Augustine and Luther on the "Offensive" Beauty of the Truth

The brightest redemption 
through the darkest death.
The greatest light
through the blackest darkness. 
Albrecht Dürer, The Great Calvary.

There are two very interesting passages that Augustine and Luther offer in Confessions (397-400) and Lectures on Romans (1515-1516) respectively. They describe truth as offensive to fallen man. More specifically, Augustine and Luther believe that fallen mankind loves the truth when it appears attractive, while it hates the truth when it appears unattractive and when it is rebuking. I have always found these passages fascinating. 

In Confessions 10.23.33, Augustine says that all men seek after happiness. Nevertheless, not all men seek true happiness, but only what they perceive to be true happiness.  In fact, "a happy life is joy in the truth." But God is Truth, and "this is a joying in Thee, Who art the Truth, O God my light, health of my countenance, my God." 

For Augustine, these considerations prompt a question: "why doth 'truth generate hatred,' and the man of Thine, preaching the truth, become an enemy to them?" (10.23.34). The entire passage needs to be quoted entirely in order to provide its entire content and context. Moreover, I think it is so beautiful and insightful that it deserves to be quoted at length. 

"But why doth 'truth generate hatred,' and the man of Thine, preaching the truth, become an enemy to them? whereas a happy life is loved, which is nothing else but joying in the truth; unless that truth is in that kind loved, that they who love anything else would gladly have that which they love to be the truth: and because they would not be deceived, would not be convinced that they are so? Therefore do they hate the truth for that thing's sake which they loved instead of the truth. They love truth when she enlightens, they hate her when she reproves. For since they would not be deceived, and would deceive, they love her when she discovers herself unto them, and hate her when she discovers them. Whence she shall so repay them, that they who would not be made manifest by her, she both against their will makes manifest, and herself becometh not manifest unto them. Thus, thus, yea thus doth the mind of man, thus blind and sick, foul and ill-favoured, wish to be hidden, but that aught should be hidden from it, it wills not. But the contrary is requited it, that itself should not be hidden from the Truth; but the Truth is hid from it. Yet even thus miserable, it had rather joy in truths than in falsehoods. Happy then will it be, when, no distraction interposing, it shall joy in that only Truth, by Whom all things are true." ~ Augustine, Confessions, 10.23.34. Emphasis added.

Two things have to be kept in mind while reading this passage: 1) mankind is fallen into sin, and 2) the truth Augustine is referring to is God. Augustine is giving us an explanation of how the fall of mankind into sin has affected men to the point of corrupting not only their ethical nature but also damaging their epistemological power to the point of willful self-deception. The African tells us that men, because of their fallenness, prefer convincing themselves that what they believe is be the truth even when that is shown not to be the case, revealing that "because they would not be deceived, would not be convinced that they are so." This leads them to "hate the truth for that thing's sake which they loved instead of the truth." When it comes to the true Truth, that is God, "they love truth when she enlightens, they hate her when she reproves." This is because, for Augustine, the good news of the gospel of God also contains a "bad news," that is, that man is sinful and in desperate need of the Saviour (for example, see On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin, 1.8.9, 1.9.10). When the Truth reveals herself, she always necessarily reveals man for what he is, that is, fallen and sinful. Thus, fallen men love the potential benefits they can have from the Truth, but they hate her when the Truth tells them what they are and what they need, or "they love her when she discovers herself unto them, and hate her when she discovers them." 

I think this passage of Augustine can also be read in this way. All men love the idea of having the truth, of believing the truth, and of knowing the truth: "I ask any one, had he rather joy in truth, or in falsehood? They will as little hesitate to say 'in the truth,' as to say 'that they desire to be happy' ... I have met with many that would deceive; who would be deceived, no one. Where then did they know this happy life, save where they know the truth also? For they love it also, since they would not be deceived" (10.23.33). However, the truth of God rebukes man in his sinful state, and rightly so, because man needs to know and acknowledge his misery before properly understanding his need for the gospel. When this happens, natural man hates the truth, even though he loves the general idea of knowing the truth and the potential benefits of this knowledge. And this hatred always appears in the case of natural, unregenerate men whose fallen spiritual state cannot but manifest itself into hatred for the Truth. Therefore, even though all men love the idea of truth, fallen men hate the Truth, which will always appear to them in a different if not opposite way than they expected. 

My previous statement seems further expounded by another Augustinian passage that, again, I will quote at length. Here, Augustine talks about divine Wisdom curing mankind's spiritual wounds, "some of them by their opposites, some of them by their likes" (On Christian Doctrine, 1.14.13), "opposites" which he elsewhere says "might be called in Latin ‘oppositions,’ or, to speak more accurately, ‘contrapositions’" (The City of God, 11.18), thus creating "an exquisite poem set off with antitheses" (Ivi).

"As the use of remedies is the way to health, so this remedy took up sinners to heal and restore them. And just as surgeons, when they bind up wounds, do it not in a slovenly way, but carefully, that there may be a certain degree of neatness in the binding, in addition to its mere usefulness, so our medicine, Wisdom, was by His assumption of humanity adapted to our wounds, curing some of them by their opposites, some of them by their likes. And just as he who ministers to a bodily hurt in some cases applies contraries, as cold to hot, moist to dry, etc., and in other cases applies likes, as a round cloth to a round wound, or an oblong cloth to an oblong wound, and does not fit the same bandage to all limbs, but puts like to like; in the same way the Wisdom of God in healing man has applied Himself to his cure, being Himself healer and medicine both in one. Seeing, then, that man fell through pride, He restored him through humility. We were ensnared by the wisdom of the serpent: we are set free by the foolishness of God. Moreover, just as the former was called wisdom, but was in reality the folly of those who despised God, so the latter is called foolishness, but is true wisdom in those who overcome the devil. We used our immortality so badly as to incur the penalty of death: Christ used His mortality so well as to restore us to life. The disease was brought in through a woman's corrupted soul: the remedy came through a woman's virgin body. To the same class of opposite remedies it belongs, that our vices are cured by the example of His virtues. On the other hand, the following are, as it were, bandages made in the same shape as the limbs and wounds to which they are applied: He was born of a woman to deliver us who fell through a woman: He came as a man to save us who are men, as a mortal to save us who are mortals, by death to save us who were dead. And those who can follow out the matter more fully, who are not hurried on by the necessity of carrying out a set undertaking, will find many other points of instruction in considering the remedies, whether opposites or likes, employed in the medicine of Christianity." ~ On Christian Doctrine, 1.14.13.

There are several passages where Luther adopts a very similar idea and language to those of Augustine. Especially (but not exclusively) in his early career, Luther often used what is usually called the sub contra specie principle (under opposite appearances). Truth always reveals itself in the opposite way that man expects. Therefore, man always wants and expects the opposite of what God has actually revealed.

