"When someone starts to tinker with the doctrine of God, many simply assume that very clever people are engaged in improving tradition." ~ C. R. Trueman, in God without Passions: A Reader, 16.
From several conversations I have had and comments I have read on social media, I have noticed that many today's revisionists of the doctrine of God (those who reject the classical attributes of God, such as immutability, impassibility, etc.) often like to say that, since one of the themes of a Biblical passage (such as Mal. 3:6 and Psalm 102) is God's relational faithfulness, then the passage tells us nothing or little about the being of God, thus giving no or little basis to make ontological predications about God (here, I will use mutualism and theistic personalism as synonyms). However, this attitude is also present in many academic environments, as exemplified, one instance among many, in N. Wolterstorff's famous "God Everlasting," in God and the Good, 181-203. I wonder if this rather widespread assumption is also caused by the fabricated antithesis that many place between exegesis and systematic theology (as expounded, among many examples that could be mentioned, in the words of N. T. Wright; see Steven Duby for a much better perspective on this). I personally believe that that is one factor. Differently, good and Biblical classical theism does not engage in this sort of unsubstantiated claim (and the ones that will be expounded in here). Rather, it exegetes the Scripture in its entirety, whatever the passage may be.
The conclusions of the assumption mentioned above are a non sequitur. That God's faithfulness might be the main theme of a Biblical passage does not logically imply that that passage does not offer substantial material for our systematic theology of God. Carl F. H. Henry comments Wolterstorff's claims as follows.
"The prophet [Malachi] could surely have found, as Old Testament writers do elsewhere, a less circuitous way of stressing God's unswerving fidelity, had that been his exclusive concern ... Furthermore, Wolterstorff's insistence that 'no ontological claim whatever is being made' [in Mal. 3:6 and Psalm 102] prompts the question whether divine moral consistency is to be conceived as a nonontological predication: constancy of nature is what immutability is all about ... The second text cited by Wolterstorff is Psalm 102:37 ... We should note, unlike perishing and changeable things and creatures, God, adds the Psalmist, is unchanging: 'Thou art the same.' The declaration that God remains 'the same' would be an odd and curiously indirect way of saying that God has unending existence. Wolterstorff's interpretation rests on his antecedent bias against divine immutability." ~ C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, and Authority, Vol. V, 293.
Then, Henry continues by quoting a passage from Stephen Charnock's commentary on Psalm 102 as found in his famous The Existenceence and Attributes of God. In this Psalm, God and creation are clearly compared ontologically, as Charnock's contextual exegesis shows
"'Thou art the same' (Psalm 102:27). The essence of God, with all the perfections of his nature, are pronounced the same, without any variation from eternity to eternity; so that the text doth not only assert the eternal duration of God, but his immutability in that duration. His eternity is signified in that expression, 'Thou shalt endure;' his immutability in this, 'Thou art the same.' To endure, argues indeed his immutability as well as eternity; for what endures, is not changed, and what is changed, doth not endure; but 'Thou art the same' doth more fully signify it. He could not be the same if he could be changed into any other thing than what he is; the Psalmist therefore puts not thou halt been, or shalt be, but thou art the same, without any alteration. 'Thou art the same;' that is, the same God; the same in essence and nature; the same in will and purpose. Thou dost change all other things as thou pleanest, but thou art immutable in every respect, and receivest no shadow of change, though never so light and small. The Psalmist here alludes to the name Jehovah, I Am; and doth not only ascribe immutability to God, but exclude everything else from partaking in that perfection. All things else are tottering; God sees all other things in continual motion under his feet, like water passing away and no more seen; while he remains fixed and immovable; his wisdom and power, his knowledge and will, are always the same. His essence can receive no alteration, neither by itself, nor by any external cause; whereas other things either naturally decline to destruction, pass from one term to another, till they come to their period; or shall at the last day be wrapped up, after God hath completed his will in them and by them, as a man doth a garment he intends to repair and transform to another use. So that in the text, God, as immutable, is opposed to all creatures as perishing and changeable." ~ S. Charnock, The Existence and Attributes of God, Discourse 5, On the Immutability of God.The question-begging assumption at issue also goes against common sense in that it fabricates an unnecessary and unrealistic airtight separation between "being" and "relationship," between "nature" and "action," between "essence" and "will." In fact, we intuitively know that the essential character of person x is also predicated by the kind of things x does or likes and by the kinds of persons that x communes with. For example, if x has a flourishing and functional marriage with woman y (a woman that has a certain specific essential character, specific attitudes, habits, specific, etc.) this tells us a lot about the kind of person x himself is. Similarly, if x has dysfunctional relationships caused by bad repeated actions and habits, this tells us a lot about the kind of person x is. Such radical separation between "nature" and "relationship" is counterintuitive, artificial, and it does not fit at all within a Scriptural framework. It is a metaphysical assumption imported in the Scriptures that, as far as I know, mutualists are very far from having demonstrated. As Jonathan Edwards pointed out, the acts and volitions that our nature produces through our will guided by our mind (including the acts and volitions of God's relationships with His people) are not causally isolated monads that tell us nothing or little about the kind of being we are. Rather, the necessary moral connection between a being's nature and his acts and volitions offer us much substantial information about the essential nature of that being. Common people intuitively make a necessary connection between a virtuous or vicious action with a virtuous or vicious nature. This necessary moral connection between an action and its moral agent is established with good reason, since choices are our properties, they belong to us, and they represent us, and, in a sense, they are us (see Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 182, 320-333, 427-428; Original Sin, 224). And if this is true for man, this is even truer for God who is perfect and lacks nothing and whose redeeming works always faithfully represent His nature.
