole of humanity, and it ends with the prediction that one day there will come a new heaven, but also a new earth in which righteousness dwells [2 Pet. 3:13]. And in the unfolding of this rich and broad history, it descends again and again to all kinds of particulars, to phenomena in nature, to events in general history, to chronologies and genealogies, to definite expressions about the nature of man, about his soul [ziel], his spirit [geest], and his heart [hart]. On all sides, special revelation penetrates deep into the natural life of humanity." ~ Bavinck, Biblical and Religious Psychology, 8-9.

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Updated: March 5, 2024

Luther's "Shocking" Realization of the Need for a Reformation

Dawn: Luther at Erfurt,
by Joseph Noel Paton.
From Wikimedia Commons.

The following passages are taken from Martin Luther's Sermons on John (2:23-24), in Luther's Works, Volume 22, Sermons on Gospel of St John Chapters 1-4. Luther mentions the deep pains and intense struggles that he experienced when he gradually started to realize that some of the teachings of the Church Fathers, some of which were developed and officially accepted by the Roman Catholic Church, were in contradiction with the Scriptures. Luther briefly describes the slow and painful realization of the desperate need for a Reformation of the church, a Reformation to which Luther was called to contribute, as an appointed preacher and lecturer in the church. Of course, these words do not tell the entire story. Nevertheless, they offer a personal picture, depicted by Luther himself, of Luther's own theological and existential struggles, and it is a picture that is in contradiction to some anti-Protestant propaganda that sees Luther as a careless revolutionary and deconstructionist.

No one will believe how great an ordeal it is and how severe a shock when a person first realizes that he must believe and teach contrary to the fathers, especially when he sees that so many excellent, intelligent, and learned men, yes, the best of them taught thus, and that the majority of the people in the world shared their views; among these were so many holy men, like Saints Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine. I, too, have often experienced this shock. But in spite of all this, that one man, my Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, must have greater weight with me than all the holiest people on earth put together. Yea, He must also outweigh all the angels in heaven (Gal. 1:8) if they teach anything at variance with the Gospel, or if they add to or detract from the doctrine of the divine Word. And then when I read the books of St Augustine and discover that he, too, did this and that, it thoroughly appals me. And when, over and above this, the hue and the cry is raised: ‘The church! The church!’, this dismays one most of all. It is truly difficult to subdue one’s own heart in these matters, to deviate from people who are so highly respected and who bear such a holy name—indeed, from the church herself—and no longer to have any confidence and faith in the church’s teaching. I mean, of course, that church of which they say: ‘Lo, the church has decreed that the precepts of Saints Francis and Dominic and the orders of monks and nuns are proper, Christian, and good.’ This truly bewilders and dismays a person. But after all is said and done, I must say that I dare not accept whatever any man might say; for he may be a pious and God-fearing man and yet be mistaken and err. Therefore I shall not trust myself to them all, as the Lord, according to this text, did not trust Himself to man either. And in another passage, found in the Gospel of Matthew, Christ earnestly warns us to beware of false prophets who will appear and not merely declare that they are Christians, but will also ‘show great signs and wonders, so as to lead astray, if possible, even the elect’ (Matt. 24:24). ~ Pages 256-257.

I remind you how difficult it is to break down the barriers and to realize that holy men such as St. Augustine and others might be mistaken. It distressed me greatly for approximately twenty years; and I debated, struggled, and wrestled with myself before I pressed through to the conviction that not everything the pope says is to be believed, that the church may err, and that I should not follow the fathers blindly. ~ Page 259. 

Therefore we must remember that these holy men may have been saved, but it was Christ who died for us. We must place our trust solely on Him as our only Saviour, and on no other, not on ourselves or our own opinions, however good they may be. Do not trust yourself to your own opinions, but take them to Christ and see whether they are in conformity with the faith (Rom. 12:7) and the Word of the holy Gospel ... It is essential for the heart of a Christian to be firmly convinced that Christ's innocent life, His holy blood, and precious death are our salvation, that we, together with all the saints, must cling to christ alone, and that no saint in heaven ever relied on himself and his own righteousness. ~ Page 272.