"It is characteristic of us that we love truth and righteousness. Hence, we cling to truth when it has an attractive appearance, but we despise it when it appears to be unattractive–as it always does, as we can see in Christ who 'had no form or comeliness' (Isa. 53:2). So it is the case for every truth that goes counter to our thinking." ~ Luther, Lectures on Romans, 96.

Elsewhere in the same work, Luther provides some more comments on how Christ perfectly exemplifies this sub contra specie principle. Moreover and very interestingly, he mentions Augustine himself and how God salvifically worked in his life in a similar way.

"In this way he [God] acted in his proper work [see also Luther's distinction between opera aliena and opera propria, alien work and proper work], in that which is the foremost of his works and the pattern of all of them, i.e., in Christ. When he wanted to glorify him, he made him die, he caused him to be confounded and to descend into hell, contrary in the utmost to what all his disciples fervently wished and hoped in their devoutest thoughts. So he dealt with Blessed Augustine, when he let him fall deeper and deeper into error despite the prayer of his mother, so that he might grant it to her beyond her asking. And so he deals with all saints.” ~ Luther, Lectures on Romans, 242. Emphasis added.

As in Augustine, these upside down expectations are caused by man's sinfulness.

"We must always be ready to surrender our point of view so that we do not stumble on this rock of offense (cf. Rom, 9:32; Isa. 8:14), i.e., the truth which in humility stands over against us and is contrary to what we think it ought to be. We are so presumptuous as to believe that only what we think is the truth, and we want to hear and see as truth only what we agree with and approve. But this cannot be." ~ Luther, Lectures on Romans, 103.

Of course, these considerations have implications on how Luther sees salvation. The Reformer takes 1 Cor 1:20–31 as a paradigm ( for example, in thesis 19). God, to oppose the expectation of the Gentiles, purposely determined to show his wisdom in the foolishness (mind the opposite terms) of a crucified Messiah. God decreed to show his power through the weakness of the scandal of a crucified Saviour, in opposition to the expectation of a mighty, earthly saviour. Not that the message of Christ crucified is scandal and foolishness in itself, but in the perception of fallen man. Fallen mankind desire power and glory, even though he is undeserving, while the incarnate Word forsook power and glory in order to become weak and humble.  

“For our good is hidden and that so deeply that it is hidden under its opposite. Thus our life is hidden under death, self-love under self-hatred, glory under shame, salvation under perdition, the kingdom under banishment, heaven under hell, wisdom under foolishness, righteousness under sin, strength under weakness. And generally any yes we say to any good under a no, in order that our faith may be anchored in God.” ~ Luther, Lectures on Romans, 264.

I have argued elsewhere that a very good case can be made to show that Luther is relying on Augustine for the formulation of his sub contra specie principle. Even in the case these parallels do not prove a direct influence of Augustine on Luther on this point, in my opinion, they show at the very least an indirect influence. After all, the principle here discussed powerfully appears in Luther's Heidelberg Disputation (for example, theses 3-4), theses that Luther claims to have deduced "from St. Paul ... and also from St. Augustine, his most trustworthy interpreter" (Preface). Furthermore, it is clear from Luther's own early works that he has in mind a substantial Augustinian framework while writing. 

Second picture: Augustine, by Sandro Botticelli.

Third picture: Luther, by Lucas Cranach the Elder.

©

The Immutable God of the Bible: Considerations

 

"When someone starts to tinker with the doctrine of God, many simply assume that very clever people are engaged in improving tradition." ~ C. R. Trueman, in God without Passions: A Reader, 16.

From several conversations I have had and comments I have read on social media, I have noticed that many today's revisionists of the doctrine of God (those who reject the classical attributes of God, such as immutability, impassibility, etc.) often like to say that, since one of the themes of a Biblical passage (such as Mal. 3:6 and Psalm 102) is God's relational faithfulness, then the passage tells us nothing or little about the being of God, thus giving no or little basis to make ontological predications about God (here, I will use mutualism and theistic personalism as synonyms). However, this attitude is also present in many academic environments, as exemplified, one instance among many, in N. Wolterstorff's famous "God Everlasting," in God and the Good, 181-203. I wonder if this rather widespread assumption is also caused by the fabricated antithesis that many place between exegesis and systematic theology (as expounded, among many examples that could be mentioned, in the words of N. T. Wright; see Steven Duby for a much better perspective on this). I personally believe that that is one factor. Differently, good and Biblical classical theism does not engage in this sort of unsubstantiated claim (and the ones that will be expounded in here). Rather, it exegetes the Scripture in its entirety, whatever the passage may be.

The conclusions of the assumption mentioned above are a non sequitur. That God's faithfulness might be the main theme of a Biblical passage does not logically imply that that passage does not offer substantial material for our systematic theology of God. Carl F. H. Henry comments Wolterstorff's claims as follows.

"The prophet [Malachi] could surely have found, as Old Testament writers do elsewhere, a less circuitous way of stressing God's unswerving fidelity, had that been his exclusive concern ... Furthermore, Wolterstorff's insistence that 'no ontological claim whatever is being made' [in Mal. 3:6 and Psalm 102] prompts the question whether divine moral consistency is to be conceived as a nonontological predication: constancy of nature is what immutability is all about ... The second text cited by Wolterstorff is Psalm 102:37 ... We should note, unlike perishing and changeable things and creatures, God, adds the Psalmist, is unchanging: 'Thou art the same.' The declaration that God remains 'the same' would be an odd and curiously indirect way of saying that God has unending existence. Wolterstorff's interpretation rests on his antecedent bias against divine immutability." ~ C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, and Authority, Vol. V, 293.

Then, Henry continues by quoting a passage from Stephen Charnock's commentary on Psalm 102 as found in his famous The Existenceence and Attributes of God. In this Psalm, God and creation are clearly compared ontologically, as Charnock's contextual exegesis shows

"'Thou art the same' (Psalm 102:27). The essence of God, with all the perfections of his nature, are pronounced the same, without any variation from eternity to eternity; so that the text doth not only assert the eternal duration of God, but his immutability in that duration. His eternity is signified in that expression, 'Thou shalt endure;' his immutability in this, 'Thou art the same.' To endure, argues indeed his immutability as well as eternity; for what endures, is not changed, and what is changed, doth not endure; but 'Thou art the same' doth more fully signify it. He could not be the same if he could be changed into any other thing than what he is; the Psalmist therefore puts not thou halt been, or shalt be, but thou art the same, without any alteration. 'Thou art the same;' that is, the same God; the same in essence and nature; the same in will and purpose. Thou dost change all other things as thou pleanest, but thou art immutable in every respect, and receivest no shadow of change, though never so light and small. The Psalmist here alludes to the name Jehovah, I Am; and doth not only ascribe immutability to God, but exclude everything else from partaking in that perfection. All things else are tottering; God sees all other things in continual motion under his feet, like water passing away and no more seen; while he remains fixed and immovable; his wisdom and power, his knowledge and will, are always the same. His essence can receive no alteration, neither by itself, nor by any external cause; whereas other things either naturally decline to destruction, pass from one term to another, till they come to their period; or shall at the last day be wrapped up, after God hath completed his will in them and by them, as a man doth a garment he intends to repair and transform to another use. So that in the text, God, as immutable, is opposed to all creatures as perishing and changeable." ~ S. Charnock, The Existence and Attributes of God, Discourse 5, On the Immutability of God.

