T. F. Torrance on Realism and Idealism

As I have been studying and thinking about Christian theistic realism and Christian theistic phenomenalistic idealism, I have come across a discussion by Thomas F. Torrance (1913–2007). He was a realist of some sort. Independently of his position (which I don't necessarily share), while presenting his own view, Torrance also makes some very interesting remarks on the alleged contrast and conflict between "realism" and "idealism."

The contrast between realism and idealism, implied in the use of either term, evidently has its source in the distinction we make between subject and object, idea and reality, or sign and thing signified. This is a natural operation of the human mind, for it belongs to the essence of rational behavior that we can distinguish ourselves as knowing subjects from the objects of our knowledge, and can employ ideas or words to refer to or signify realities independent of them. Normally our attention in knowing, speaking, listening, or reading is not focused upon the ideas or words we use, far less upon ourselves, but upon the realities they signify or indicate beyond themselves. Hence in our regular communication with one another we use and interpret signs in the light of their objective reference. Thus the natural operation of the human mind would appear to be realist. 

We use these distinctions, then, between subject and object, idea and reality, or sign and thing signified, naturally and unreflectingly, and only turn a critical eye upon them when something arises to obscure signification, such as a break in the semantic relation. Much now depends upon where the emphasis falls, upon the signifying pole or the objective pole of the semantic relation. that is, upon idea or reality, upon sign or thing signified. In this state of affairs the contrast between idealism and realism arises out of an oscillation in emphasis from one pole of the semantic relation to the other. The distinction sharpens into a conflict, however, when the two poles are extended to a breaking point or when the relation between them is disrupted through some dichotomy of thought. However, since the relation between idea and reality or sign and thing signified is never completely severed, there seems to be a regular tendency, as one extreme position is corrected in respect of the other, for each to pass over into the other, to that idealism sometimes passes over into a form of realism and realism passes over into a form of idealism. For example, in the dialectical relation that arises out of a split between theoretical and empirical factors in natural science, an emphasis upon mathematics separated from experience may end up in a mechanical and materialist understanding of the world, while an emphasis upon sense experience as the ultimate ground of knowledge may end up in a rationalist empiricism or even a conventionalism. Virtually the same dialectic arises in theology between radically divergent approaches to the understanding of Christ traditionally characterized as "dark" and "ebionice," for in modern as in ancient Christologities each tends to turn into a form of the other.

It may be noted that when the semantic relation between idea and reality or between sign and thing signified is not completely severed but only damaged, our thought nevertheless becomes trapped in distorting ambiguities which require correction. It is within the context of this problematic state of affairs, and on the ground of some form of epistemological dualism that underlies it, that coherence and correspondence theories of truth have continually been thrown up in the history of thought. Who has always been at stake is a distorting refraction in the ontological substructure of knowledge. The lesson that is constantly being taught is that there can be no satisfactory theory of truth within the brackets of a dualist frame of thought, for it can only yield the oscillating dialectic between coherence and correspondence. There can be no way forward except through a rejection of dualist modes of thought in an integration of empirical and theoretical components in knowledge and of form and being in our understanding of reality. That would restore the integrity of the semantic reference of idea and sign to reality, in which reality would have objective priority over all our conceiving and speaking of it. Strictly speaking, the contrast, let alone the conflict, between realism and idealism would not then arise, nor would the distinction between a coherence and a correspondence view of truth which depends on a disjunction between form and being. 

To return to the meaning of realism, we shall use the term, not in an attenuated dialectical sense merely in contrast to idealism, nominalism, or conventionalism, but to describe the orientation in thought that obtains in semantics, science, or theology on the basis of a nondualist or unitary relation between the empirical and theoretical ingredients in the structure of the real world and in our knowledge of it. This is an epistemic orientation of the two-way relation between the subject and object poles of thought and speech, in which ontological primacy and control are naturally accorded to reality over all our conceiving and speaking of it. (T. F. Torrance, Reality and Evangelical Theology: The Realism of Christian Revelation, 58-60)

Reading Augustine for who has little time

Augustine of Hippo (354–430) is a key theologian and philosopher than anyone interested in Christian theology and philosophy needs to read, at the very least to some extent. However, for many of us, the busyness of life does not give us the time to approach the rewarding reading of this North African thinker. Moreover, the gigantic Augustinian corpus might be intimidating, and one might be confused on where to start: "Augustine wrote over one hundred treatises, countless sermons, and more than five million words in all” (Levering, The Theology of Augustine, xi).

There are some Augustinian anthologies that can help in this noble pursuit. They are anthologies, that is, collections of quotations from Augustinian primary sources. They are not expositions of Augustine's thought, and, therefore, they do not provide expositions of Augustine's own life or his historical and intellectual context. But the reader should not be discouraged, as I believe it is sufficient to get a basic grasp of Augustine's life from any trusted source to enjoy these anthologies.

• An Augustine Synthesis, by Erich Przwara. This anthology is structured in a philosophically fascinating way. The book provides a sufficiently comprehensive picture of Augustine's Christian philosophy. This is the lengthiest and most challengingly divided anthology of the three listed here.
• What Augustine Says, by Norman Geisler. Somewhat like Przwara's book, but shorter and with a division of topics that will probably be more familiar and approachable to most people.
• The Triumph of Grace: Augustine's Writings on Salvation, by N. R. Needham. A superb collection of texts from Augustine's works. The book is thematically divided into chapters which are, in turn, briefly introduced. An ideal place to start to see Augustine's God-centered view of salvation.