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Boethius's Psychology of Discontentment

From Wikimedia Commons.

These are just a few extracts from Boethius' very famous The Consolation of Philosophy. I like how Boethius mentions and explains some false assumptions that we sometimes embrace (even unconsciously) when we allow discontentment to crawl in our minds.

"Whose happiness is so firmly established that he has no quarrel from any side with his estate of life? For the condition of our welfare is a matter fraught with care: either its completeness never appears, or it never remains. One man’s wealth is abundant, but his birth and breeding put him to shame. Another is famous for his noble birth, but would rather be unknown because he is hampered by his narrow means. A third is blessed with wealth and breeding, but bewails his life because he has no wife. Another is happy in his marriage, but has no children, and saves his wealth only for an heir that is no son of his. Another is blessed with children, but weeps tears of sorrow for the misdeeds of son or daughter. So none is readily at peace with the lot his fortune sends him. For in each case there is that which is unknown to him who has not experienced it, and which brings horror to him who has experienced it. Consider further, that the feelings of the most fortunate men are the most easily affected, wherefore, unless all their desires are supplied, such men, being unused to all adversity, are cast down by every little care: so small are the troubles which can rob them of complete happiness. How many are they, think you, who would think themselves raised to heaven if the smallest part of the remnants of your good fortune fell to them? This very place, which you call a place of exile, is home to those who live herein. Thus there is nothing wretched unless you think it to be so: and in like manner he who bears all with a calm mind finds his lot wholly blessed. Who is so happy but would wish to change his estate, if he yields to impatience of his lot? With how much bitterness is the sweetness of man’s life mingled! For even though its enjoyment seem pleasant, yet it may not be surely kept from departing when it will. It is plain then how wretched is the happiness of mortal life which neither endures forever with men of calm mind, nor ever wholly delights the care-ridden.Wherefore, then, O mortal men, seek ye that happiness without, which lies within yourselves? Ye are confounded by error and ignorance. I will shew you as shortly as I may, the pole on which turns the highest happiness. Is there aught that you value more highly than your own self? You will answer that there is nothing. If then you are master of yourself, you will be in possession of that which you will never wish to lose, and which Fortune will never be able to take from you. Yet consider this further, that you may be assured that happiness cannot be fixed in matters of chance: if happiness is the highest good of a man who lives his life by reason, and if that which can by any means be snatched away, is not the highest good (since that which is best cannot be snatched away), it is plain that Fortune by its own uncertainty can never come near to reaching happiness. Further, the man who is borne along by a happiness which may stumble, either knows that it may change, or knows it not: if he knows it not, what happiness can there be in the blindness of ignorance? If he knows it, he must needs live in fear of losing that which he cannot doubt that he may lose; wherefore an ever-present fear allows not such a one to be happy." ~ 2.4.

Why then do you long for them with such railing against Fortune? You seek, I believe, to put want to flight by means of plenty. But you find that the opposite results. The more various is the beauty of furniture, the more helps are needed to keep it beautiful; and it is ever true that they who have much, need much; and on the other hand, they need least who measure their wealth by the needs of nature, not by excess of display. Is there then no good which belongs to you and is implanted within you, that you seek your good things elsewhere, in things without you and separate from you? Have things taken such a turn that the animal, whose reason gives it a claim to divinity, cannot seem beautiful to itself except by the possession of lifeless trappings? Other classes of things are satisfied by their intrinsic possessions; but men, though made like God in understanding, seek to find among the lowest things adornment for their higher nature: and you do not understand that you do a great wrong thereby to your Creator. He intended that the human race should be above all other earthly beings; yet you thrust down your honourable place below the lowest. For if every good thing is allowed to be more valuable than that to which it belongs, surely you are putting yourselves lower than them in your estimation, since you think precious the most worthless of things; and this is indeed a just result. Since, then, this is the condition of human nature, that it surpasses other classes only when it realises what is in itself; as soon as it ceases to know itself, it must be reduced to a lower rank than the beasts. To other animals ignorance of themselves is natural; in men it is a fault." ~ 2.5.