These are some of the reasons why Mal. 3:6 and Jam. 1:17 tells us: "I am the Lord, I change not; therefore ye sons of Jacob are not consumed," and "Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning;" that is, God does not consume the sons of Jacob and is always ready to listen and answer prayers (God's merciful faithfulness) because He does not change in His being, and conversely, since He does not change in His being, so His plan of salvation that "he hath purposed in himself" even "before the foundation of the world" (Eph. 1:9, 4) does not change. Baines and Garrick comment Mal. 3:6 as follows.
It is easy to see that this question-begging assumption tactically works quite well in favour of the mutualist theist. In fact, what makes the revisionist assumption in question even more implausible is that it would have the rather curious result that the entire Bible tells us little or nothing about God's being, since covenantal language is present throughout the entire Scripture, from Gen. 3:15 to Rev. 21:3. As I hinted above, the modern mutualist's move is quite similar to the move of Edwards' deistic adversary: as the deist made the Bible exclusively and strictly about human history (which supposedly rules out divine origin and intervention), so the mutualist makes the Bible exclusively and strictly about God's relation to His people intended in a mutualistic way (thus supposedly ruling out at the very outset the classical Scriptural understanding of God). Thus, by assuming this mutualistic metaphysical presupposition, the mutualist naturally excludes from Scripture any content that contrast with that assumes framework, including, of course, sound and Biblical classical theism. In fact (and quite tellingly), the mutualist does not claim that the specific passages in question (such as 1 Sam. 15:29, Psalm 102, Mal. 3:6, Jam. 1:17, from here called A) do not teach anything at all about God's being, but the mutualist claims that these passages do that only within the limits of the mutualistic and mutabilist assumption here discussed. Let us further analyse this last point.
In addition to what I have expounded in the previous paragraph, mutualists often point at passages such as Gen. 18:23-33 and Exo. 32:7-14 (from here called B) where Abraham and Moses pray the Lord for mercy. Usually, the mutualist approaches these texts with an attitude very similar to the one that positivists have when it comes to science and empirical evidence: they claim a sort of absolute objectivity and neutrality. The concept of "a natural reading of the passage" is often mentioned, that is, a "natural reading" of these passages that supposedly teaches the mutability of God, at least in certain respects. Often, little or none exegesis is given for this kind of passages, and a mutualistic view of God is simply assumed as the clear teaching of the passages. However, when it comes to passages such as B and similar, the "natural reading" approach conveniently disappears, and it is thoroughly substituted by acrobatic exegesis aimed at not making those passages saying what they say, that is, that God is immutable in His being. This is one side of the arbitrary and self-contradictory exegetical approach of old and new theistic mutualism.
"Mal. 3:6 is parallel in structure, each term of the first clause corresponding to one in the second. Thus 'I' corresponds to 'you,' 'the LORD' to 'sons of Jacob,' and 'do not change' corresponds to 'are not consumed.' Further, these clauses relate to each other as cause and effect. This is shown by the first word of the verse ('for') and the logical conjunction ('therefore') that introduces the second clause. It is because the LORD does not change that the sons of Jacob are not consumed. God’s claim of changelessness is not limited by the text. It is not any one attribute in particular to which he refers. God is speaking of his one, simple nature as God, YHWH." ~ R. S. Baines and S. Garrick, in Confessing the Impassible God, 132-133Then, the two authors go on by quoting John Calvin's commentary on Mal. 3:6.