These anthologies offer short nuggets from Augustine's writings so that the reader (especially the beginner) can gradually acquire, through small daily doses, a good understanding of Augustine's Christian thought (as for all things, a little patience and perseverance are also required).

Tolle lege.

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Some Edwardsean Book Reviews

In the last few years, I have accumulated a few reviews of books on Jonathan Edwards. At the moment I am reading The Thought of Jonathan Edwards by Miklos Veto. The book is both lengthy and rich. Therefore, it will take me some time before I finish my review.

In the meantime, I will list here all the Edwardsean reviews I have written so far, from the oldest to the newest.

• Harry S. Stout (General Editor), Kenneth P. Minkema and Adriaan C. Neele (Associate Editors), The Jonathan Edwards Encyclopedia.
• John J. Bombaro, Jonathan Edwards's Vision of Reality: The Relationship of God to the World, Redemption History, and the Reprobate.
• Steven M. Studebaker, Amos Yong, eds., Pentecostal Theology and Jonathan Edwards. In Jonathan Edwards Studies, Vol 11, No 1 (2021).
• Peter B. Jung, ed., Free Will: Jonathan Edwards’ Psychological, Ethical, and Theological Philosophy in his Freedom of the Will.
• Avihu Zakai, Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of Nature: The Re-enchantment of the World in the Age of Scientific Reasoning.
• John Carrick, Jonathan Edwards and the Immediacy of God.

What follows are reviews of books with some significant connections to Edwards.

• Robert L. Boss, Joshua R. Farris, S. Mark Hamilton, eds., New England Dogmatics: A Systematic Collection of Questions and Answers in Divinity by Maltby Gelston (1766-1865).
• Joshua R. Farris (Editor), S. Mark Hamilton  (Editor), and James S. Spiegel (General Editor), Idealism and Christian Theology: Idealism and Christianity: Volume 1.
• Michael Patrick Preciado, A Reformed View of Freedom: The Compatibility of Guidance Control and Reformed Theology.
• Paul Helm, Reforming Free Will: A Conversation on the History of Reformed Views.

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Edwards' Among the Re-Enchanters: A Book Review

The full title of the book by Avihu Zakai that I am reviewing here is Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of Nature: The Re-enchantment of the World in the Age of Scientific Reasoning. Judging by the title alone, one might think that this book is exclusively about Jonathan Edwards' philosophy of nature. However, this first impression is proved wrong by the very first pages of the book.

The key category of this book is "re-enchantment" (nothing to do with magic or sorcery), a concept that Zakai has used also in his previous monograph, Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of History: The Reenchantment of the World in the Age of Enlightenment. With "re-enchantment," Zakai refers to Edwards' attempt "to provide a philosophical and theological alternative to mechanical philosophy that would take into account his profound religious and theological persuasions regarding God's sovereignty and the divine presence in the worlds" (Zakai, Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of History, 118). But Edwards was not the only one engaged in the re-enchantment of reality, and Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of Nature contains fascinating discussions of a few of these re-enchanters.

In the Introduction the author tells us that the aim of the "study is to place Edwards's writings on natural philosophy in the broad historical, theological, and scientific context of a wide variety of religious responses to the rise of the New Philosophy of nature in the early modern period (focusing on astronomy, cosmology, and physics)" (1). More specifically, the context that Zakai plans to describe is composed by John Donne, Blaise Pascal, John Edwards (not to be confused with Jonathan Edwards), Robert Greene, G. W. Leibniz, Jonathan Swift, William Blake, and George Berkeley (although Zakai mentions and/or briefly discusses others, namely, Giordano Bruno, the Cambridge Platonists, the Physico-Theologians, Nicolas Malebranche, Pierre Gassendi, Alexander Pope, and a few others). Before doing that, however, some historical and intellectual background needs to be set forth.

The author does that in chapter 1, titled "Philosophia ancilla theologiae: Science and Religion in Jonathan Edwards's Thought." The chapter discusses the affinities between Edwards' thought and some general characteristics of Medieval, Scholastic, and Renaissance thought: theology as regina scientiarum (queen of the sciences), philosophia ancilla theologiae (philosophy/science as handmaid of theology), scala naturae (the great chain of being), omnia videmus in Deo (we see all things in God), and theatrum Dei gloria (the natural world as the theater of God's glory). Of course, there are specific qualifications and differences between Edwards and the several past approaches on those issues, but those are not the point and they do not damage Zakai's thesis. Through the exposition of the points I just listed, Zakai correctly shows how Edwards is significantly tied to the Christian theology and philosophy that preceded him.

Chapter 2, "The Rise of Modern Science and the Decline of Theology as the «‘Queen of Sciences,’" is an account of how the development of the "New Philosophy of nature" during the 16th and 17th centuries undermined both the previous view of God and nature and the relationship between theology and science. The author does that by expounding the principles of the respective philosophies of science of Galileo Galilei, Francis Bacon, Isaac Newton, and others.