The question-begging assumption at issue also goes against common sense in that it fabricates an unnecessary and unrealistic airtight separation between "being" and "relationship," between "nature" and "action," between "essence" and "will." In fact, we intuitively know that the essential character of person x is also predicated by the kind of things x does or likes and by the kinds of persons that x communes with. For example, if x has a flourishing and functional marriage with woman y (a woman that has a certain specific essential character, specific attitudes, habits, specific, etc.) this tells us a lot about the kind of person x himself is. Similarly, if x has dysfunctional relationships caused by bad repeated actions and habits, this tells us a lot about the kind of person x is. Such radical separation between "nature" and "relationship" is counterintuitive, artificial, and it does not fit at all within a Scriptural framework. It is a metaphysical assumption imported in the Scriptures that, as far as I know, mutualists are very far from having demonstrated. As Jonathan Edwards pointed out, the acts and volitions that our nature produces through our will guided by our mind (including the acts and volitions of God's relationships with His people) are not causally isolated monads that tell us nothing or little about the kind of being we are. Rather, the necessary moral connection between a being's nature and his acts and volitions offer us much substantial information about the essential nature of that being. Common people intuitively make a necessary connection between a virtuous or vicious action with a virtuous or vicious nature. This necessary moral connection between an action and its moral agent is established with good reason, since choices are our properties, they belong to us, and they represent us, and, in a sense, they are us (see Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 182, 320-333, 427-428; Original Sin, 224). And if this is true for man, this is even truer for God who is perfect and lacks nothing and whose redeeming works always faithfully represent His nature.

These are some of the reasons why Mal. 3:6 and Jam. 1:17 tells us: "I am the Lord, I change not; therefore ye sons of Jacob are not consumed," and "Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning;" that is, God does not consume the sons of Jacob and is always ready to listen and answer prayers (God's merciful faithfulness) because He does not change in His being, and conversely, since He does not change in His being, so His plan of salvation that "he hath purposed in himself" even "before the foundation of the world" (Eph. 1:9, 4) does not change. Baines and Garrick comment Mal. 3:6 as follows.

"Mal. 3:6 is parallel in structure, each term of the first clause corresponding to one in the second. Thus 'I' corresponds to 'you,' 'the LORD' to 'sons of Jacob,' and 'do not change' corresponds to 'are not consumed.' Further, these clauses relate to each other as cause and effect. This is shown by the first word of the verse ('for') and the logical conjunction ('therefore') that introduces the second clause. It is because the LORD does not change that the sons of Jacob are not consumed. God’s claim of changelessness is not limited by the text. It is not any one attribute in particular to which he refers. God is speaking of his one, simple nature as God, YHWH." ~ R. S. Baines and S. Garrick, in Confessing the Impassible God, 132-133

Then, the two authors go on by quoting John Calvin's commentary on Mal. 3:6.

"Here the Prophet more clearly reproves and checks the impious waywardness of the people; for God, after having said that he would come and send a Redeemer, though not such as would satisfy the Jews, now claims to himself what justly belongs to him, and says that he changes not, because he is God. Under the name Jehovah, God reasons from his own nature; for he sets himself, as we have observed in our last lecture, in opposition to mortals; nor is it a wonder that God here disclaims all inconsistency, since the impostor Balaam was constrained to celebrate God’s immutable constancy — 'For he is not God,' he says, 'who changes,' or varies, 'like man.' (Num 23:19.) We now then understand the force of the words, I am Jehovah. But he adds as an explanation, I change not, or, I am not changed ... God continues in his purpose, and is not turned here and there like men who repent of a purpose they have formed, because what they had not thought of comes to their mind, or because they wish undone what they have performed, and seek new ways by which they may retrace their steps. God denies that anything of this kind can take place in him, for he is Jehovah, and changes not, or is not changed." ~ J. Calvin, Commentary on Malachi 3:6.

I find that the theistic personalist assumption in question is in principle quite similar to one of the common objection of the deists of old according to which, since the Bible has a strong historical character, then it cannot contain or teach divine truths and it cannot be therefore divine (I am not comparing mutualists to deists, I am only comparing two of their respective principles). To this kind of asburd objection, Jonathan Edwards answered that "to object against a book's being divine merely because it is historical is a silly objection, just as if that could not be the word of God that gives us an account of what is past, or as though it was not reasonable to suppose that God, in a revelation he should give mankind, would go to give us any relation of the dispensations of his own providence" (Jonathan Edwards, A History of the Work of Redemption, Sermon 13, 284). In a similar way, to object that the Bible is about God's faithfulness and then to conclude that, therefore, classical theism is not thought therein, is an absurd objection that entirely begs the question.

It is easy to see that this question-begging assumption tactically works quite well in favour of the mutualist theist. In fact, what makes the revisionist assumption in question even more implausible is that it would have the rather curious result that the entire Bible tells us little or nothing about God's being, since covenantal language is present throughout the entire Scripture, from Gen. 3:15 to Rev. 21:3. As I hinted above, the modern mutualist's move is quite similar to the move of Edwards' deistic adversary: as the deist made the Bible exclusively and strictly about human history (which supposedly rules out divine origin and intervention), so the mutualist makes the Bible exclusively and strictly about God's relation to His people intended in a mutualistic way (thus supposedly ruling out at the very outset the classical Scriptural understanding of God). Thus, by assuming this mutualistic metaphysical presupposition, the mutualist naturally excludes from Scripture any content that contrast with that assumes framework, including, of course, sound and Biblical classical theism. In fact (and quite tellingly), the mutualist does not claim that the specific passages in question (such as 1 Sam. 15:29, Psalm 102, Mal. 3:6, Jam. 1:17, from here called A) do not teach anything at all about God's being, but the mutualist claims that these passages do that only within the limits of the mutualistic and mutabilist assumption here discussed. Let us further analyse this last point.

