The Preciousness of Christ's Divinity and Humanity

Art by Full of Eyes.

«What a grand and glorious truth is this to the believing soul: the absolute Deity of the Savior, the essential Godhead of Christ! How it endears Him to the heart as the Rock of ages upon which its hope is built! How precious must be every evidence of the divine strength, stability, and durability of that basis upon which the believing sinner reposes his whole salvation. Precious, then, is Christ as God. Precious in His Deity, precious as a distinct person in the adorable Godhead, precious as "God over all, blessed for evermore." But pause, Christian reader, for a moment, in wonder and praise before this august truth. If there is a spot where we should put off the shoes from our feet, surely it is this. With what profound reverence, with what silent awe, yet with what adoring love should we contemplate the GODHEAD of our Redeemer!

But this personal representation of the Lord Jesus involves also the preciousness of His manhood. His [Christ's] personal alliance with our nature, His condescending stoop to our humanity, is not the least endearing feature to the heart of His believing saints. We have claimed for the Son of God absolute Deity; we now claim for Him perfect humanity. "Flesh," real and substantial, yet, "harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners," was He "made." A humanity identical with His people in all but its original and actual sinfulness. "He knew no sin." And yet, what a sin-bearer was He! All the transgressions of His elect met upon Him! But He could only bear sin, as He himself was essentially free from its taint. Had there been the remotest breath of pollution adhering to Him- had one drop of the moral virus circulated through His veins, it had rendered Him utterly and forever incapable of presenting to the justice of God, an atonement for sin. He then would have needed, like the high priest of old, to have offered for sins "first for Himself, then for the people."

How precious, then, beloved, is our Lord Jesus as "bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh." Think of His perfect humanity, a humanity free from sin, and therefore capable of dying for the ungodly, a humanity laden with sorrow, and therefore capable of sympathizing with the afflicted. Precious to our hearts as God, precious as Man, precious as both united in one, inconceivably and eternally precious is He, whose name is "Wonderful," to His believing saints. Tell, oh tell, how precious is that humanity of the Son of God that partook, by actual participation, and still bears, by the most perfect sympathy, all the sinless weaknesses, infirmities, temptations, and sorrows of His people. Precious humanity! to which, when other human friendships are changed, and other human love is chilled, and other human sympathy is exhausted, you may repair, and find it an evergreen, a perennial stream, a gushing fountain of unchanged affection, tenderness, and sympathy, meeting and satisfying, to their utmost capacity, your hearts' deep pantings! Precious humanity! that dries each tear, that bears each burden, that is touched with each infirmity, that soothes each sorrow, and that succours each temptation of His people. "In all things it behooved Him to be made like unto His brethren, that He might be a merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining to God, to make reconciliation for the sins of His people. For in that He himself has suffered being tempted, He is able to succor those who are tempted."

Oh, love the Lord, then, all you His saints; laud Him, all you His people; and, in all your deep griefs, your lonely sorrows, your sore trials, your fiery temptations, your pressing needs, your daily infirmities, repair to the succourings, and the sympathies, and the intercessions of His humanity, and learn how precious Jesus can be to the hearts of His suffering and sorrowing ones. Upon this rock of Christ's complex person God has built His Church, and the gates of hell cannot prevail against it.» 

 ~ Octavius Winslow, The Precious Things of God, 

chapter 1, pages 6-7, 8-11.

T. F. Torrance on Realism and Idealism

As I have been studying and thinking about Christian theistic realism and Christian theistic phenomenalistic idealism, I have come across a discussion by Thomas F. Torrance (1913–2007). He was a realist of some sort. Independently of his position (which I don't necessarily share), while presenting his own view, Torrance also makes some very interesting remarks on the alleged contrast and conflict between "realism" and "idealism."

The contrast between realism and idealism, implied in the use of either term, evidently has its source in the distinction we make between subject and object, idea and reality, or sign and thing signified. This is a natural operation of the human mind, for it belongs to the essence of rational behavior that we can distinguish ourselves as knowing subjects from the objects of our knowledge, and can employ ideas or words to refer to or signify realities independent of them. Normally our attention in knowing, speaking, listening, or reading is not focused upon the ideas or words we use, far less upon ourselves, but upon the realities they signify or indicate beyond themselves. Hence in our regular communication with one another we use and interpret signs in the light of their objective reference. Thus the natural operation of the human mind would appear to be realist. 