Chapter 3, "‘All Coherence Gone’—Donne and the 'New Philosophy' of Nature." John Donne, although perhaps not philosophically ingenious as the kind of Edwards and Leibniz, was nonetheless very knowledgeable about the philosophical and scientific ideas of his age (107-111). Zakai shows how, armed with that knowledge, the metaphysical poet used his artistic skills to offer a picture of "the disturbing effects of the New Philosophy upon the human imagination, or more specifically upon traditional definition and formation of religious identities, during the modern era" (6).

Chapter 4, "‘God of Abraham’ and ‘not of philosophers’: Pascal against the Philosophers' Disenchantment of the World," focuses on Pascal's polemics against the prevalent Early Modern philosophy of science which. For Zakai, "Pascal's Pensées are not only an ‘Apology for the Christian Religion’ in the strict sense but also a staunch defense of the Christian worldview, a reaffirmation of traditional Christian thought and belief with respect to God, the human condition, nature, and history," a work where Pascal is "resisting the demystifying of nature and the emptying of the world of theological considerations" (7).

Chapter 5, "Religion and the Newtonian Universe," begins with an exposition of Newton's, Clarke's, and others' unorthodox theological views which tended to Arianism and Socinianism and which were propounded by such thinkers as "rational," contrary (so they claimed) to the orthodox views. After that, the author expounds John Edwards', Greene's, Leibniz's, Swift's, and Blake's reactions to the new philosophy of nature. These accounts are important inasmuch as they place Edwards in an international intellectual context where several thinkers attempted in different ways to re-enchant that reality that the new philosophy of nature detached from God and his activity.

Chapters 6 and 7 directly discuss Edwards' philosophy of nature. They are the core of Zakai's book in that they constitute (combined with his Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of History) Zacki's contribution "to restore Edwards to his due prominence in early modern philosophy" (232).

Chapter 6 contains good summaries of some of the "prevailing errors of the present day" (WJEO 16:727). These errors are some of Edwards's main targets, namely, deism, the new philosophy of nature, and the British school of Moral Sense. In addition to that, Zacki explains how Edwards' doctrine of God, philosophy of nature, and moral philosophy can be properly appreciated only when considered within this polemical context and as direct answers and alternatives to the three errors.

Chapter 7, "Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of Nature: The Re-Enchantment of the World in the Age of Scientific Reasoning," Zacki analyzes Edwards' philosophy of nature as a response to the new philosophy of nature's attempt to disenchant the world by detaching it from God and his sovereignty. More specifically, the chapter expounds how Edwards' discussions of the atomic doctrine, the laws of nature, the relationship between God and the world, the nature of creation, and idealism constituted Edwards' attempt to construct a global and universally theistic view of the nature of reality to oppose to the prevailing mechanistic philosophy. According to Zaki, this is what makes Edwards a universal philosopher worthy to have a significant position in the history of early modern philosophy and theology.

Jonathan Edwards

He [Edwards] was a bold and independent philosopher who engaged with Enlightenment ideas, attempted to understand the constitution of the natural world and ascertain God’s relation to the physical world. Nowhere is his force of mind more evident than in his reaction against the dominant scientific culture and imagination of his time—mechanical philosophy, the doctrine that all natural phenomena can be explained and understood by the mere mechanics of matter and motion—and, consequently, in his quest to provide a meaningful philosophical and theological alternative to the mechanistic explanation of the essential nature of reality, an alternative that reconstituted the glory of God’s absolute sovereignty, power, and will within creation. Through idealistic philosophy and natural typology, Edwards sought to mount a counteroffensive to materialist, mechanistic thought. In that way he constructed a teleological and theological alternative to the prevailing mechanistic interpretation of the essential nature of reality, whose ultimate goal was the re-enchantment of the world by reconstituting the glory of God's majestic sovereignty, power, and will within the order of creation. (234) 

Minor Criticisms
"Bad news" first. The problems I see with this volume are minor, and most likely they are not even intentional on Zakai's part. However, they might cause misunderstandings in some readers. Therefore, with the risk of sounding pedantic, I will list them here as briefly as I can.

Zakai often mentions the "undemonstrated truths of faith" (40, 56, 76, 83). With no further qualification, "undemonstrated" is an ambiguous term, and it will meet the disapproval of virtually any Christian apologist, Edwards included. Scientific "demonstrated" truths (79, 64) is equally ambiguous: it is enough to consider how significantly science has changed from the Early Modern period.

In my modest opinion, Francis Bacon's (and others') philosophical assumptions are not presented for what they are, that is, strict empiricist assumptions under the pretense of "scientific" objectivity.

"Bacon is right that we can think we know something just because we have a word for it. We ought to be careful not to let words direct our thoughts. But Bacon s arbitrary in his choice of criteria for accepting words as meaningful or not. As Bacon adopts an empirical method, those words are fictitious whose objects cannot be verified by sense experience. This rules out many abstract terms (good, just, right, form, thing) as well as words referring to immaterial realities. This is an arbitrary restriction unless Bacon can show that empirical verification is the only standard for affirming something as meaningful, which he cannot do and still claim that his new idea (which like all ideas is not verifiable by the senses) is to be affirmed as meaningful." ~ Montague Brown, Restoration of Reason, 20 (see also 25-27).

Of course, one cannot say everything that there is to say, and I am going slightly beyond the stated goals of Zakai's volume. However, considering how prominent Bacon's philosophical presuppositions are in his philosophy of nature, at least a brief reference to this fact would have been appropriate.