In addition to what I have expounded in the previous paragraph, mutualists often point at passages such as Gen. 18:23-33 and Exo. 32:7-14 (from here called B) where Abraham and Moses pray the Lord for mercy. Usually, the mutualist approaches these texts with an attitude very similar to the one that positivists have when it comes to science and empirical evidence: they claim a sort of absolute objectivity and neutrality. The concept of "a natural reading of the passage" is often mentioned, that is, a "natural reading" of these passages that supposedly teaches the mutability of God, at least in certain respects. Often, little or none exegesis is given for this kind of passages, and a mutualistic view of God is simply assumed as the clear teaching of the passages. However, when it comes to passages such as B and similar, the "natural reading" approach conveniently disappears, and it is thoroughly substituted by acrobatic exegesis aimed at not making those passages saying what they say, that is, that God is immutable in His being. This is one side of the arbitrary and self-contradictory exegetical approach of old and new theistic mutualism. 

John Calvin
(1509-1564).

Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274).

Another side of the unreasonableness of this mutualistic exegetical approach is evident also from another point of view. Passages B are descriptive passages. With this, I mean that they record some specific historical events, in our cases, God's conversations in time with two of His chosen men (Abraham and Moses, respectfully). In this conversations, God talks the way a man talks, and inescapably so, since man is the inferior party in these interactions and, therefore, God has to adapt His revelation to man's epistemological limits. Therefore, God reveals Himself through discursive language because man cannot understand or communicate differently, man cannot transcend his own epistemological limits. But God, even though eternal and immutable, can and does enter into His temporal and changeable creation by "accommodating" his revelation to man's capacity and by expressing His eternal and immutable will through temporal and created words. This is the reason why He uses expressions that convey changeableness, such as "repenting," that is, He does that for understanding purposes to favour the comprehension of limited creatures, and not in order to make ontological statements about His supposed mutable being. This is God's language of accommodation that Aquinas and Calvin explain. Here is what Helm says.

"[In the Bible] the language that asserts or implies change in God invariably has to do with divine-human dialogue, to those situations in which God speaks to and acts on behalf of his people and his people speak and act in return ... It is a logically necessary condition of dialogue between persons that each of the partners should appear to act and react in time. If dialogue between God and humankind is to be real and not make-believe, then God cannot represent himself (in his role as dialogue partner) as wholly immutable, for then it would be impossible for him to elicit certain kinds of responses from his people. His purpose for his people, on whose behalf he intervenes in time, cannot be expressed in wholly immutable fashion. The fundamental point is that such language is not dispensable but necessary. If a timelessly eternal God is to communicate to embodied intelligent creatures who exist in space and time and to bring about his purpose through them, and particularly to gain certain kind of responses from them, as a part of the process he must do so by representing himself in ways that are not literally true." ~ Paul Helm, "Is God Bound by Time?," in God Under Fire: Modern Scholarship Reinvents God, 128-129.

Helm then goes on by explaining that God's language of accommodation is not a purely speculative and metaphysical principle imported in the Scripture, as many mutualists wrongly claim. Rather, it reflects what God and His salvific plan are all about for us.

The language of change that God uses of himself is not the whole story about God any more than the use of anthropomorphic language is. Nor is it there for rhetorical or ornamental effect, but its use takes us to the heart of biblical religion. So God accommodates himself to the human condition, and statements such as 'God repented' are false if taken literally, because God cannot literally repent, and cannot do so. ~ Ibid., 129 (Helm continues by saying that such non-literall expressions do not imply any insincerity from God inasmuch as such supposed insincerity only follow if the literalistic approach is assumed).

However, what the mutualist does with these descriptive passages (or divine-human dialogue passages, as Helm calls them) is that he deduces normative (in the sense of positive) truths regarding God's supposed mutability. In other words, since God in the passages in question uses human language that is inevitably discursive and extended in time, they then conclude that God is mutable in His mind and in His being. But these descriptive statements about revelational divine events taking place in time do not necessarily imply normative truths about God's supposed changeableness, and this becomes even truer if we consider that in these passages this aspect of God's being is not addressed. That description necessarily implies normativity is a rather basic fallacy, but one not uncommon among the claims and exegeses of theistic personalists. This is not to say that passages B tells us nothing about God's nature, but the fact is that what we can gather from passages B is not that God is mutable, nor that there is contingency is Him, but merely that He is a gracious God that has pity to His people and listens to their prayers. All these things do not in any way necessarily imply any mutability in Him.

Moreover, as if what has been said so far is not enough, there is something more. Also passages A are descriptive passages which contain some history. In this sense, most of the Bible is historical either in the sense that it records some historical past event or that it has to do with history in some other way (for instance, eschatology). However, the point here is that passages A are not only descriptive, but in them God's being in its immutable aspect is directly addressed and described. Since this is the case, we can deduce from them positive truths about God's immutable essence. However, the mutualist rejects them on the basis of the abovementioned unreasonable and question-begging assumption according to which a passage that teaches something about God's covenantal faithfulness tells us little or nothing about the immutable nature of God. Therefore, the mutualist ignores the Bible passages that tell us positive truths about God as being immutable (passages A) while, at the same time, making the peculiar claim that passages B where God "accommodate himself" to man's understanding presumedly tell us positive truths about His supposed mutability of nature, when they actually do not do that. The mutualist often says that the Biblical ontological predications about God have to be limited by the context, and rightly so, since context is essential. However, the irony is that the mutualist claim to deduce ontological predictions about God's supposed mutable being from passages B where not only God's presumed changeableness of being is nowhere indicated, but passages B are actually those passages where most clearly both the context and the content limit the ontological predications that can be made about God. In fact, what we can gather from passages B is that God is a gracious God and that He listens to the prayers of His people. They certainly do not allow us to conclude that He is mutable inasmuch as said divine gracefulness does not in any way implies the mutability that the mutualist wants to read in such passages.

Also here, it is easy to see that such inconsistent exegeses work tacitly in favour of the theistic mutualism. In fact, since God cannot but use human discursive language in order to reveal Himself to limited creatures, and since from this isolated fact the mutualist fallaciously deduces ontological predictions such as God's mutability and passibility, then, with this inconsistent principle assumed, every instance in the Bible where God talks to someone by using human language (basically almost everywhere) punctually becomes an occasion for the mutualist's cry: "See! The 'natural reading' of the passage shows that God is mutable." This incoherent way of reading the Bible is one of the reasons why many mutualists feel free to accuse classical theists to limit themselves only to few verses, while they supposedly read the Biblical account in its entirety for what it "naturally" conveys. Of course, as shown in the previous paragraphs, this last statement (which incarnates the abovementioned "natural reading" chimera) truly means that the mutualist reads ontological mutabilist ideas about God's essential nature where there are none (passages B), while either ignoring or mutilating other verses (passages A) that directly address and describe God's being as immutable. No wonder, then, that once this self-contradictory mutualistic framework is assumed, the Bible assumes the misguided appearance of supporting theistic personalism.