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In Defence of (Good) Labels in Philosophical and Theological Discussion (and, Precision ≠ Pedantry)

I found this on the Internet. I do not know
where it is from exactly. Apologies.

A while ago, I posted on Facebook the following quotation by Herman Bavinck.

"The difference between Augustine and Pelagius, Calvin and Castellio, Gomarus and Arminius is not that the latter were that much more gentle, loving, and tenderhearted than the former. On the contrary, it arises from the fact that the former accepted Scripture in its entirety, also including this doctrine [election and reprobation; they were and always wanted to be theistic and recognize the will and hand of the Lord also in these disturbing facts of life; they were not afraid to look reality in the eyes even when it was appaling. Pelagianism scatters flowers over graves, turns death into an angel, regards sin as mere weakness, lectures on the uses of adversity, and consider this the best possible world. Calvinism has no use for such drivel. It refuses to be hoodwinked. It tolerates no such delusion, takes full account of the seriousness of life, champions the rights of the Lord of lords, and humbly bows in adoration before the inexplicable sovereign will of God Almighty. As a result, it proves to be fundamentally more merciful than Pelagianism. How deeply Calvin felt the gravity of what he said is evident from his use of the expression 'dreadfull decree' [Institutes, 3.23.7]. Totally withouth warrant, this expression has been held against him. In fact, it is to his credit, not to his discredit. The decree, as Calvin's teaching, is not dreadful, but dreadful indeed is the reality that is the revelation of that decree of God, a reality that comes through both in Scripture and in history. To all thinking humans, whether they are followers of Pelagius or Augustine, that reality [of God's decree] remains completely the same. It is not something that can in any way be undone by illusory notions of it." ~ Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics: God and Creation: Vol. 2, 394-395.

Soon, a scholar (who will remain unnamed) commented that "I" (even though I quoted Bavinck's own words) was misinterpreting Arminianism and Pelagianism (a plausible claim when directed to me, quite a grandiose claim when directed to Bavinck). This is because, the person continued, they are theologically and historically not exactly the same (although neither Bavinck nor I ever claimed that they are exactly the same, and that is not even the point of the quotation). Therefore, the person claimed, Arminianism and Pelagianism should not be linked together as Bavinck does. With a fine final touch, the person implicitly but unmistakenly suggested that I should go studying these issues since I did not know enough about them (I was not sure how that is relevant, but it was quite right nonetheless!).

I will set aside the first and the last two curious remarks since this blog post is not at all meant to be a personal matter but an occasion for some considerations. Talking about the real issue here, Bavinck's point is not the theological and philosophical differences between Pelagianism and Arminianism, a point that nobody denied and that is irrelevant here. The real claim is that these two theological positions (Arminianism and Pelagianism) have the same core problem, that is, making salvation ultimately depend on man, and not God (as the reading of the Bavinck's entire chapter, "The Divine Counsel," clearly shows). It is on the basis of those shared common cores that the connections and the labelling are made (between Arminianism and Pelagianism in this case, and in other cases if done correctly), and not on the basis of a supposed full theological equality which nobody has claimed and that is admittedly not there. 

This is nothing new. Augustine of Hippo saw that what we today call Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism have basically the same essential problems. In Letter 217, Augustine described Semi- Pelagianism “as necessarily implying the basal idea of Pelagianism” (B. B. Warfield, Augustine and the Pelagian Controversy; emphasis added). In fact, Augustine writes to Vitalis as follows.