Relatedly, the distinction between science and philosophy of science is not always properly assumed. What Bacon, Isaac Newton, and others proposed was not simply new scientific discoveries, but also a new philosophy of nature. The latter did not correspond with and did not necessarily follow from the former. Bacon and Newton did not divorce "physics and science in general form philosophy" (176) simply because this is impossible to do (even Kant, with all his faults, realized that to a certain degree, as it can be seen in the Preface of his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, 8-9, 14). In fact, considering the great scientific knowledge of men such as Leibniz and Edwards, it can be argued that they criticised not simply "the metaphysical and theological implications" (232, emphasis added) of the new philosophy of nature, but also its hidden philosophical assumptions.

Finally, chapter 4 on Pascal (although good) seems at times to depict Pascal as a sort of skeptic who blindly forsakes his reason and abandons himself to faith (128, 133, 139, 144-145). I am not saying this was intentional. However, such a picture can still risk to mischaracterize Pascal (and quoting Voltaire and Jorge Louis Borges, great men of literature but poor philosophers, does not help). I believe that it is more faithful to Pascal's life and Pensées to develop the idea that Pascal, not in spite of but (also) because of his superb scientific skills, realized the limits of science and, for that reason, he came "to see natural sciences from a broader perspective" (D. R. Groothuis, On Pascal, 25), and to oppose those who ascribed  to science abilities that it does not possess.

Strengths
Zakai uses his vast learning and a conspicuous academic apparatus in order to place Edwards in a group of selected re-enchanters of reality with transcendence. Zakai uses these thinkers as representatives of a general response to the new philosophy of nature. This contextualization is very helpful, especially for those who will read Edwards himself. This is because Zakai shows how Edwards frequents attacks on the new philosophy of nature, deism, mechanism, etc., are not the fixation of a minister obsessed with old ideas. Rather, these polemics are part of the sophisticated system of a thinker who was well aware of the great turn that Western thought was taking. And he was far from being the only one. In their own respective ways (and, in the case of a couple of them, with some exaggerations), all these reality re-enchanters attempted to proclaim that, contrary to the claims of many of their influential contemporaries, God is not only compatible with, but also necessary for, a view of reality that is both rational and existentially significant. 

G. W. Leibniz and George Berkeley

Zakai offers short comparisons between Edwards and Leibniz and Edwards and Berkeley, and the author emphasizes some of the general similarities between Edwards and the two philosophers from the Old World. This is both a strength and a weakness of the book (again, I am aware one cannot say everything there is to say). These comparisons are productive, but they leave the reader slightly unsatisfied because of their brevity. Considering the substantial similarity between some of Leibniz's, Edwards', and Berkeley's concerns and objectives, Leibniz and Berkeley probably deserved a separate chapter each. More extended and detailed comparisons of these common concerns and goals against the background of giants such as Leibniz and Berkeley would have contributed to highlight more Edwards' deserved place among Leibniz's and Berkeley's rank, or, to quote what Zakai himself says elsewhere, to give Edwards "a dis­tin­guished place among early mod­ern philoso­phers who reacted against the meta­phys­i­cal and the­o­log­i­cal impli­ca­tions that often accom­pa­nied the appearance of new modes of sci­en­tific thought and imag­i­na­tion from the six­teenth to the eigh­teenth cen­turies."

For the very reasons I just mentioned, this book might also help those who are inclined to over-emphasise (and, in a few  cases, maximise) the "parting of the way" hypothesis, that is, the real and alleged irreconcilable differences between the thought of Edwards and that of the Reformed orthodox before him. Edwards' deep awareness of the international situation of Western thought, the historical timeliness of his proposal, and the philosophically comprehensive scope of his project will, perhaps, encourage a more irenic consideration of his genius, and lead to the realization that Edwards is much more than a too often parochial "continuity-discontinuity with the Reformed Scholastics" reading.

The variety of thinkers and points of view discussed in the book might not appear attractive to some readers. However, if the goal is to understand Edwards better as a universal philosopher, such minor inconvenience is a very small price to pay while reading this very informative volume. 

Conclusion
Some of the thinkers discussed in Zakai's Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of Nature are prominent Christian thinkers with some of the greatest imaginations that can be found. Imagination does not have to be taken in a pejorative sense. Quite the opposite. Imagination here is intended as an important function of the mind, "the organ of meaning" (C. S. Lewis), "that distinctly human capacity by which we image anything and everything that is not immediately visible to our eyes" (Wilbourne), "the ability to grasp the way things fit together—the capacity of beholding wholes" (Vanhoozer). 

Especially (but not exclusively) in the case of Edwards, his ability to see and grasp all things as united to the God-man Jesus Christ inevitably led him, not only to strongly oppose the errors of his days, but also to offer a vast and fascinating Christocentric view of reality. Zakai's Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of Nature is a good sequel of his Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of History. The former (like the latter) will help to gain a contextual understanding of the significance of Edwards' magnificent view of reality. I recommend it.