Keeping in mind what has been said so far (particularly regarding the right way of reading passages B), the self-contradictory nature of the exegetical approach of personalistic theism appears even more bizarre if we consider the absurdities that it would imply if coherently applied to the Scripture. For instance, since God asked Cain where his brother Abel was (Gen. 4:9), and since such superficial reading of this question "implies" ignorance and unawareness in God (as a superficial reading of passages B "implies" mutability in Him), then using the same mutualistic approach, God did not really know where Abel was. Similarly, He really did not know where Adam was when He said: "Where art thou" (Gen. 3:9). Of course, many mutualists would reject the logical consequences of their literalistic approach to Scriptures, but this only in contradiction with their own dysfunctional assumptions used to read the Bible.

Anselm of Canterbury (1033/4-1109).

Many personalist theists accuse classical theists to arbitrarily appealing to "mystery." In light of the considerations mentioned above, it seems to me that the real problem is that for much of today's theistic mutualism there is either no or little mystery in our knowledge of the divine Being. For many mutualists, if something about God does not seem to fit into the limits of our human limited perception and unaided reason, then we have to make it fit, so that any kind of mystery may disappear, with the result of radically changing the doctrine of God that Christian orthodox believers and thinkers have endorsed for about 2000 years. In this sense, mutualism often seems to entail a modified version of rationalism according to which God has to be comprehended (that is, fully grasped and embraced by the human mind) and therefore put within the limits of man's reason and perception. This attitude is opposed to letting our reason to understand (that is, to gain a coherent knowledge of Him within man's epistemological and creaturely limits and to the extent that is given to us) the God of the Scriptures who is "a being than which nothing greater can be thought" (with all the other theological truths about God's nature that this statement entails, as shown in Anselm's Monologion and Proslogion).

Here, I have offered several initial (and at points general) considerations about the topic of God's immutability. I hope to show in the next blog posts even more how the Scriptures clearly teach the immutability of God's being and plan (and the latter does not necessarily exclude the former, as mutualists fallaciously claim). If I will have the time to do that, I will do it also aided by the giants of the past, as usual. This is another aspect where much contemporary theistic personalism is seriously lacking: a sufficient and/or correct understanding and appreciation of the enormous exegetical, theological, and philosophical evidence that the classical theistic tradition has to offer to its support. However, a coherently Biblical view of the Church (and of the consequent development of dogma) acknowledges the importance of properly knowing what the orthodox believers of the past really thought, and to get to know their Biblical and theological arguments in order to understand why they believed what they believed. Otherwise, the danger of chronological snobbery would be always upon us. In addition to the inconsistent and arbitrary approaches mentioned above, chronological snobbery usually makes grandiose claims about the classical theistic tradition (such as the unsubstantiated claim according to which classical theism does not have and has not offered Biblical support for its teachings). Moreover, while usually accusing classical theists of appealing to authority, many mutualists among the chronological snobs arbitrarily limit themselves only to a selected group of innovations from the last few decades (I myself have witnessed more than once individuals appealing to Richard Bauckham and to the highly controversial N. T. Wright as they have, for some inexplicable reason, the ultimate authority on everything), and attitude that almost always prevents a proper understanding of the past.

Not that knowing this history and writers is in and of itself sufficient (otherwise, we fall into the opposite extreme of the chronological snobs). Rather, the knowledge and understanding of the theological and Scriptural arguments they offer in support of classical theism are what interests us. What is needed is a posture of humility and teachableness, and not the arrogance of an unhelpful sense of intellectual superiority fallaciously dictated by the mere fact to be chronologically placed after (a section of) the classical tradition. Such arrogance is even aggravated when this tradition is not really known or understood. Finally, this attitude will turn against itself because, when the "future will arrive," the chronological snobs of the present might be snubbed by the chronological snobs of the future.

"Let us, therefore, say nothing of those who, with an over carnal mind, have thought the nature of the Word of God, and the Wisdom, which, remaining in herself, makes all things new, whom we call the only Son of God ... to be changeable." ~ Augustine of Hippo, On the Trinity, 2.8.14.

"My days are like a shadow that declineth; and I am withered like grass. But thou, O Lord, shalt endure for ever; and thy remembrance unto all generations ...  I said, O my God, take me not away in the midst of my days: thy years are throughout all generations. Of old hast thou laid the foundation of the earth: and the heavens are the work of thy hands. They shall perish, but thou shalt endure: yea, all of them shall wax old like a garment; as a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed: but thou art the same, and thy years shall have no end. The children of thy servants shall continue, and their seed shall be established before thee." ~ Psalm 102: 11-12, 24-28.

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Interview on Luther and Augustine.

Two days ago, on 26 April 2018, in the exact day that celebrated the 500th anniversary of Martin Luther's Heidelberg Disputation (26 April 1518), I had the pleasure and the honour to be interviewed by Iron Sharpens Iron Radio's host Chris Arnzen. We discussed my book, Luther's Augustinian Theology of the Cross. We focused on Luther, the Reformation, Augustine of Hippo, the very strong connections between the two theological giants in matters of salvation, and more. Those who are interested can listen to the recorded interview on the radio's website.

I have never been interviewed in my life before. It was a good and instructing experience. Chris Arnzen is a dear brother and a gracious radio host who made the discussion both enjoyable and engaging at the same time. Iron Sharpens Iron is an enjoyable radio to listen to. This radio has interviewed many influential Reformed exponents in the past, before deciding to significantly lower the standard by interviewing me 😄 (jokes aside, please consider donating to it as donations are one of the vital sustainments of this free web radio). I also enjoyed answering questions from the listeners. I always find humbling to receive feedback telling me that my modest work has been beneficial to others. I was also glad to know that my speech on the radio was understandable in spite of my Italian accent. 🙂

I noticed that my book is available again on Wordery and BookDepository, after a period when it was described as unavailable. As usual, it is available on Amazon USA, on Amazon UK, on Wipf and Stock, and on Kindle E-Book. So far, to those interested in buying it, I personally suggest Wordery because it has free worldwide postage.

I conclude this short blog post (an announcement, more than a blog post as such) by quoting one of my favourite theses from Luther's Heidelberg Disputation, written in his usual and unique provocative style, followed by a long but worthy to be read quotation by Augustine that, in my view, significantly resonates with Luther's own thesis. 

Thesis 20. He deserves to be called a theologian, however, who comprehends the visible and manifest things of God seen through suffering and the cross. 
Proof: The manifest and visible things of God are placed in opposition to the invisible, namely, his human nature, weakness, foolishness. The Apostle in 1 Cor. 1:25 calls them the weakness and folly of God. Because men misused the knowledge of God through works, God wished again to be recognized in suffering, and to condemn "wisdom concerning invisible things" by means of "wisdom concerning visible things," so that those who did not honor God as manifested in his works should honor him as he is hidden in his suffering (absconditum in passionibus). As the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 1:21, "For since, in the wisdom of God, the world did not know God through wisdom, it pleased God through the folly of what we preach to save those who believe." Now it is not sufficient for anyone, and it does him no good to recognize God in his glory and majesty, unless he recognizes him in the humility and shame of the cross. Thus God destroys the wisdom of the wise, as Isa. 45:15 says, "Truly, thou art a God who hidest thyself." So, also, in John 14:8, where Philip spoke according to the theology of glory: "Show us the Father." Christ forthwith set aside his flighty thought about seeing God elsewhere and led him to himself, saying, "Philip, he who has seen me has seen the Father" (John 14:9). For this reason true theology and recognition of God are in the crucified Christ, as it is also stated in John 10 (John 14:6) "No one comes to the Father, but by me." "I am the door" (John 10:9), and so forth.