"Here you [Vitalis] are again perhaps going to say that the Lord does this when we read or hear his teaching, if a person assents with his will to the truth that he reads or hears. You say, 'For, if God's teaching were concealed from him, God would not direct his steps in order that, once they had been directed, a man would choose God's way.' And for this reason you think that the Lord directs the steps of a man to choose God's way only in the sense that without God's teaching he could not come to know the truth to which he assents by his will. You say, 'If a man assents to it (something that lies within his free choice), the Lord is correctly said to direct his steps in order that he may choose the way of him whose teaching he follows because he was first persuaded and then assented, which he does by his natural freedom if he wills to, but does not do if he does not will to. And he will receive a reward or punishment in accord with what he has done.' This is the teaching of the Pelagians that is wrongly spread about and rightly condemned, and Pelagius himself, fearing that he would be condemned in the courtroom of the Eastern bishops, condemned the view by which they say that the grace of God is not given for individual actions but lies in free choice or in the law and teaching. Will we be hardhearted to such a point, my brother, that we hold that Pelagian view on the grace of God, or rather against the grace of God, that Pelagius himself condemned with a false heart, but still in fear of Catholic judges?" ~ Augustine, Letter 217, 2.4 (emphasis added).

Augustine was certainly aware of the differences between Pelagius and Vitalis (and of the differences between the Pelagians and the Semi-Pelagians), and Augustine wisely does not expressly call Vitalis a Pelagian (Augustine's intent is corrective and pastoral). Nevertheless, Augustine is clearly making a strong connection between Vitalis and Pelagianism because they have a core doctrine in common (of course, not any core doctrine in common, but one relevant to the debate they were facing).

Robert L. Dabney makes a very similar point while discussing the similarities between Pelagianism and the position of one of his theological adversaries, Albert Taylor Bledsoe (1809-1877).

One more of Dr. Bledsoe's complaints of unfairness remains to be noticed. This is, that we assert his philosophy to be virtually Pelagian. This charge we did undoubtedly make, and intend to repeat. Now, Pelagius and Celestius taught sundry dogmas, such as baptismal redemption, monkery, the existence of unredeemed infants dying in infancy in a happy eternal state which yet is not the Christian's heaven, which Dr. Bledsoe does not hold; nor does the veriest Socinian on whose modern shoulders Pelagius's own mantle has fallen, hold them. They are as antiquated as the Ptolemaic astronomy. These ancient heretics, again, carried out their erroneous first principles with a symmetrical consistency in some results which we never dreamed of ascribing to Dr. Bledsoe; we do him no such injustice. In these senses he is, if he will prefer it so, no Pelagian. But in church history Pelagianism is a given, definite code of doctrines in philosophy and theology, clustering around certain hingepropositions. These hinge-propositions granted, the essential body of the system follows for all consistent minds. What wo mean by calling Dr. Bledsoe a virtual Pelagian is, then, this: that he asserts these hinge-propositions, and the more obvious and important of their consequences." ~ Robert L. Dabney, "The Philosophy of Volition," 222.

The Canons of Dort also make the same kind of connections, several times, between Arminianism and Pelagianism. Some people might be offended by some of the words used by the Canons, which would be missing the point they are getting at. The Canons have been carefully written by some of the best Protestant theologians of the 17th century, they are a very important document and, therefore, they should be considered seriously. The writers of the Canons were not trying to be inflammatory, but they were making an important theological claim regarding the substantial similarities that they saw between Arminianism and Pelagianism. See Canons of Dort, Head 2, Error 3, Error 6; Head 3 and 4, Article 2, Error 7, 9; Head 5, Error 2.

Again, it is on the basis of those shared common cores that the connections and the labelling are made (between Arminianism and Pelagianism in this case, and in other cases if done correctly), and not on the basis of a supposed full theological equality which nobody has claimed and that it is admittedly not there. Bavinck's, Dabney's, and the Canons' claims are refuted by proving that there are no core shared doctrines between Arminianism and Pelagianism (good luck with that!), and not simply by pointing to the obvious fact that those two positions do not teach exactly the same things and that they raised in the midst of two different historical contexts. Moreover, if this kind of connections and labelling should be made only when two positions are theologically and philosophically fully the same, then the necessity of such connections and labels will disappear altogether because then we will have, not two teachings with similar core doctrines, but one and the same teaching, thus making the useful practice in question virtually impossible. It is an unreasonable criterion. 