"Here the Prophet more clearly reproves and checks the impious waywardness of the people; for God, after having said that he would come and send a Redeemer, though not such as would satisfy the Jews, now claims to himself what justly belongs to him, and says that he changes not, because he is God. Under the name Jehovah, God reasons from his own nature; for he sets himself, as we have observed in our last lecture, in opposition to mortals; nor is it a wonder that God here disclaims all inconsistency, since the impostor Balaam was constrained to celebrate God’s immutable constancy — 'For he is not God,' he says, 'who changes,' or varies, 'like man.' (Num 23:19.) We now then understand the force of the words, I am Jehovah. But he adds as an explanation, I change not, or, I am not changed ... God continues in his purpose, and is not turned here and there like men who repent of a purpose they have formed, because what they had not thought of comes to their mind, or because they wish undone what they have performed, and seek new ways by which they may retrace their steps. God denies that anything of this kind can take place in him, for he is Jehovah, and changes not, or is not changed." ~ J. Calvin, Commentary on Malachi 3:6.I find that the theistic personalist assumption in question is in principle quite similar to one of the common objection of the deists of old according to which, since the Bible has a strong historical character, then it cannot contain or teach divine truths and it cannot be therefore divine (I am not comparing mutualists to deists, I am only comparing two of their respective principles). To this kind of asburd objection, Jonathan Edwards answered that "to object against a book's being divine merely because it is historical is a silly objection, just as if that could not be the word of God that gives us an account of what is past, or as though it was not reasonable to suppose that God, in a revelation he should give mankind, would go to give us any relation of the dispensations of his own providence" (Jonathan Edwards, A History of the Work of Redemption, Sermon 13, 284). In a similar way, to object that the Bible is about God's faithfulness and then to conclude that, therefore, classical theism is not thought therein, is an absurd objection that entirely begs the question.
It is easy to see that this question-begging assumption tactically works quite well in favour of the mutualist theist. In fact, what makes the revisionist assumption in question even more implausible is that it would have the rather curious result that the entire Bible tells us little or nothing about God's being, since covenantal language is present throughout the entire Scripture, from Gen. 3:15 to Rev. 21:3. As I hinted above, the modern mutualist's move is quite similar to the move of Edwards' deistic adversary: as the deist made the Bible exclusively and strictly about human history (which supposedly rules out divine origin and intervention), so the mutualist makes the Bible exclusively and strictly about God's relation to His people intended in a mutualistic way (thus supposedly ruling out at the very outset the classical Scriptural understanding of God). Thus, by assuming this mutualistic metaphysical presupposition, the mutualist naturally excludes from Scripture any content that contrast with that assumes framework, including, of course, sound and Biblical classical theism. In fact (and quite tellingly), the mutualist does not claim that the specific passages in question (such as 1 Sam. 15:29, Psalm 102, Mal. 3:6, Jam. 1:17, from here called A) do not teach anything at all about God's being, but the mutualist claims that these passages do that only within the limits of the mutualistic and mutabilist assumption here discussed. Let us further analyse this last point.
In addition to what I have expounded in the previous paragraph, mutualists often point at passages such as Gen. 18:23-33 and Exo. 32:7-14 (from here called B) where Abraham and Moses pray the Lord for mercy. Usually, the mutualist approaches these texts with an attitude very similar to the one that positivists have when it comes to science and empirical evidence: they claim a sort of absolute objectivity and neutrality. The concept of "a natural reading of the passage" is often mentioned, that is, a "natural reading" of these passages that supposedly teaches the mutability of God, at least in certain respects. Often, little or none exegesis is given for this kind of passages, and a mutualistic view of God is simply assumed as the clear teaching of the passages. However, when it comes to passages such as B and similar, the "natural reading" approach conveniently disappears, and it is thoroughly substituted by acrobatic exegesis aimed at not making those passages saying what they say, that is, that God is immutable in His being. This is one side of the arbitrary and self-contradictory exegetical approach of old and new theistic mutualism.