"There have been some philosophers of this world who have sought for the Creator by means of the creature; for He can be found by means of the creature, as the apostle plainly says, 'For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and glory; so they are without excuse.' And it follows, 'Because that, when they knew God;' he did not say, Because they did not know, but 'Because that, when they knew God, they glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened.' How darkened? It follows, when he says more plainly: 'Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools' (Rom 1:20-22). They saw whither they must come; but ungrateful to Him who afforded them what they saw, they wished to ascribe to themselves what they saw; and having become proud, they lost what they saw, and were turned from it to idols and images, and to the worship of demons, to adore the creature and to despise the Creator. But these having been blinded did those things, and became proud, that they might be blinded: when they were proud they said that they were wise. Those, therefore, concerning whom he said, 'Who, when they had known God,' saw this which John says, that by the Word of God all things were made. For these things are also found in the books of the philosophers: and that God has an only-begotten Son, by whom are all things. They were able to see that which is, but they saw it from afar: they were unwilling to hold the lowliness of Christ, in which ship they might have arrived in safety at that which they were able to see from afar and the cross of Christ appeared vile to them. The sea has to be crossed, and do you despise the wood? Oh, proud wisdom! You laugh to scorn the crucified Christ; it is He whom you see from afar: 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God.' But wherefore was He crucified? Because the wood of His humiliation was needful to you ... be carried in a ship, be carried by the wood: believe in the crucified One, and you shall arrive there. On account of you He was crucified, to teach you humility; and because if He should come as God, He would not be recognized. For if He should come as God, He would not come to those who were not able to see God. For not according to His Godhead does He either come or depart; since He is everywhere present, and is contained in no place. But, according to what did He come? He appeared as a man." ~ Augustine, Sermons on the Gospel of John, 2.4.

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A Passage from Augustine on Divine Immutability and Simplicity

Augustine of Hippo is one of those writers that you can read as carefully as possible, but at the second reading, you will always say at least once: "I forgot about this beautiful passage," or "I didn't really notice this before," or something like that. In a beautiful and very interesting passage, one of those I forgot about for years (I do not know how) of his On The Trinity (5.16.17), Augustine discusses the possibly problematic question of the relationship between the immutable and simple God and the composed and changeable creature. This difficulty has partly to do with some of the Biblical names ascribed to God, such as Lord and Master. The African theologian starts by asking a question that seems to posit some difficulties in conceiving a relationship between the immutable Creator and the mutable Creature. 

If a lord also is not so-called unless when he begins to have a slave, that appellation likewise is relative and in time to God; for the creature is not from all eternity, of which He is the Lord. How then shall we make it good that relative terms themselves are not accidental, since nothing happens accidentally to God in time, because He is incapable of change, as we have argued in the beginning of this discussion? 

Put in other words: if God is unchangeable, then He is eternally Lord. But, as Lord, He has to be Lord over something. But creation is not eternal but had a temporal beginning. Then, how can God be possible called "Lord" since there was not always something to be Lord over? Augustine offers an initial answer relying on the atemporality of God and the temporality of creation.

God, indeed, is alone eternal, and that times are not eternal on account of their variety and changeableness, but that times nevertheless did not begin to be in time (for there was no time before times began, and therefore it did not happen to God in time that He should be Lord, since He was Lord of the very times themselves, which assuredly did not begin in time). 

However, there could still be a difficulty if we think to those things that were not created at the very beginning, not with time but in time, such as, for instance, mankind itself, created on the sixth day of creation, according to the account of Genesis 2.

What will he reply respecting man, who was made in time, and of whom assuredly He was not the Lord before he was of whom He was to be Lord? ... How then shall we make it good that nothing is said of God according to accident?

For Augustine, there is only one possible answer worthy of the glorious being of God.

Nothing happens to His nature by which He may be changed, so that those things are relative accidents which happen in connection with some change of the things of which they are spoken.

God has always been Lord, Master, Creator, and so on. He did not need creation or any creature in order to be so because the concept of “need” presupposes a prior lack of something, but there is no lack of anything in God because He is fully self-sufficient and a se. Since God is the ultimate ground of all reality, and everything receives its existence from Him, these names that Augustine calls "relative accidents" denotes a change in the creature, not in the Creator.

We ought to admit, concerning that unchangeable substance of God, that something may be so predicated relatively in respect to the creature, that although it begin to be so predicated in time, yet nothing shall be understood to have happened to the substance itself of God, but only to that creature in respect to which it is predicated.

This is also true for the believer. The elect believer passes from a state of alienation from God to a state of communion with God. However, this does not necessarily imply mutability in God.

"Lord," it is said, "You have been made our refuge." God, therefore, is said to be our refuge relatively, for He is referred to us, and He then becomes our refuge when we flee to Him; pray does anything come to pass then in His nature, which, before we fled to Him, was not? In us therefore some change does take place; for we were worse before we fled to Him, and we become better by fleeing to Him: but in Him there is no change. So also He begins to be our Father, when we are regenerated through His grace, since He gave us power to become the sons of God. Our substance therefore is changed for the better, when we become His sons; and He at the same time begins to be our Father, but without any change of His own substance. Therefore that which begins to be spoken of God in time, and which was not spoken of Him before, is manifestly spoken of Him relatively; yet not according to any accident of God, so that anything should have happened to Him, but clearly according to some accident of that, in respect to which God begins to be called something relatively.

Now, elsewhere Augustine also says that "the Father loved us also before, not only before the Son died for us, but before He created the world; the apostle himself being witness, who says, 'According as He has chosen us in Him before the foundation of the world'" (13.11.15). Therefore, God "becomes" the believer's Saviour, Lord, Master, etc., only in an improper or relative sense, since He, as He is in Himself, has always been the Saviour, Lord, and Master of his elect people. 

When a righteous man begins to be a friend of God, he himself is changed; but far be it from us to say, that God loves any one in time with as it were a new love, which was not in Him before, with whom things gone by have not passed away and things future have been already done. Therefore He loved all His saints before the foundation of the world, as He predestinated them; but when they are converted and find them; then they are said to begin to be loved by Him, that what is said may be said in that way in which it can be comprehended by human affections. So also, when He is said to be angry with the unrighteous, and gentle with the good, they are changed, not He: just as the light is troublesome to weak eyes, pleasant to those that are strong; namely, by their change, not its own.