“The emanation or communication of the divine fullness, consisting in the knowledge of God, love to God, and joy in God, has relation indeed both to God and the creature: but it has relation to God as its fountain, as it is an emanation from God; and as the communication itself, or thing communicated, is something divine, something of God, something of his internal fullness; as the water in the stream is something of the fountain; and as the beams are of the sun. And again, they have relation to God as they have respect to him as their object: for the knowledge communicated is the knowledge of God; and so God is the object of the knowledge: and the love communicated, is the love of God; so God is the object of that love: and the happiness communicated, is joy in God; and so he is the object of the joy communicated. In the creature's knowing, esteeming, loving, rejoicing in, and praising God, the glory of God is both exhibited and acknowledged; his fullness is received and returned. Here is both an emanation and remanation. The refulgence shines upon and into the creature, and is reflected back to the luminary. The beams of glory come from God, and are something of God, and are refunded back again to their original. So that the whole is of God, and in God, and to God; and God is the beginning, middle and end in this affair.” ~ Jonathan Edwards.

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Review copy kindly provided by Bloomsbury.

Henry Scougal on Love, Hatred, and Disagreement

Source: Works of the Rev. Henry Scougal
(1650–1678).

We come next to the enemies of our religion; and indeed there are many who are so far from thinking them to be among the number of those whom they are obliged to love, that they look upon it as a part of their duty to hate and malign them. Their zeal is continually venting itself in fierce invectives against Antichrist, and everything they are pleased to call Antichristian; and they are ready to apply all the prophecies and imprecations of the Old Testament, in their very prayers, against those that differ from them. And ordinarily the animosities are greatest where the differences are least, and one party of a reformed church shall be more incensed against another, than either against the superstition and tyranny of Rome, or the carnality of the Mahometan faith. Yea, perhaps you may find some who agree in opinion, and only differ in several ways of expressing the same thing, and yet can scarce look on one another without displeasure and aversion. But, alas! how much do these men disparage that religion for which they appear so zealous, how much do they mistake the spirit of Christianity!

Are the persons whom they hate, greater enemies to religion, than those who persecuted the Apostles and martyrs for professing it? And yet these were the persons whom our Saviour commanded his disciples to love: and himself did pray for those that crucified him; and severely checked the disciples, when, by a precedent brought from the Old Testament, they would have called for fire from heaven on those who would not receive them ; telling them, They knew not what spirit they were of: i. e. They did not consider by what spirit they were prompted to such cruel inclinations; or, as others explain it, they did not yet sufficiently understand the temper and genius of Christianity; which is pure and peaceable, gentle and meek: full of sweetness, and full of love. If men would impartially examine their hatred and animosity against the enemies of their religion, I fear they would find them proceed from a principle which themselves would not willingly own. 

Pride and self-conceit will make a man disdain those of a different persuasion, and think it a disparagement. We may to his judgment, that any should differ from it. Mere nature and self-love will make a man hate those who oppose the interest and advancement of that party which himself has espoused. Hence men are many times more displeased at some small mistakes in judgment, than the greatest immoralities in practice; yea, perhaps, they will find a secret pleasure, and wicked satisfaction, in hearing or reporting the faults or scandal of their adversaries. Certainly the power of religion rightly prevailing in the soul, would mould us into another temper: it would teach us to love and pity, and pray for the person, as well as hate and condemn the errors they are supposed to espouse: it would make us wish their conversion rather than their confusion; and be more desirous that God would fit them for another world, than that he would take them out of this. indeed wish the disappointment of their wicked purposes; for this is charity to them, to keep them from being the unhappy instruments of mischief in the world: but he that can wish plagues and ruin to their persons, and delights in their sins, or in their misery, hath more of the devil than the Christian.

 ~ Henry Scougal, “The Indispensable Duty of Loving our Enemies,” in Works of the Rev. Henry Scougal, 143-144. 

Legal Preaching

“John 1:29: ‘Behold the Lamb of God,
who takes away the sins of the world.’
John saw in Bethany
who Moses heard on Sinai.”
From Full of Eyes.

We are led to think that there are some points on which all our hearts and consciences need to be more earnestly impressed, and these points we believe to be connected with the requirements and denunciations of the law of God. 

But, there is a dread of legal preaching. If, by this phrase be meant, the preaching which fosters the hope of salvation because of our obedience to the law, such preaching is most solemnly proscribed in Scripture, for it is destructive of the very elements of the gospel. We are persuaded, however, that men would never venture on such preaching, if they understood the law of God; neither did others understand it, could they endure to listen to such preaching. The best antidote to these delusions, then, is an exposition of the law, in all the breadths and lengths of its requirements. 

But, if by legal preaching is meant, the faithful and fervid enforcement of these commands on every man's conscience, as the standard by which he is to walk now, and to be judged hereafter, whence, we demand, the dread of such a style of preaching? Surely not from an enlightened regard to the honour of God; we know nothing of that honour, but as we study and obey his law. Surely, not from, an enlightened attachment to the gospel; we do not understand the gospel, but as it enlarges our conceptions of the divine law, and constrains us to fulfil it. If the gospel had not been intended to exalt the character of the law in our esteem, to enhance its authority, and, by relieving the conscience from the guilt of having broken it, to influence the heart to a steady observance of its precepts, the whole genius of the gospel must have been the reverse of what it is. In proportion as the law is explained, and really understood, God is honoured; the conscience is enlightened; the gospel is valued; the necessity of holiness is acknowledged; the grief of penitence is awakened; the corruption of the heart is felt; the atonement of the Saviour is embraced; the influence of the Spirit is implored; the heart is purified; the soul is saved. These are the objects for which we preach; and, with a view to these, in reliance on that blessing, without which our efforts must be useless, we purpose, with special minuteness and fidelity, to illustrate and enforce, in some following discourses, the laws of God. They will be found to meet all the subtleties of the heart, and to affect all the relations we sustain, whether towards God, as our Creator and Governor, or towards each other, in the various connexions and dependencies of the present state. They will derive illustration from the pages of history, and from passing events; will be enforced by all the motives that can touch the conscience, influence the affections, or persuade the will; and will have a distinct reference to the disclosures of the last day, and the decisions of eternity.