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| John Calvin (1509-1564). |
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| Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). |
Another side of the unreasonableness of this mutualistic exegetical approach is evident also from another point of view. Passages B are descriptive passages. With this, I mean that they record some specific historical events, in our cases, God's conversations in time with two of His chosen men (Abraham and Moses, respectfully). In this conversations, God talks the way a man talks, and inescapably so, since man is the inferior party in these interactions and, therefore, God has to adapt His revelation to man's epistemological limits. Therefore, God reveals Himself through discursive language because man cannot understand or communicate differently, man cannot transcend his own epistemological limits. But God, even though eternal and immutable, can and does enter into His temporal and changeable creation by "accommodating" his revelation to man's capacity and by expressing His eternal and immutable will through temporal and created words. This is the reason why He uses expressions that convey changeableness, such as "repenting," that is, He does that for understanding purposes to favour the comprehension of limited creatures, and not in order to make ontological statements about His supposed mutable being. This is God's language of accommodation that Aquinas and Calvin explain. Here is what Helm says.
"[In the Bible] the language that asserts or implies change in God invariably has to do with divine-human dialogue, to those situations in which God speaks to and acts on behalf of his people and his people speak and act in return ... It is a logically necessary condition of dialogue between persons that each of the partners should appear to act and react in time. If dialogue between God and humankind is to be real and not make-believe, then God cannot represent himself (in his role as dialogue partner) as wholly immutable, for then it would be impossible for him to elicit certain kinds of responses from his people. His purpose for his people, on whose behalf he intervenes in time, cannot be expressed in wholly immutable fashion. The fundamental point is that such language is not dispensable but necessary. If a timelessly eternal God is to communicate to embodied intelligent creatures who exist in space and time and to bring about his purpose through them, and particularly to gain certain kind of responses from them, as a part of the process he must do so by representing himself in ways that are not literally true." ~ Paul Helm, "Is God Bound by Time?," in God Under Fire: Modern Scholarship Reinvents God, 128-129.
Helm then goes on by explaining that God's language of accommodation is not a purely speculative and metaphysical principle imported in the Scripture, as many mutualists wrongly claim. Rather, it reflects what God and His salvific plan are all about for us.
The language of change that God uses of himself is not the whole story about God any more than the use of anthropomorphic language is. Nor is it there for rhetorical or ornamental effect, but its use takes us to the heart of biblical religion. So God accommodates himself to the human condition, and statements such as 'God repented' are false if taken literally, because God cannot literally repent, and cannot do so. ~ Ibid., 129 (Helm continues by saying that such non-literall expressions do not imply any insincerity from God inasmuch as such supposed insincerity only follow if the literalistic approach is assumed).
However, what the mutualist does with these descriptive passages (or divine-human dialogue passages, as Helm calls them) is that he deduces normative (in the sense of positive) truths regarding God's supposed mutability. In other words, since God in the passages in question uses human language that is inevitably discursive and extended in time, they then conclude that God is mutable in His mind and in His being. But these descriptive statements about revelational divine events taking place in time do not necessarily imply normative truths about God's supposed changeableness, and this becomes even truer if we consider that in these passages this aspect of God's being is not addressed. That description necessarily implies normativity is a rather basic fallacy, but one not uncommon among the claims and exegeses of theistic personalists. This is not to say that passages B tells us nothing about God's nature, but the fact is that what we can gather from passages B is not that God is mutable, nor that there is contingency is Him, but merely that He is a gracious God that has pity to His people and listens to their prayers. All these things do not in any way necessarily imply any mutability in Him.
Moreover, as if what has been said so far is not enough, there is something more. Also passages A are descriptive passages which contain some history. In this sense, most of the Bible is historical either in the sense that it records some historical past event or that it has to do with history in some other way (for instance, eschatology). However, the point here is that passages A are not only descriptive, but in them God's being in its immutable aspect is directly addressed and described. Since this is the case, we can deduce from them positive truths about God's immutable essence. However, the mutualist rejects them on the basis of the abovementioned unreasonable and question-begging assumption according to which a passage that teaches something about God's covenantal faithfulness tells us little or nothing about the immutable nature of God. Therefore, the mutualist ignores the Bible passages that tell us positive truths about God as being immutable (passages A) while, at the same time, making the peculiar claim that passages B where God "accommodate himself" to man's understanding presumedly tell us positive truths about His supposed mutability of nature, when they actually do not do that. The mutualist often says that the Biblical ontological predications about God have to be limited by the context, and rightly so, since context is essential. However, the irony is that the mutualist claim to deduce ontological predictions about God's supposed mutable being from passages B where not only God's presumed changeableness of being is nowhere indicated, but passages B are actually those passages where most clearly both the context and the content limit the ontological predications that can be made about God. In fact, what we can gather from passages B is that God is a gracious God and that He listens to the prayers of His people. They certainly do not allow us to conclude that He is mutable inasmuch as said divine gracefulness does not in any way implies the mutability that the mutualist wants to read in such passages.