We use these distinctions, then, between subject and object, idea and reality, or sign and thing signified, naturally and unreflectingly, and only turn a critical eye upon them when something arises to obscure signification, such as a break in the semantic relation. Much now depends upon where the emphasis falls, upon the signifying pole or the objective pole of the semantic relation. that is, upon idea or reality, upon sign or thing signified. In this state of affairs the contrast between idealism and realism arises out of an oscillation in emphasis from one pole of the semantic relation to the other. The distinction sharpens into a conflict, however, when the two poles are extended to a breaking point or when the relation between them is disrupted through some dichotomy of thought. However, since the relation between idea and reality or sign and thing signified is never completely severed, there seems to be a regular tendency, as one extreme position is corrected in respect of the other, for each to pass over into the other, to that idealism sometimes passes over into a form of realism and realism passes over into a form of idealism. For example, in the dialectical relation that arises out of a split between theoretical and empirical factors in natural science, an emphasis upon mathematics separated from experience may end up in a mechanical and materialist understanding of the world, while an emphasis upon sense experience as the ultimate ground of knowledge may end up in a rationalist empiricism or even a conventionalism. Virtually the same dialectic arises in theology between radically divergent approaches to the understanding of Christ traditionally characterized as "dark" and "ebionice," for in modern as in ancient Christologities each tends to turn into a form of the other.

It may be noted that when the semantic relation between idea and reality or between sign and thing signified is not completely severed but only damaged, our thought nevertheless becomes trapped in distorting ambiguities which require correction. It is within the context of this problematic state of affairs, and on the ground of some form of epistemological dualism that underlies it, that coherence and correspondence theories of truth have continually been thrown up in the history of thought. Who has always been at stake is a distorting refraction in the ontological substructure of knowledge. The lesson that is constantly being taught is that there can be no satisfactory theory of truth within the brackets of a dualist frame of thought, for it can only yield the oscillating dialectic between coherence and correspondence. There can be no way forward except through a rejection of dualist modes of thought in an integration of empirical and theoretical components in knowledge and of form and being in our understanding of reality. That would restore the integrity of the semantic reference of idea and sign to reality, in which reality would have objective priority over all our conceiving and speaking of it. Strictly speaking, the contrast, let alone the conflict, between realism and idealism would not then arise, nor would the distinction between a coherence and a correspondence view of truth which depends on a disjunction between form and being. 

To return to the meaning of realism, we shall use the term, not in an attenuated dialectical sense merely in contrast to idealism, nominalism, or conventionalism, but to describe the orientation in thought that obtains in semantics, science, or theology on the basis of a nondualist or unitary relation between the empirical and theoretical ingredients in the structure of the real world and in our knowledge of it. This is an epistemic orientation of the two-way relation between the subject and object poles of thought and speech, in which ontological primacy and control are naturally accorded to reality over all our conceiving and speaking of it. (T. F. Torrance, Reality and Evangelical Theology: The Realism of Christian Revelation, 58-60)

Reading Augustine for who has little time

Augustine of Hippo (354–430) is a key theologian and philosopher than anyone interested in Christian theology and philosophy needs to read, at the very least to some extent. However, for many of us, the busyness of life does not give us the time to approach the rewarding reading of this North African thinker. Moreover, the gigantic Augustinian corpus might be intimidating, and one might be confused on where to start: "Augustine wrote over one hundred treatises, countless sermons, and more than five million words in all” (Levering, The Theology of Augustine, xi).

There are some Augustinian anthologies that can help in this noble pursuit. They are anthologies, that is, collections of quotations from Augustinian primary sources. They are not expositions of Augustine's thought, and, therefore, they do not provide expositions of Augustine's own life or his historical and intellectual context. But the reader should not be discouraged, as I believe it is sufficient to get a basic grasp of Augustine's life from any trusted source to enjoy these anthologies.

• An Augustine Synthesis, by Erich Przwara. This anthology is structured in a philosophically fascinating way. The book provides a sufficiently comprehensive picture of Augustine's Christian philosophy. This is the lengthiest and most challengingly divided anthology of the three listed here.
• What Augustine Says, by Norman Geisler. Somewhat like Przwara's book, but shorter and with a division of topics that will probably be more familiar and approachable to most people.
• The Triumph of Grace: Augustine's Writings on Salvation, by N. R. Needham. A superb collection of texts from Augustine's works. The book is thematically divided into chapters which are, in turn, briefly introduced. An ideal place to start to see Augustine's God-centered view of salvation.