~ William Hendry Stowell, The Ten Commandments Illustrated and Enforced on Christian Principles (1825), Introductory Lecture, pages 4-5.

Edwards’ Wheels of Time

Jonathan Edwards' view of the first chapter of the book of Ezekiel is, in my view, one of the most fascinating sections written by the New England divine. Independently of the worth and accuracy of Edwards' unusual exegesis (which is still greatly more plausible than the ones of those who torture the text to insert aliens into it!), his interpretation of this chapter reveals an intriguing side of Edwards' comprehensively cosmic view of all things as being from God, through God, and to God. The following are some extracts from Jonathan Edwards, Notes on Scripture (WJE Online Vol. 15), pages 373-379, entry 389.

Divine providence is most aptly represented by the revolution or course of these wheels. Things in their series and course in providence, they do as it were go round like a wheel in its motion on the earth. That which goes round like a wheel goes from a certain point or direction, till it gradually returns to it again. So is the course of things in providence.

Edwards applies this omni-comprehensive metaphysical principle to the natural world.

God's providence over the world consists partly in his governing the natural world according to the course and laws of nature. This consists wholly as it were in the revolution of wheels. So the annual changes that appear in the natural world are as it were by the revolution of a wheel, or the course of the sun through that great circle, the ecliption,I.e. the ecliptic. or the ring of that great wheel, the zodiac. And so the monthly changes are by the revolution of another lesser wheel within that greater annual wheel, which, being a lesser wheel, must go round oftener to make the same progress. Ezekiel's vision was of wheels within wheels, of lesser wheels within greater, which all went round as though running upon several parallel planes, each touching the circumference of its respective wheel, and all making the same progress, keeping pace one with another; and therefore the lesser wheels must go round so much oftener, according as their circumference was less. So again, the diurnal changes in the natural world are by the revolution of a wheel still within the monthly wheel, and going round about thirty times in one revolution of the other.  

So 'tis with the motion of the air in the winds; it goes and returns according to its circuits. And so it is with the motion of the water in the tides, and in their course out of the sea, and into the clouds, springs and rivers, and into the sea again. So it is with the circulation of the blood in a man's body, and the bodies of other animals. So it is with the life of man; it is like the revolution of a wheel. He is from the earth, and gradually rises, and then gradually falls, and returns to the earth again. Dust we are, and unto dust we return [Genesis 3:19]. We come naked out of our mother's womb, and naked must we go and return as we came, as it were into our mother's womb. The dust returns to earth as it was, and the spirit returns to God who gave it. So 'tis with the world of mankind; it is, the whole of it, like a wheel. It as it were sinks, and goes down to the earth in one generation, and rises in another, as 'tis with a wheel; at the same time that one side is falling to the earth, another part of the wheel is rising from the earth.

The same is true, of course, for the rational and moral elements of God's creation, that is, men and angels.

So it is in the course of things in God's providence over the intelligent and moral world; all is the motion of wheels. They go round and come to the same again; and the whole series of divine providence, from the beginning to the end, is nothing else but the revolution of certain wheels, greater and lesser, the lesser being contained within the greater. What comes to pass in the natural world is, in this respect, typical of what comes to pass in the moral and intelligent world, and seems to be so spoken of by the wise man in that forementioned place in Ecclesiastes. The words that follow next, after those that were mentioned respecting the natural world, do respect the intelligent world. Ecclesiastes 1:9–10, "The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done, is that which shall be done. And there is no new thing under the sun," etc. 

Things in their series and course in providence do as it were return to the same point or place whence they began, as in the turning of a wheel; but yet not so, but that a further end is obtained than was at first, or the same end is obtained in a much further degree. So that in the general there is a progress towards a certain final issue of things, and every revolution brings nearer to that issue, as 'tis in the motion of a wheel upon the earth, as in the motion of the wheels of a chariot, and not like the motion of a wheel by its axis, for if so, its motion would be in vain. 

The ultimate end of all these cosmic revolutions is the unfolding of God's redemptive plan to the manifestation of his glory.

The entire series of events in the course of things through the age of the visible universe may fitly be represented by one great wheel, exceeding high and terrible, performing one great revolution. In the beginning of this revolution, all things come from God, and are formed out of a chaos; and in the end, all things shall return into a chaos again, and shall return to God, so that he that is the Alpha will be the Omega. This great wheel contains a lesser wheel, that performs two revolutions while that performs one. The first begins at the beginning of the world, and ends at the coming of Christ, and at the ending of the Old Testament dispensation, which is often represented as the end of the world in Scripture. The first revolution began with the creation of the world; so the second revolution began with the creation of new heavens and a new earth.

Over against this background, Edwards expounds at length what, according to him, the wheels of Ezekiel 1 represent. I will quote here only a section of his explanation. 