But does all this simply have to do with Arminianism and Pelagianism? Not really. Then why have I bathed in all this cybernetic ink? The reason is that the Facebook event described above gives me the occasion to discuss the usefulness (and possible dangers) of using labels. I think the reason that explains the response I received is not related to an ordered desire to be theologically and historically precise but rather has more to do with a desire of making unnecessary qualifications, ignoring substantial common issues, and not realising the necessity of labels and designations in order not to get lost in an endless web of tangential qualifications and distinctions. Already in the 18th century, Jonathan Edwards faced this kind of protests. I believe his words are quite to the point.

"Many find much fault with the calling professing Christians, that differ one from another in some matters of opinion, by distinct names; especially calling them by the names of particular men, who have distinguished themselves as maintainers and promoters of those opinions: as the calling some professing Christians 'Arminians,' from Arminius; others 'Arians,' from Arius; others 'Socinians,' from Socinus, and the like. They think it unjust in itself; as it seems to suppose and suggest, that the persons marked out by these names, received those doctrines which they entertain, out of regard to, and reliance on those men after whom they are named; as though they made them their rule: in the same manner, as the followers of Christ are called 'Christians'; after his name, whom they regard and depend upon, as their great Head and Rule. Whereas, this is an unjust and groundless imputation on those that go under the forementioned denominations. Thus (say they) there is not the least ground to suppose, that the chief divines, who embrace the scheme of doctrine which is by many called Arminianism, believe it the more because Arminius believed it: and that there is no reason to think any other, than that they sincerely and impartially study the Holy Scriptures, and inquire after the mind of Christ, with as much judgment and sincerity, as any of those that call them by these names; that they seek after truth, and are not careful whether they think exactly as Arminius did; yea, that in some things they actually differ from him. This practice is also esteemed actually injurious on this account, that it is supposed naturally to lead the multitude to imagine the difference between persons thus named and others, to be greater than it is; yea, as though it were so great, that they must be as it were another species of beings. And they object against it as arising from an uncharitable, narrow, contracted spirit; which, they say, commonly inclines persons to confine all that is good to themselves and their own party, and to make a wide distinction between themselves and others, and stigmatize those that differ from them with odious names. They say moreover, that the keeping up such a distinction of names has a direct tendency to uphold distance and disaffection, and keep alive mutual hatred among Christians, who ought all to be united in friendship and charity, however they can't in all things think alike." ~ Jonathan Edwards, The Freedom of the Will, Preface.

Does that mean that one can use labels and make connections indiscriminately? For instance, can we put Calvinism and fatalism on the same category? The answer is no. The similarities between Calvinism and fatalism are very far from being substantial (therefore, we lack what is needed to make the connection and use the label), but they are either only in appearance or straightforwardly fabricated (Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 277-311, 365-371, 375-412; John Gill, The Cause of God and Truth, 183-198;  C. Hodge, Systematic Theology: Vol. 2, 278-309; R. L. Dabney, The Practical Philosophy, 153-155; G. H. Clark, “Religion, Reason, and Revelation,” in Christian Philosophy, 238-270; T. J. Williams, Love, Freedom, and Evil, 43-58, 103-116, 119-185; S. Christensen, What About Free Will?, 224-237; J. N. Anderson, “Calvinism and the First Sin,” in D. E. Alexander and D. M. Johnson, Calvinism and the Problem of Evil, 200-229; G. Bignon, Excusing Sinners and Blaming God, 167-232). Edwards admits that too often labels are given and connections are made where there is no real or enough warrant and simply in order to uncharitably censure others.