Also here, it is easy to see that such inconsistent exegeses work tacitly in favour of the theistic mutualism. In fact, since God cannot but use human discursive language in order to reveal Himself to limited creatures, and since from this isolated fact the mutualist fallaciously deduces ontological predictions such as God's mutability and passibility, then, with this inconsistent principle assumed, every instance in the Bible where God talks to someone by using human language (basically almost everywhere) punctually becomes an occasion for the mutualist's cry: "See! The 'natural reading' of the passage shows that God is mutable." This incoherent way of reading the Bible is one of the reasons why many mutualists feel free to accuse classical theists to limit themselves only to few verses, while they supposedly read the Biblical account in its entirety for what it "naturally" conveys. Of course, as shown in the previous paragraphs, this last statement (which incarnates the abovementioned "natural reading" chimera) truly means that the mutualist reads ontological mutabilist ideas about God's essential nature where there are none (passages B), while either ignoring or mutilating other verses (passages A) that directly address and describe God's being as immutable. No wonder, then, that once this self-contradictory mutualistic framework is assumed, the Bible assumes the misguided appearance of supporting theistic personalism.
Also here, it is easy to see that such inconsistent exegeses work tacitly in favour of the theistic mutualism. In fact, since God cannot but use human discursive language in order to reveal Himself to limited creatures, and since from this isolated fact the mutualist fallaciously deduces ontological predictions such as God's mutability and passibility, then, with this inconsistent principle assumed, every instance in the Bible where God talks to someone by using human language (basically almost everywhere) punctually becomes an occasion for the mutualist's cry: "See! The 'natural reading' of the passage shows that God is mutable." This incoherent way of reading the Bible is one of the reasons why many mutualists feel free to accuse classical theists to limit themselves only to few verses, while they supposedly read the Biblical account in its entirety for what it "naturally" conveys. Of course, as shown in the previous paragraphs, this last statement (which incarnates the abovementioned "natural reading" chimera) truly means that the mutualist reads ontological mutabilist ideas about God's essential nature where there are none (passages B), while either ignoring or mutilating other verses (passages A) that directly address and describe God's being as immutable. No wonder, then, that once this self-contradictory mutualistic framework is assumed, the Bible assumes the misguided appearance of supporting theistic personalism.
Keeping in mind what has been said so far (particularly regarding the right way of reading passages B), the self-contradictory nature of the exegetical approach of personalistic theism appears even more bizarre if we consider the absurdities that it would imply if coherently applied to the Scripture. For instance, since God asked Cain where his brother Abel was (Gen. 4:9), and since such superficial reading of this question "implies" ignorance and unawareness in God (as a superficial reading of passages B "implies" mutability in Him), then using the same mutualistic approach, God did not really know where Abel was. Similarly, He really did not know where Adam was when He said: "Where art thou" (Gen. 3:9). Of course, many mutualists would reject the logical consequences of their literalistic approach to Scriptures, but this only in contradiction with their own dysfunctional assumptions used to read the Bible.
Many personalist theists accuse classical theists to arbitrarily appealing to "mystery." In light of the considerations mentioned above, it seems to me that the real problem is that for much of today's theistic mutualism there is either no or little mystery in our knowledge of the divine Being. For many mutualists, if something about God does not seem to fit into the limits of our human limited perception and unaided reason, then we have to make it fit, so that any kind of mystery may disappear, with the result of radically changing the doctrine of God that Christian orthodox believers and thinkers have endorsed for about 2000 years. In this sense, mutualism often seems to entail a modified version of rationalism according to which God has to be comprehended (that is, fully grasped and embraced by the human mind) and therefore put within the limits of man's reason and perception. This attitude is opposed to letting our reason to understand (that is, to gain a coherent knowledge of Him within man's epistemological and creaturely limits and to the extent that is given to us) the God of the Scriptures who is "a being than which nothing greater can be thought" (with all the other theological truths about God's nature that this statement entails, as shown in Anselm's Monologion and Proslogion).