The whole series of things through the age of the world may be represented as a wheel of various rings, one within another and less than another, each one going round but once, the lesser ones finishing their revolution soonest, and each beginning at the creation of the old heavens and earth, which in some respects had different beginnings, one when Adam was created, another in Noah's time, the settling of the world after the building of Babel, and another at the establishment of the Jewish state. And the revolution of each wheel ends in an end of the world, and a day of judgment, and a creation of new heavens and a new earth. The least wheel finishes its revolution at the coming of Christ, and the destruction of Jerusalem, and overthrow of the heathen empire that followed, when the world in a sense came to an end and there was a day of judgment, which began at the creation of the Jewish state in the time of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Moses, and Joshua, and the total apostasy of the Gentile world to heathenism. The next wheel, which is larger, began its revolution at Noah's coming out of the ark, and the building of Babel, and dispersing of nations, and settling the world from thence, which is as it were another beginning of the world, and ends at the destruction of Antichrist, or the spiritual Babylon, and Satan's visible kingdom on earth, which began in the building of Babel, and the commencing of the glorious times of the church. This is another end of the world, and day of judgment, and building of the new heavens and new earth. The third and greatest wheel begins its revolution at the creation, and finishes at Christ's second coming to judge the world and destroy heaven and earth, in a literal sense. 

Every wheel in every revolution begins and proceeds from God, and returns to God; as in Ezekiel's vision, God is represented as appearing above the wheels, so that to him they continually returned. God remarkably appears both in the beginning and ending of each of these wheels that have been mentioned, especially in those that respect the state of the church of God. As to human [things], such as human kingdoms and empires, they rise from the earth, and return to the ground again; but spiritual things begin their revolution from God on high, and thither they return again. 

The changes that are in the world with respect to the profession of the truth, and rise and fall of heresies, is very much like the motion of wheels; they rise and fall, and rise and fall again. 

Those wheels in this vision are represented as God's chariot wheels. The world is the chariot of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, in which he makes his progress to that glory, that glorious marriage with his spouse, that eternal feast, that everlasting kingdom of rest, and love, and joy, which the Father hath designed him. 

This chariot is drawn on those wheels by the four animals, which denote God's power, wisdom, justice, and mercy; and all proceed on calves' feet, because the great work of providence, that is as it were the sum of all providences, is that work of mercy, the work of redemption.

Edwards explains further (this time from entry 391, in Edwards, Notes on Scripture, 384-386).

What Ezekiel here saw was designed to represent God's chariot, in which God rode, and those wheels are the wheels of his chariot. And God, who sat in his throne above the firmament, over those wheels and cherubim, is represented as in the seat in which he rides, and makes progress with the wheels and cherubim. God came to Ezekiel to speak to him, and give him his mission on this chariot, and is so represented in the first chapter.

Then in the same entry, Edwards offers the following intriguing corollary.

Corol. Hence I would argue, that the affairs of heaven have doubtless great respect to the affairs of this lower world and God's providence here, and that the church in heaven, in the progress it makes in its state of glory and blessedness, keeps pace with the church on earth, that the glory of both is advanced together. Those great dispensations of providence, by which glorious things are brought to pass for the church on earth, are accompanied with like advances made at the same time in the church in heaven; and also that the affairs of the church in heaven have some way or other a dependence on God's providence towards his church on earth, and that their progress is dependent on the progress of things in God's providence towards his church here. For heaven and earth are both framed together. 'Tis the same chariot; one part has relation to another, and is connected with another, and is all moved together. The motion of one part depends on the motion of the other, The upper part moves on the wheels of the lower part, for heaven is the room and seat of the chariot that is above the firmament, that moves on the wheels that are under the firmament, and that go upon the earth. When those wheels are moved by the cherubim, then the upper part moves; when they stop, that stops; and wherever the wheels go, that goes. 'Tis on these wheels that Christ, the King of heaven, in his throne in heaven, makes progress to the final issue of all things. 'Tis on the wheels of his providence that move on earth that he, on his throne in heaven, makes progress towards the ultimate end of the creation of both heaven and earth, and the ultimate end of all the affairs of both. For this is the end of the journey of the whole chariot, both wheels and throne, for both are moving towards the same journey's end; and the motion of all is by the wheels on earth. And if so, doubtless 'tis on those wheels that all the inhabitants of heaven, both saints and angels, are carried towards their ultimate end, for all are Christ's family; they are either his servants and attendants in the affair of redemption, which is the grand movement of the wheels, and are the ministers that draw the wheels, or are his members: "member." and parts of his body. 

This therefore confirms that the saints and angels in heaven do make progress in knowledge and happiness, by what they see of God's works on earth. We know that all the happiness of the saints in heaven is entirely dependent on those great things that Christ did on earth in the work of redemption, as it was purchased by it. And there is reason to think that their knowledge and glory is, in other respects, by what they see of those great works of providence which God carries on [in] the world, in the prosecution of the grand design of redemption.

The triune God is, of course, at the center of all this as the one moving the wheels of history for the unfolding of his redemptive plan and the ad extra manifestation of his glory (from entry 393, in Edwards, Notes on Scripture, 287-288).