"I confess, these things are very plausible. And I will not deny, that there are some unhappy consequences of this distinction of names, and that men's infirmities and evil dispositions often make an ill improvement of it. But yet I humbly conceive, these objections are carried far beyond reason. The generality of mankind are disposed enough, and a great deal too much, to uncharitableness, and to be censorious and bitter towards those that differ from them in religious opinions: which evil temper of mind will take occasion to exert itself, from many things in themselves innocent, useful and necessary." ~ Ivi.

"Calling a spade a spade" should not degenerate in "calling a spoon a spade." However, to dismiss a good practice because it is often abused is not a reasonable response.

"But yet there is no necessity to suppose, that the thus distinguishing persons of different opinions by different names, arises mainly from an uncharitable spirit. It may arise from the disposition there is in mankind (whom God has distinguished with an ability and inclination for speech) to improve the benefit of language, in the proper use and design of names, given to things which they have often occasion to speak of, or signify their minds about; which is to enable them to express their ideas with ease and expedition, without being incumbered with an obscure and difficult circumlocution. And the thus distinguishing persons of different opinions in religious matters, may not imply, nor infer any more than that there is a difference, and that the difference is such as we find we have often occasion to take notice of, and make mention of. That which we have frequent occasion to speak of (whatever it be, that gives the occasion) this wants a name: and 'tis always a defect in language, in such cases, to be obliged to make use of a description, instead of a name." ~ Ivi.

This is a very common habit that humanity practices in several different circumstances.

"Thus we have often occasion to speak of those who are the descendants of the ancient inhabitants of France, who were subjects or heads of the government of that land, and spake the language peculiar to it; in distinction from the descendants of the inhabitants of Spain, who belonged to that community, and spake the language of that country. And therefore we find the great need of distinct names to signify these different sorts of people, and the great convenience of those distinguishing words, 'French,' and 'Spaniards'; by which the signification of our minds is quick and easy, and our speech is delivered from the burden of a continual reiteration of diffuse descriptions, with which it must otherwise be embarrassed. That the difference of the opinions of those, who in their general scheme of divinity agree with these two noted men, Calvin, and Arminius, is a thing there is often occasion to speak of, is what the practice of the latter, itself confesses; who are often, in their discourses and writings, taking notice of the supposed absurd and pernicious opinions of the former sort. And therefore the making use of different names in this case can't reasonably be objected against, or condemned, as a thing which must come from so bad a cause as they assign. It is easy to be accounted for, without supposing it to arise from any other source, than the exigence and natural tendency of the state of things; considering the faculty and disposition God has given mankind, to express things which they have frequent occasion to mention, by certain distinguishing names. It is an effect that is similar to what we see arise, in innumerable cases which are parallel, where the cause is not at all blameworthy." ~ Ivi.

The presence of substantial similarities in the pillar teachings of position a and position b is a sufficient reason to make the connections and to use the kind of labels we have been discussing so far. That said, labels should only be used when such substantial similarities are actually there, and should not be used as mere attempts to negatively characterize or demonize. Finally, both labels and warranted theoretical connections are made necessary by the very nature of language, by the need of communicative effectiveness and concision, and by the need to avoid "obscure and difficult circumlocution[s]." As long as integrity is maintained, the meanings of the words and the doctrines involved are accurate, and the connections are grounded, the academic and the minister, as well as the non-academic and the layperson, should not fear to adopt the practices here discussed when necessary simply because he or she does not have a graduate degree in Late Antiquity Christian theology, Early Modern Protestant thought, or similar. Once the criteria just mentioned are satisfied (although I realise they are only introductory and general), the practices at issue are legit and those who adopt them should not worry if, for example, someone does not like the fact of being theologically and philosophically close to Pelagianism, Semi-Pelagianism, Arminianism, or some other doctrine. Accuracy is essential, courtesy is always welcome, and charity is required. Pedantry and evasiveness are not.

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