Here, I have offered several initial (and at points general) considerations about the topic of God's immutability. I hope to show in the next blog posts even more how the Scriptures clearly teach the immutability of God's being and plan (and the latter does not necessarily exclude the former, as mutualists fallaciously claim). If I will have the time to do that, I will do it also aided by the giants of the past, as usual. This is another aspect where much contemporary theistic personalism is seriously lacking: a sufficient and/or correct understanding and appreciation of the enormous exegetical, theological, and philosophical evidence that the classical theistic tradition has to offer to its support. However, a coherently Biblical view of the Church (and of the consequent development of dogma) acknowledges the importance of properly knowing what the orthodox believers of the past really thought, and to get to know their Biblical and theological arguments in order to understand why they believed what they believed. Otherwise, the danger of chronological snobbery would be always upon us. In addition to the inconsistent and arbitrary approaches mentioned above, chronological snobbery usually makes grandiose claims about the classical theistic tradition (such as the unsubstantiated claim according to which classical theism does not have and has not offered Biblical support for its teachings). Moreover, while usually accusing classical theists of appealing to authority, many mutualists among the chronological snobs arbitrarily limit themselves only to a selected group of innovations from the last few decades (I myself have witnessed more than once individuals appealing to Richard Bauckham and to the highly controversial N. T. Wright as they have, for some inexplicable reason, the ultimate authority on everything), and attitude that almost always prevents a proper understanding of the past.
Not that knowing this history and writers is in and of itself sufficient (otherwise, we fall into the opposite extreme of the chronological snobs). Rather, the knowledge and understanding of the theological and Scriptural arguments they offer in support of classical theism are what interests us. What is needed is a posture of humility and teachableness, and not the arrogance of an unhelpful sense of intellectual superiority fallaciously dictated by the mere fact to be chronologically placed after (a section of) the classical tradition. Such arrogance is even aggravated when this tradition is not really known or understood. Finally, this attitude will turn against itself because, when the "future will arrive," the chronological snobs of the present might be snubbed by the chronological snobs of the future.
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| Anselm of Canterbury (1033/4-1109). |
Here, I have offered several initial (and at points general) considerations about the topic of God's immutability. I hope to show in the next blog posts even more how the Scriptures clearly teach the immutability of God's being and plan (and the latter does not necessarily exclude the former, as mutualists fallaciously claim). If I will have the time to do that, I will do it also aided by the giants of the past, as usual. This is another aspect where much contemporary theistic personalism is seriously lacking: a sufficient and/or correct understanding and appreciation of the enormous exegetical, theological, and philosophical evidence that the classical theistic tradition has to offer to its support. However, a coherently Biblical view of the Church (and of the consequent development of dogma) acknowledges the importance of properly knowing what the orthodox believers of the past really thought, and to get to know their Biblical and theological arguments in order to understand why they believed what they believed. Otherwise, the danger of chronological snobbery would be always upon us. In addition to the inconsistent and arbitrary approaches mentioned above, chronological snobbery usually makes grandiose claims about the classical theistic tradition (such as the unsubstantiated claim according to which classical theism does not have and has not offered Biblical support for its teachings). Moreover, while usually accusing classical theists of appealing to authority, many mutualists among the chronological snobs arbitrarily limit themselves only to a selected group of innovations from the last few decades (I myself have witnessed more than once individuals appealing to Richard Bauckham and to the highly controversial N. T. Wright as they have, for some inexplicable reason, the ultimate authority on everything), and attitude that almost always prevents a proper understanding of the past.
Not that knowing this history and writers is in and of itself sufficient (otherwise, we fall into the opposite extreme of the chronological snobs). Rather, the knowledge and understanding of the theological and Scriptural arguments they offer in support of classical theism are what interests us. What is needed is a posture of humility and teachableness, and not the arrogance of an unhelpful sense of intellectual superiority fallaciously dictated by the mere fact to be chronologically placed after (a section of) the classical tradition. Such arrogance is even aggravated when this tradition is not really known or understood. Finally, this attitude will turn against itself because, when the "future will arrive," the chronological snobs of the present might be snubbed by the chronological snobs of the future.
"Let us, therefore, say nothing of those who, with an over carnal mind, have thought the nature of the Word of God, and the Wisdom, which, remaining in herself, makes all things new, whom we call the only Son of God ... to be changeable." ~ Augustine of Hippo, On the Trinity, 2.8.14.
"My days are like a shadow that declineth; and I am withered like grass. But thou, O Lord, shalt endure for ever; and thy remembrance unto all generations ... I said, O my God, take me not away in the midst of my days: thy years are throughout all generations. Of old hast thou laid the foundation of the earth: and the heavens are the work of thy hands. They shall perish, but thou shalt endure: yea, all of them shall wax old like a garment; as a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed: but thou art the same, and thy years shall have no end. The children of thy servants shall continue, and their seed shall be established before thee." ~ Psalm 102: 11-12, 24-28.