Ezekiel 1:4. "And I looked, and, behold, a whirlwind came out of the north, and a great cloud, and a fire enfolding itself, and a brightness was about it, and out of the midst thereof as the color of amber, out of the midst of the fire." This that was here seen by Ezekiel was the Shekinah, or the symbol and representation of the deity. Here is a cloud and fire, as God appeared in the wilderness in a pillar of cloud and fire. Psalms 18:11, "His pavilion round about him were dark waters and thick clouds of the skies." And Psalms 97:2, "Clouds and darkness are round about him." And there was a whirlwind, which was an usual symbol of the divine presence, as Job 38:1. "Then the Lord answered Job out of the whirlwind." So again Job 40:6. And Nahum 1:3, "The Lord hath his way in the whirlwind." 

The fire that appeared, which did in a special manner represent the divine essence, is said to be "a fire enfolding itself," or "catching itself," as it is in the margin [i.e. margin of the KJV] or receiving or taking itself into its own bosom, which represents the action of the deity towards itself, in the action of the persons of the TRINITY towards each other. The Godhead is perceived only by perceiving the Son and the Spirit, for "no man hath seen God at any time" [John 1:18]. He is seen by his image, the Son, and is felt by the Holy Spirit, as fire is perceived only by its light and heat, seen by one and felt by the other. Fire, by its light, represents the Son of God, and by its heat, the Holy Spirit. God is light, and he is love. This light, in the manner of the subsisting of the Father and the Son, shines on itself; it receives its own brightness into its own bosom. The deity, in the generation of the Son, shines forth with infinite brightness towards itself; and in the manner of the proceeding of the Holy Ghost, it receives all its own heat into its own bosom, and burns with infinite heat towards itself. The flames of divine love are received and enfolded into the bosom of the deity. 

'Tis the nature of all other fire to go out of itself, as it were to fly from itself, and hastily to dissipate; the flames are continually going forth from the midst of the towards the exterior air. But this fire received itself into its own bosom. 

Ezekiel saw this cloud of glory and fire enfolding, or taking in, itself, before he saw the chariot of God, the cherubims, and wheels, and firmament, and throne, and the appearance of a man above upon it which came out of that cloud and fire. And therefore this "fire enfolding itself" does especially represent the deity before the creation of the world, or before the beginning of theJE deleted "course of the wheel." being of this chariot with its wheels, when all God's acts were only towards himself, for then there was no other being but he. 

This appeared coming "out of the north," from whence usually came whirlwinds in that country, and possibly because in the north is the empty place. The chariot of the world comes forth out of nothing.

I conclude with a related and helpful summary of Edwards' view of Ezekiel 1 which explains further the trinitarian nature of Edwards' view of all things that Edwards sees in that Biblical passage.

The second notable piece of Edwards's project, expounding upon the 'God-saturated' aspect of redemption history, is his use of Ezekiel's wheels." Edwards pictured the whole of created reality like a huge clock, and just as the sun, stars and planets rotate in their orbits, so ages of history, and even individual lives, are part of a cyclical movement careening toward God's end the 'striking of the hammer at the appointed time', as Edwards would prophetically utter. Like a symphony, each wheel moves according to its role within the largest wheel—a cacophony of glorifying revolutions—accomplishing one ultimate turn of time and inaugurating God's eternal consummation. In his 'Notes on Scripture', Edwards explains: 'Things in their series and course in providence, they do as it were go round like a wheel in its motion on earth. That which goes round like a wheel goes from a certain point or direction, till it gradually returned to it again. So is the course of things in providence. He uses the zodiac, the changes in season and the yearly calendar to note the cyclical nature of time, never neglecting to highlight its fundamental teleology. Most importantly, all these 'wheels' are interconnected...

Edwards sees this movement in everything from the calendar to the circulation of blood in human bodies. As one epoch falls toward the earth, so another begins to rise, just as a wheel simultaneously hits the ground and rises from it. Likewise, all of the lesser wheels are gears within one giant wheel representing all of time. This wheel makes only one great revolution, from God and back to God ... The organization and driving force behind every other wheel is this one; everything coming from God, and everything ultimately going back to him in judgement. Notably, Edwards maps the structure of History of Redemption onto his development of Ezekiel's wheels. Each section of the redemption sermon series is represented by a wheel within the great wheel: 'The course of things from the beginning of the world to the flood may be looked upon as the revolution of a wheel ... The course of things from the flood to Abraham was as it were the revolution of another wheel, or another revolution of the same wheel.' This epochal motion in creation, ushering created reality toward eternity, narrates the broad movement of Edwards's theological vision. The eternal motion of the divine processions in the Godhead is the engine for his development, driving the economic activity of the Son and the Spirit, out of which flows the scheme of redemption. In other words, these wheels of time diligently perform their specific part according to the conductor's movement, the movement of the inner-triune life of God, who wills his economic existence for the redemption of his creation. As such, this organizing framework for Edwards's theology revolves around redemption and ultimately Christ, its centrepiece. Just as each demarcation of History of Redemption corresponds to a wheel (or revolution of that wheel), so this image would serve the theocentricity of Edwards's systematic portrayal of doctrine. His project would be 'thrown into the form of an history', but as a systematic theology, it was held together through a careful and expansive notion of the immanent and economic life of God (Kyle C. Strobel, Jonathan Edwards's Theology: A Reinterpretation, 7-9). 

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