To enlarge Augustine's parallel between God and light, let us say (with reverence) that God is like a sun, our Sun. The rays of the Sun hit man x and man y. x's skin is covered with a suncream graciously given to him by a merciful Stranger, while y does not possess that gift. Through the protection of the suncream, x is enlightened and beautified. Without the suncream, y is blinded and burnt. The sunbeams are the same sunbeams, coming from the same Sun. Recognizing the limitation of human speech and the inevitable imperfections of the analogy, it can be said that so is the Triune God, shining in His immutable nature as one glorious simple being. The suncream is God's righteousness given in Christ through which x can benefit from God through Christ. God, in the simplicity of His nature and in the sameness with and of His attributes, acts and shines equally towards the elect whom He loves and the unrighteous whom He hates. The difference is that the elect are elected in the Son and loved by the Holy Spirit in eternity and redeemed by the Son incarned in time (a necessary thing, since they are temporal creatures) in order to be justified before God, reconciled to Him (and not Him to them, since He always loved them and was eternally favourable to them in Christ), and to partake of the Divine life through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit who, acording to Augustine, is the personal love and communion of God, love Himself, of the same essence of Father and of the Son (15.17.27-19-37). Differently, the reprobate are outside Christ (Sermons on John, 111.5) and, therefore, recipients of judgment, since God in His perfection cannot bear sin. In all this, "when He is said to be angry with the unrighteous, and gentle with the good, they are changed, not He: just as the light is troublesome to weak eyes, pleasant to those that are strong; namely, by their change, not its own" (5.16.17). 

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My Initial Two Cents Inspired by Dolezal-Frame: Metaphysical Disdain for Metaphysics

At the moment, in Protestant circles, there is a rather lively debate going on about the doctrine of God's nature. It seems it has been triggered by John Frame's review (followed by a 2nd and 3rd part) of J. E. Dolezal's book. In my opinion, the understanding of the God of Scripture is the real issue. The focus is especially on some of the divine incommunicable attributes, such as simplicity, immutability, and impassibility. I think this is the hinge of the entire dispute, and not merely the adoption or rejection of "Thomism" or of some tenets of that or of some other tradition (which would be a rather simplistic and reductionist view of the controversy).

What I would like to do here is to offer some very introductory considerations about the debate in relation to a rhetorical device I have seen in the controversy in question. I am referring to what I have called the metaphysical disdain for metaphysics that I have seen among many critics of Christian classical theism. With that, I am referring to the self-contradictory and demonizing lament of some adversaries of classical theism who never seem to miss the occasion to cry: "That's metaphysics, not exegesis!" I think that is an unnecessary and false dichotomy. I believe one thing on the background of the criticism of classical theism is the unnecessary and not-long-ago-produced dualism between biblical exegesis and systematic theology. In addition to this, In order to show why I think such claim is self-contradictory and demonizing, I will offer an imaginary dialogue to my reader. The following is not meant to represent any anti-classical theist in any accurate way. It is just a fictional dialogue, so no particular individual should feel offended. Nevertheless, it contains specific objections and attitudes that I have met on different occasions.

Anti Classical Theist: "Unlike you, I don't think we should interpret the Bible verses where God says to change His mind. I read them for what they 'simply' mean."

Classical Theist: "What about the verses that say that God or His mind do not change?"

ACT: "Well, you should interpret them."

CT: "...No way!"

ACT: "We ACTs interpret the Bible faithfully. Malachi 3:6 talks about the unchangeable plan of God, not about his nature. It's merely covenantal." 

CT: "Actually, the verse crystal clearly says that God's plan for his people doesn't change because He doesn't change. And what about James 1:13-18? Or Job 23:13? Are those "merely covenantal," too? Moreover, you have to prove that a passage which is covenantal logically excludes the fact that it is teaching us something about the nature of God. You can't just assume that acritically." 

ACT: "We ACTs interpret the Bible for what it really says."

CT: "You kinda said that already. What about the passage?"

ACT: "We ACTs don't ground exegesis on Greek philosophy."

CT: "That sounds like a strawman. Neither do we CTs. But if something is true, it's true, no matter who said it. So, Malachi..."

ACT: "We ACTs do not use metaphysics."

CT: " Oh, really? I wonder where terms and concepts such as essence, being, person, hypostasis, nature, and so on, come from. They are not literally in the Bible. Do you want to get rid of those, too? I guess you won't reject those, because they are found in the writings of the Fathers of the ancient church, thus being inconsistent with your own approach. God has to be explained somehow as much as it's possible, and words and definitions are useful for that. Of course you use metaphysics, just not the general framework that Christians has used for centuries."

ACT: "Nothing I have suggested disparages the use of extra-biblical terminology. Nobody does theology without using extra-biblical terminology."

CT: "No, sorry, but it isn't just a matter of mere 'terminology.' I fully agree with sola Scriptura and all its principles, and I also agree that exegesis is foundational. But your 'extra-biblical terminology' isn't just a gaseous set of merely neutral terms floating inactively in the air with no philosophical or ontological meaning, but they constitute a system that claims to understand better something. So, if you claim that the I need to make my case for using categories, exactly the same applies to you and to what you simplistically call 'extra-biblical terminology.' You cannot selectively and conveniently decide where to make that request to justify the method, but it applies to all cases, your 'extra-biblical terminology' not excluded. You should do that in a sufficiently clear way (and even then, I wonder how many terms and concepts you will still borrow from Scholasticism generally intended)."

ACT: "Wow! It looks like everybody's an expert metaphysician, now."

CT: "That's beside the point. Moreover, contrary to the implicit claim behind your sardonic remark, using metaphysical categories is not the same thing as being a professional metaphysician. If I teach theology to 9th graders, that doesn't necessarily mean I am a professional theologian, nor I necessarily need to be one in order to do that."

ACT: "You mentioned Scholasticism, but Aquinas hasn't solved everything."

CT: "Are you even listening to me? I never even mentioned Aquinas. But he has many good things to s..."

ACT: "Frame, Wright, and Bauckham agree with me."

CT: "You just implicitly accused me to merely rely on an authority I never mention, and now you mention three of your authorities just like that?"

ACT: "There is no detailed exegetical treatment of the doctrine of divine simplicity."

CT: "That is actually not true. First of all, you can find several exegetical nuggets not only in some Patristic and Medieval theologians, but also among the Reformed Scholastics. That they are not gathered in one single place or volume, that does not make your statement true. Then, I can think of one, or two, or three contemporary examples that directly contradict your claim. Plus numerous articles and book chapters."

ACT: "Sounds like docetism."

CT: "..."