These anthologies offer short nuggets from Augustine's writings so that the reader (especially the beginner) can gradually acquire, through small daily doses, a good understanding of Augustine's Christian thought (as for all things, a little patience and perseverance are also required).

Tolle lege.

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Some Edwardsean Book Reviews

In the last few years, I have accumulated a few reviews of books on Jonathan Edwards. At the moment I am reading The Thought of Jonathan Edwards by Miklos Veto. The book is both lengthy and rich. Therefore, it will take me some time before I finish my review.

In the meantime, I will list here all the Edwardsean reviews I have written so far, from the oldest to the newest.

• Harry S. Stout (General Editor), Kenneth P. Minkema and Adriaan C. Neele (Associate Editors), The Jonathan Edwards Encyclopedia.
• John J. Bombaro, Jonathan Edwards's Vision of Reality: The Relationship of God to the World, Redemption History, and the Reprobate.
• Steven M. Studebaker, Amos Yong, eds., Pentecostal Theology and Jonathan Edwards. In Jonathan Edwards Studies, Vol 11, No 1 (2021).
• Peter B. Jung, ed., Free Will: Jonathan Edwards’ Psychological, Ethical, and Theological Philosophy in his Freedom of the Will.
• Avihu Zakai, Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of Nature: The Re-enchantment of the World in the Age of Scientific Reasoning.
• John Carrick, Jonathan Edwards and the Immediacy of God.

What follows are reviews of books with some significant connections to Edwards.

• Robert L. Boss, Joshua R. Farris, S. Mark Hamilton, eds., New England Dogmatics: A Systematic Collection of Questions and Answers in Divinity by Maltby Gelston (1766-1865).
• Joshua R. Farris (Editor), S. Mark Hamilton  (Editor), and James S. Spiegel (General Editor), Idealism and Christian Theology: Idealism and Christianity: Volume 1.
• Michael Patrick Preciado, A Reformed View of Freedom: The Compatibility of Guidance Control and Reformed Theology.
• Paul Helm, Reforming Free Will: A Conversation on the History of Reformed Views.

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Edwards' Among the Re-Enchanters: A Book Review

The full title of the book by Avihu Zakai that I am reviewing here is Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of Nature: The Re-enchantment of the World in the Age of Scientific Reasoning. Judging by the title alone, one might think that this book is exclusively about Jonathan Edwards' philosophy of nature. However, this first impression is proved wrong by the very first pages of the book.

The key category of this book is "re-enchantment" (nothing to do with magic or sorcery), a concept that Zakai has used also in his previous monograph, Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of History: The Reenchantment of the World in the Age of Enlightenment. With "re-enchantment," Zakai refers to Edwards' attempt "to provide a philosophical and theological alternative to mechanical philosophy that would take into account his profound religious and theological persuasions regarding God's sovereignty and the divine presence in the worlds" (Zakai, Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of History, 118). But Edwards was not the only one engaged in the re-enchantment of reality, and Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of Nature contains fascinating discussions of a few of these re-enchanters.

In the Introduction the author tells us that the aim of the "study is to place Edwards's writings on natural philosophy in the broad historical, theological, and scientific context of a wide variety of religious responses to the rise of the New Philosophy of nature in the early modern period (focusing on astronomy, cosmology, and physics)" (1). More specifically, the context that Zakai plans to describe is composed by John Donne, Blaise Pascal, John Edwards (not to be confused with Jonathan Edwards), Robert Greene, G. W. Leibniz, Jonathan Swift, William Blake, and George Berkeley (although Zakai mentions and/or briefly discusses others, namely, Giordano Bruno, the Cambridge Platonists, the Physico-Theologians, Nicolas Malebranche, Pierre Gassendi, Alexander Pope, and a few others). Before doing that, however, some historical and intellectual background needs to be set forth.

The author does that in chapter 1, titled "Philosophia ancilla theologiae: Science and Religion in Jonathan Edwards's Thought." The chapter discusses the affinities between Edwards' thought and some general characteristics of Medieval, Scholastic, and Renaissance thought: theology as regina scientiarum (queen of the sciences), philosophia ancilla theologiae (philosophy/science as handmaid of theology), scala naturae (the great chain of being), omnia videmus in Deo (we see all things in God), and theatrum Dei gloria (the natural world as the theater of God's glory). Of course, there are specific qualifications and differences between Edwards and the several past approaches on those issues, but those are not the point and they do not damage Zakai's thesis. Through the exposition of the points I just listed, Zakai correctly shows how Edwards is significantly tied to the Christian theology and philosophy that preceded him.

Chapter 2, "The Rise of Modern Science and the Decline of Theology as the «‘Queen of Sciences,’" is an account of how the development of the "New Philosophy of nature" during the 16th and 17th centuries undermined both the previous view of God and nature and the relationship between theology and science. The author does that by expounding the principles of the respective philosophies of science of Galileo Galilei, Francis Bacon, Isaac Newton, and others.

Chapter 3, "‘All Coherence Gone’—Donne and the 'New Philosophy' of Nature." John Donne, although perhaps not philosophically ingenious as the kind of Edwards and Leibniz, was nonetheless very knowledgeable about the philosophical and scientific ideas of his age (107-111). Zakai shows how, armed with that knowledge, the metaphysical poet used his artistic skills to offer a picture of "the disturbing effects of the New Philosophy upon the human imagination, or more specifically upon traditional definition and formation of religious identities, during the modern era" (6).

Chapter 4, "‘God of Abraham’ and ‘not of philosophers’: Pascal against the Philosophers' Disenchantment of the World," focuses on Pascal's polemics against the prevalent Early Modern philosophy of science which. For Zakai, "Pascal's Pensées are not only an ‘Apology for the Christian Religion’ in the strict sense but also a staunch defense of the Christian worldview, a reaffirmation of traditional Christian thought and belief with respect to God, the human condition, nature, and history," a work where Pascal is "resisting the demystifying of nature and the emptying of the world of theological considerations" (7).

Chapter 5, "Religion and the Newtonian Universe," begins with an exposition of Newton's, Clarke's, and others' unorthodox theological views which tended to Arianism and Socinianism and which were propounded by such thinkers as "rational," contrary (so they claimed) to the orthodox views. After that, the author expounds John Edwards', Greene's, Leibniz's, Swift's, and Blake's reactions to the new philosophy of nature. These accounts are important inasmuch as they place Edwards in an international intellectual context where several thinkers attempted in different ways to re-enchant that reality that the new philosophy of nature detached from God and his activity.

Chapters 6 and 7 directly discuss Edwards' philosophy of nature. They are the core of Zakai's book in that they constitute (combined with his Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of History) Zacki's contribution "to restore Edwards to his due prominence in early modern philosophy" (232).

Chapter 6 contains good summaries of some of the "prevailing errors of the present day" (WJEO 16:727). These errors are some of Edwards's main targets, namely, deism, the new philosophy of nature, and the British school of Moral Sense. In addition to that, Zacki explains how Edwards' doctrine of God, philosophy of nature, and moral philosophy can be properly appreciated only when considered within this polemical context and as direct answers and alternatives to the three errors.

Chapter 7, "Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of Nature: The Re-Enchantment of the World in the Age of Scientific Reasoning," Zacki analyzes Edwards' philosophy of nature as a response to the new philosophy of nature's attempt to disenchant the world by detaching it from God and his sovereignty. More specifically, the chapter expounds how Edwards' discussions of the atomic doctrine, the laws of nature, the relationship between God and the world, the nature of creation, and idealism constituted Edwards' attempt to construct a global and universally theistic view of the nature of reality to oppose to the prevailing mechanistic philosophy. According to Zaki, this is what makes Edwards a universal philosopher worthy to have a significant position in the history of early modern philosophy and theology.

Jonathan Edwards

He [Edwards] was a bold and independent philosopher who engaged with Enlightenment ideas, attempted to understand the constitution of the natural world and ascertain God’s relation to the physical world. Nowhere is his force of mind more evident than in his reaction against the dominant scientific culture and imagination of his time—mechanical philosophy, the doctrine that all natural phenomena can be explained and understood by the mere mechanics of matter and motion—and, consequently, in his quest to provide a meaningful philosophical and theological alternative to the mechanistic explanation of the essential nature of reality, an alternative that reconstituted the glory of God’s absolute sovereignty, power, and will within creation. Through idealistic philosophy and natural typology, Edwards sought to mount a counteroffensive to materialist, mechanistic thought. In that way he constructed a teleological and theological alternative to the prevailing mechanistic interpretation of the essential nature of reality, whose ultimate goal was the re-enchantment of the world by reconstituting the glory of God's majestic sovereignty, power, and will within the order of creation. (234) 

Minor Criticisms
"Bad news" first. The problems I see with this volume are minor, and most likely they are not even intentional on Zakai's part. However, they might cause misunderstandings in some readers. Therefore, with the risk of sounding pedantic, I will list them here as briefly as I can.