I repeat what I have already said through CT in the imaginary dialogue. I think exegesis is foundational. But I wonder where categories such as essence, being, person, hypostasis, nature, and so on, come from. Certainly, we do not find them literally in the Bible. Shall we get rid of them, too? I guess today's Protestant theological revisionists will not reject these categories because they are found in the writings of the Fathers of the ancient church, thus being inconsistent with their own assumed approach. In fact, these terms and concepts are not just mere neutral terms that fly in the air like inactive ectoplasms with no ontological meaning whatsoever, but each of them does convey a specific meaning. God has to be explained somehow as much as it is possible, and words and definitions are useful for that. Protestant theological revisionists do use a metaphysics, they just do not use the general framework that Christianity has productively used for centuries.

Such unjustified shock for the teachings of Christian classical theism, and especially for the traditional categories used to express those teachings, reminds me of the following words of Jonathan Edwards. He wrote them in the context of his debate with Arminians and libertarians, but I think they are applicable also in our specific case.

It has often been objected ... [that we] run into nice scholastic distinctions, and abstruse metaphysical subtleties ... that it is very abstracted and metaphysical. If that be made an objection against the foregoing reasoning, that it is metaphysical, or may properly be reduced to the science of metaphysics, it is a very impertinent objection; whether it be so or no, is not worthy of any dispute or controversy. If the reasoning be good, 'tis as frivolous to inquire what science it is properly reduced to, as what language it is delivered in: and for a man to go about to confute the arguments of his opponent, by telling him, his arguments are "metaphysical," would be as weak as to tell him, his arguments could not be substantial, because they were written in French or Latin. The question is not, whether what is said be metaphysics, physics, logic, or mathematics, Latin, French, English, or Mohawk? but, whether the reasoning be good, and the arguments truly conclusive? The foregoing arguments are no more metaphysical, than those which we use against the Papists, to disprove their doctrine of transubstantiation; alleging, it is inconsistent with the notion of corporeal identity, that it should be in ten thousand places at the same time. 'Tis by metaphysical arguments only we are able to prove, that the rational soul is not corporeal; that lead or sand can't think; that thoughts are not square or round, or don't weigh a pound. The arguments by which we prove the being of God, if handled closely and distinctly, so as to show their clear and demonstrative evidence, must be metaphysically treated. 'Tis by metaphysics only, that we can demonstrate, that God is not limited to a place, or is not mutable; that he is not ignorant, or forgetful; that it is impossible for him to lie, or be unjust; and that there is one God only, and not hundreds or thousands. And indeed we have no strict demonstration of anything, excepting mathematical truths, but by metaphysics. We can have no proof, that is properly demonstrative, of any one proposition, relating to the being and nature of God, his creation of the world, the dependence of all things on him, the nature of bodies or spirits, the nature of our own souls, or any of the great truths of morality and natural religion, but what is metaphysical. I am willing, my arguments should be brought to the test of the strictest and justest reason, and that a clear, distinct and determinate meaning of the terms I use, should be insisted on; but let not the whole be rejected, as if all were confuted, by fixing on it the epithet "metaphysical." ~ Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, Part 4, Section 13.

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Young Thomas Aquinas Goes to Sunday School

"Come on, Tommy boy! Sing with us! 🎶 I have decided to follow Jesus! No turn... 🎶"

Thomas: "On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that 'predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits.' But foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who predestines, and not in the predestined. I answer that, predestination is not anything in the predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider, as was proved above (I:22:1). But the execution of providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active way in the governor. Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The execution of predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle (Romans 8:30): "Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He also magnified [Vulg. 'justified']." For more on this, see my forthcoming Summa Theologiae, 1st part, Q 23, A 2. See also Summa Theologiae, 1st part, A 23, Q 5."

"😐 ......Alrighty, then! I am sure you will like this new song. C' mon, Tom, join us! ♬ If you happy and you know it, clap your hands (clap👏 clap👏)! And if you are happ... ♫"

T.: "On the contrary, happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation. I answer that a thing may belong to happiness in three ways: 1) essentially, 2) antecedently, 3) consequently. Now the operation of sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man's happiness consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated Good, Which is his last end, as shown above (Article 1): to Which man cannot be united by an operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because, as shown above (I-II:2:5), man's happiness does not consist in goods of the body, which goods alone, however, we attain through the operation of the senses. Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the operation of the intellect demands a previous operation of the sense; consequently, in that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the resurrection, 'from the very happiness of the soul,' as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) "the body and the bodily senses will receive a certain overflow, so as to be perfected in their operations"; a point which will be explained further on when we treat of the resurrection (II-II:82-85). But then the operation whereby man's mind is united to God will not depend on the senses. You can read more on this in my forthcoming Summa Theologiae, 1st part of 2nd part, Q 3, A 3."

"😑 ......Thomas, sometimes, you really are no fun."

T.: "On the contrary, I answ..."

"Drop it."

T.: "Ok."

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Words in grey are my own and not Aquinas'.

R. L. Dabney on Natural and Revealed Theology

R. L. Dabney (1820–1898).

R. L. Dabney's The Practical Philosophy: Being the Philosophy of the Feelings, of the Will, and of the Conscience, With the Ascertainment of Practicular Rights and Duties (1897) is a very interesting book (there is also an open-access online version). I have read and consulted its third book, "The Will," because it seems to have some significant similarities with Jonathan Edwards' approach to the matter. I hope to have the time to write something about it in the future, also consulting other relevant places from Dabney's works.

While I was browsing the book, I came across the last chapter of the volume where Dabney discusses moral duties in relation to God. He then concludes with some remarks on natural and revealed theology. I find his words quite interesting, and I thought to report them here.

By the prevalent native disposition of men, duty to God for its own sake alone is not preferred, but disliked. The light of Natural Theology can do no more than present to the mind objects which, were the mind fundamentally moral, would attract it; but which naturally and in fact do not attract the immoral mind. What effective resource has Natural Theology, then, to work this moral revolution in which alone true reform and moral blessedness can originate?
Whence, then, are the effectual remedies for guilt and immorality to come? Philosophy is silent; it has no answer. To ascertain the solution we must pass into the domain of Revelation, the inculcation of which is the function of the Christian Church. Here, then, our study must end. And this is the impressive proof of its inferiority to its elder and divine sister, Christianity, that Philosophy, after leading us up to the greatest and most urgent of all problems, and redisclosing to us our guilt and moral disease, is compelled to turn over the great question of the remedy to the recorded Word of God, and retire confessing her own weakness to heal and save. Has this long course of her training been therefore useless? No; it has trained our power of thought. It has shown us many truths which are valuable, though they may not claim the primal worth and infallible certainty of God's messages. And its best gift to us will be derived if we learn its closing lesson of humility and of reverence for the "more sure word of Prophecy."

 ~ R. L. Dabney, The Practical Philosophy (Harrisonburg, VA: Sprinkle Publications, 1984), 521.

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