Zakai often mentions the "undemonstrated truths of faith" (40, 56, 76, 83). With no further qualification, "undemonstrated" is an ambiguous term, and it will meet the disapproval of virtually any Christian apologist, Edwards included. Scientific "demonstrated" truths (79, 64) is equally ambiguous: it is enough to consider how significantly science has changed from the Early Modern period.

In my modest opinion, Francis Bacon's (and others') philosophical assumptions are not presented for what they are, that is, strict empiricist assumptions under the pretense of "scientific" objectivity.

"Bacon is right that we can think we know something just because we have a word for it. We ought to be careful not to let words direct our thoughts. But Bacon s arbitrary in his choice of criteria for accepting words as meaningful or not. As Bacon adopts an empirical method, those words are fictitious whose objects cannot be verified by sense experience. This rules out many abstract terms (good, just, right, form, thing) as well as words referring to immaterial realities. This is an arbitrary restriction unless Bacon can show that empirical verification is the only standard for affirming something as meaningful, which he cannot do and still claim that his new idea (which like all ideas is not verifiable by the senses) is to be affirmed as meaningful." ~ Montague Brown, Restoration of Reason, 20 (see also 25-27).

Of course, one cannot say everything that there is to say, and I am going slightly beyond the stated goals of Zakai's volume. However, considering how prominent Bacon's philosophical presuppositions are in his philosophy of nature, at least a brief reference to this fact would have been appropriate.

Relatedly, the distinction between science and philosophy of science is not always properly assumed. What Bacon, Isaac Newton, and others proposed was not simply new scientific discoveries, but also a new philosophy of nature. The latter did not correspond with and did not necessarily follow from the former. Bacon and Newton did not divorce "physics and science in general form philosophy" (176) simply because this is impossible to do (even Kant, with all his faults, realized that to a certain degree, as it can be seen in the Preface of his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, 8-9, 14). In fact, considering the great scientific knowledge of men such as Leibniz and Edwards, it can be argued that they criticised not simply "the metaphysical and theological implications" (232, emphasis added) of the new philosophy of nature, but also its hidden philosophical assumptions.

Finally, chapter 4 on Pascal (although good) seems at times to depict Pascal as a sort of skeptic who blindly forsakes his reason and abandons himself to faith (128, 133, 139, 144-145). I am not saying this was intentional. However, such a picture can still risk to mischaracterize Pascal (and quoting Voltaire and Jorge Louis Borges, great men of literature but poor philosophers, does not help). I believe that it is more faithful to Pascal's life and Pensées to develop the idea that Pascal, not in spite of but (also) because of his superb scientific skills, realized the limits of science and, for that reason, he came "to see natural sciences from a broader perspective" (D. R. Groothuis, On Pascal, 25), and to oppose those who ascribed  to science abilities that it does not possess.

Strengths
Zakai uses his vast learning and a conspicuous academic apparatus in order to place Edwards in a group of selected re-enchanters of reality with transcendence. Zakai uses these thinkers as representatives of a general response to the new philosophy of nature. This contextualization is very helpful, especially for those who will read Edwards himself. This is because Zakai shows how Edwards frequents attacks on the new philosophy of nature, deism, mechanism, etc., are not the fixation of a minister obsessed with old ideas. Rather, these polemics are part of the sophisticated system of a thinker who was well aware of the great turn that Western thought was taking. And he was far from being the only one. In their own respective ways (and, in the case of a couple of them, with some exaggerations), all these reality re-enchanters attempted to proclaim that, contrary to the claims of many of their influential contemporaries, God is not only compatible with, but also necessary for, a view of reality that is both rational and existentially significant. 

G. W. Leibniz and George Berkeley

Zakai offers short comparisons between Edwards and Leibniz and Edwards and Berkeley, and the author emphasizes some of the general similarities between Edwards and the two philosophers from the Old World. This is both a strength and a weakness of the book (again, I am aware one cannot say everything there is to say). These comparisons are productive, but they leave the reader slightly unsatisfied because of their brevity. Considering the substantial similarity between some of Leibniz's, Edwards', and Berkeley's concerns and objectives, Leibniz and Berkeley probably deserved a separate chapter each. More extended and detailed comparisons of these common concerns and goals against the background of giants such as Leibniz and Berkeley would have contributed to highlight more Edwards' deserved place among Leibniz's and Berkeley's rank, or, to quote what Zakai himself says elsewhere, to give Edwards "a dis­tin­guished place among early mod­ern philoso­phers who reacted against the meta­phys­i­cal and the­o­log­i­cal impli­ca­tions that often accom­pa­nied the appearance of new modes of sci­en­tific thought and imag­i­na­tion from the six­teenth to the eigh­teenth cen­turies."

For the very reasons I just mentioned, this book might also help those who are inclined to over-emphasise (and, in a few  cases, maximise) the "parting of the way" hypothesis, that is, the real and alleged irreconcilable differences between the thought of Edwards and that of the Reformed orthodox before him. Edwards' deep awareness of the international situation of Western thought, the historical timeliness of his proposal, and the philosophically comprehensive scope of his project will, perhaps, encourage a more irenic consideration of his genius, and lead to the realization that Edwards is much more than a too often parochial "continuity-discontinuity with the Reformed Scholastics" reading.

The variety of thinkers and points of view discussed in the book might not appear attractive to some readers. However, if the goal is to understand Edwards better as a universal philosopher, such minor inconvenience is a very small price to pay while reading this very informative volume. 

Conclusion
Some of the thinkers discussed in Zakai's Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of Nature are prominent Christian thinkers with some of the greatest imaginations that can be found. Imagination does not have to be taken in a pejorative sense. Quite the opposite. Imagination here is intended as an important function of the mind, "the organ of meaning" (C. S. Lewis), "that distinctly human capacity by which we image anything and everything that is not immediately visible to our eyes" (Wilbourne), "the ability to grasp the way things fit together—the capacity of beholding wholes" (Vanhoozer). 

Especially (but not exclusively) in the case of Edwards, his ability to see and grasp all things as united to the God-man Jesus Christ inevitably led him, not only to strongly oppose the errors of his days, but also to offer a vast and fascinating Christocentric view of reality. Zakai's Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of Nature is a good sequel of his Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of History. The former (like the latter) will help to gain a contextual understanding of the significance of Edwards' magnificent view of reality. I recommend it.

“The emanation or communication of the divine fullness, consisting in the knowledge of God, love to God, and joy in God, has relation indeed both to God and the creature: but it has relation to God as its fountain, as it is an emanation from God; and as the communication itself, or thing communicated, is something divine, something of God, something of his internal fullness; as the water in the stream is something of the fountain; and as the beams are of the sun. And again, they have relation to God as they have respect to him as their object: for the knowledge communicated is the knowledge of God; and so God is the object of the knowledge: and the love communicated, is the love of God; so God is the object of that love: and the happiness communicated, is joy in God; and so he is the object of the joy communicated. In the creature's knowing, esteeming, loving, rejoicing in, and praising God, the glory of God is both exhibited and acknowledged; his fullness is received and returned. Here is both an emanation and remanation. The refulgence shines upon and into the creature, and is reflected back to the luminary. The beams of glory come from God, and are something of God, and are refunded back again to their original. So that the whole is of God, and in God, and to God; and God is the beginning, middle and end in this affair.” ~ Jonathan Edwards.

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Review copy kindly provided by Bloomsbury.

Henry Scougal on Love, Hatred, and Disagreement

Source: Works of the Rev. Henry Scougal
(1650–1678).

We come next to the enemies of our religion; and indeed there are many who are so far from thinking them to be among the number of those whom they are obliged to love, that they look upon it as a part of their duty to hate and malign them. Their zeal is continually venting itself in fierce invectives against Antichrist, and everything they are pleased to call Antichristian; and they are ready to apply all the prophecies and imprecations of the Old Testament, in their very prayers, against those that differ from them. And ordinarily the animosities are greatest where the differences are least, and one party of a reformed church shall be more incensed against another, than either against the superstition and tyranny of Rome, or the carnality of the Mahometan faith. Yea, perhaps you may find some who agree in opinion, and only differ in several ways of expressing the same thing, and yet can scarce look on one another without displeasure and aversion. But, alas! how much do these men disparage that religion for which they appear so zealous, how much do they mistake the spirit of Christianity!

Are the persons whom they hate, greater enemies to religion, than those who persecuted the Apostles and martyrs for professing it? And yet these were the persons whom our Saviour commanded his disciples to love: and himself did pray for those that crucified him; and severely checked the disciples, when, by a precedent brought from the Old Testament, they would have called for fire from heaven on those who would not receive them ; telling them, They knew not what spirit they were of: i. e. They did not consider by what spirit they were prompted to such cruel inclinations; or, as others explain it, they did not yet sufficiently understand the temper and genius of Christianity; which is pure and peaceable, gentle and meek: full of sweetness, and full of love. If men would impartially examine their hatred and animosity against the enemies of their religion, I fear they would find them proceed from a principle which themselves would not willingly own. 

Pride and self-conceit will make a man disdain those of a different persuasion, and think it a disparagement. We may to his judgment, that any should differ from it. Mere nature and self-love will make a man hate those who oppose the interest and advancement of that party which himself has espoused. Hence men are many times more displeased at some small mistakes in judgment, than the greatest immoralities in practice; yea, perhaps, they will find a secret pleasure, and wicked satisfaction, in hearing or reporting the faults or scandal of their adversaries. Certainly the power of religion rightly prevailing in the soul, would mould us into another temper: it would teach us to love and pity, and pray for the person, as well as hate and condemn the errors they are supposed to espouse: it would make us wish their conversion rather than their confusion; and be more desirous that God would fit them for another world, than that he would take them out of this. indeed wish the disappointment of their wicked purposes; for this is charity to them, to keep them from being the unhappy instruments of mischief in the world: but he that can wish plagues and ruin to their persons, and delights in their sins, or in their misery, hath more of the devil than the Christian.

 ~ Henry Scougal, “The Indispensable Duty of Loving our Enemies,” in Works of the Rev. Henry Scougal, 143-144. 

Legal Preaching

“John 1:29: ‘Behold the Lamb of God,
who takes away the sins of the world.’
John saw in Bethany
who Moses heard on Sinai.”
From Full of Eyes.

We are led to think that there are some points on which all our hearts and consciences need to be more earnestly impressed, and these points we believe to be connected with the requirements and denunciations of the law of God. 

But, there is a dread of legal preaching. If, by this phrase be meant, the preaching which fosters the hope of salvation because of our obedience to the law, such preaching is most solemnly proscribed in Scripture, for it is destructive of the very elements of the gospel. We are persuaded, however, that men would never venture on such preaching, if they understood the law of God; neither did others understand it, could they endure to listen to such preaching. The best antidote to these delusions, then, is an exposition of the law, in all the breadths and lengths of its requirements. 

But, if by legal preaching is meant, the faithful and fervid enforcement of these commands on every man's conscience, as the standard by which he is to walk now, and to be judged hereafter, whence, we demand, the dread of such a style of preaching? Surely not from an enlightened regard to the honour of God; we know nothing of that honour, but as we study and obey his law. Surely, not from, an enlightened attachment to the gospel; we do not understand the gospel, but as it enlarges our conceptions of the divine law, and constrains us to fulfil it. If the gospel had not been intended to exalt the character of the law in our esteem, to enhance its authority, and, by relieving the conscience from the guilt of having broken it, to influence the heart to a steady observance of its precepts, the whole genius of the gospel must have been the reverse of what it is. In proportion as the law is explained, and really understood, God is honoured; the conscience is enlightened; the gospel is valued; the necessity of holiness is acknowledged; the grief of penitence is awakened; the corruption of the heart is felt; the atonement of the Saviour is embraced; the influence of the Spirit is implored; the heart is purified; the soul is saved. These are the objects for which we preach; and, with a view to these, in reliance on that blessing, without which our efforts must be useless, we purpose, with special minuteness and fidelity, to illustrate and enforce, in some following discourses, the laws of God. They will be found to meet all the subtleties of the heart, and to affect all the relations we sustain, whether towards God, as our Creator and Governor, or towards each other, in the various connexions and dependencies of the present state. They will derive illustration from the pages of history, and from passing events; will be enforced by all the motives that can touch the conscience, influence the affections, or persuade the will; and will have a distinct reference to the disclosures of the last day, and the decisions of eternity.

~ William Hendry Stowell, The Ten Commandments Illustrated and Enforced on Christian Principles (1825), Introductory Lecture, pages 4-5.